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STUDENT PRESS LAW: 
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
 
This dissertation will identify and describe the state of the law regarding student 
speech and press freedom.  The following questions will be explored: What rights do 
young people have?  What standards have state and federal courts established?  To what 
extent and how clearly have state statutes defined student expressive rights?  What do 
state laws say about this topic?  What issues have yet to be addressed, either because a 
case has not raised certain issues or because the issue does not lend itself to compromise 
or a clear solution?  How does the capacity of social media for widespread and rapid 
dissemination affect the balancing of First Amendment rights with other interests?  
Among other topics, the dissertation will discuss the development of First 
Amendment law, the strengthening of student expression law in the 1960s, the 
curtailment of student expression rights at the K-12 level in the 1980s, and state 
legislation that protects student expression at the K-12 and university levels.  The 
conclusion will contain strategies for the enhancement of students’ First Amendment 
rights.   
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PROLOGUE 
This dissertation will identify and explore the development of student free 
expression rights, with particular focus on cases and legislation that seek to balance such 
rights with the needs of school officials to maintain discipline and teach responsibility. 
The courts have struggled to develop consistent standards, especially with changing 
technology presenting new challenges.  As a result, student rights vary significantly from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, a potentially troubling development considering that the First 
Amendment is national in scope. 
It will be argued that students are entitled to much greater First Amendment 
protection than they are currently given in most states and that courts, legislators, and 
school officials have a constitutional obligation to provide such enhanced protection. 
Doing so will help students to learn valuable lessons about the importance of free 
expression in a democratic society and will better protect discussion of public issues. 
Federal and state courts have contributed to the development of freedom of 
speech and freedom of the press rights of young adults through a series of decisions that 
attempt to balance the First Amendment with the need for school officials to maintain a 
positive learning environment.  But because the U.S. Supreme Court has handed down 
few rulings that address these issues, lower federal and state courts have stepped in to 
deal with the difficult question of how much First Amendment protection should be 
granted to students, especially when their journalism skills are underdeveloped, and they 
may not understand that potential harm that inaccurate information or an invasion of 
privacy might cause.  Courts have not been alone in trying to define the boundaries of 
such rights. Several state legislatures have extended First Amendment protection to 
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student journalists—both in K-12 and at the college level—when their state courts 
seemed unwilling to enhance such rights. 
This dissertation will identify and discuss the most significant federal and state 
cases related to student expression.  It will also examine laws enacted by several state 
legislators that address these issues.  It will be argued that student rights—both at the K-
12 and college level—need to be enriched to protect the often important content that 
young journalists disseminate and to provide an environment where students can learn the 
importance of the First Amendment to a democratic society.  Attention will be paid to 
developing technology that makes it easier than ever for students to create content that is 
widely and quickly disseminated but also challenges school officials, parents, judges, and 
legislators to find the appropriate balance between student expression and other societal 
rights. 
In sum, this dissertation will explore the following questions: “To what extent do 
young adults, both K-12 and college students, enjoy freedom of speech and freedom of 
the press rights under the First Amendment?  How should those rights be balanced with 
other societal interests such as preventing interference with school discipline and 
maintaining a positive educational environment?”  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
 
ORIGINS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 
—First Amendment, U.S. Constitution 
During the fight for independence and the founding period, Americans distrusted 
a powerful, centralized government.  Their experience with the king and parliament made 
them wary of a distant and unaccountable authority that could limit their freedom and 
influence their financial lives so profoundly.  Thus, those who gathered in Philadelphia in 
1787 to write the Constitution wanted to create a new government that would be 
sufficiently strong to protect national interests while also maintaining the vitality of state 
governments, which many people in the new nation thought would help preserve 
individual liberties. 
Because several prominent Federalists at the Philadelphia convention expected 
the new federal government to be limited to the powers outlined in the proposed 
Constitution, they did not believe at first that a list of personal rights was necessary—or 
even a good idea.  They especially worried that debate over individual civil rights in the 
final days of the constitutional convention could unravel fragile compromises on other 
issues, and some expected that any rights left off the list would be subject to infringement 
by the new government from those arguing that such unenumerated rights were not meant 
to be protected.  
The Bill of Rights—the first 10 amendments to the U.S. Constitution—is largely 
credited to James Madison, who in 1789 was elected a member of the U.S. House in the 
first Congress.  Although Madison initially had doubts about the necessity of the 
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amendments, by the time he ran for election to the House from a district in central 
Virginia, he had come to believe that such additions to the Constitution were strongly 
supported by the people and would improve the new system.  In addition, North Carolina 
and Rhode Island—which objected to various sections of the Constitution—said they 
would not join the union without a list of individual rights and liberties to curb the 
potential tyranny of a strong centralized federal government.   
The House of Representatives approved 17 amendments, but the Senate 
eliminated some and combined others, eventually forwarding 12 amendments to the 
House.  Those 12 were sent to the states for approval in September of 1789.  Of those, 10 
were ratified, with Virginia the final state to ratify the amendments in December of 
1791.1   
Freedom of Speech: Influential Voices 
Numerous writers played a role in influencing the founders’ thinking on the value 
of freedom of speech and the press as they were incorporated into the First Amendment.  
For example, Cato’s Letters or Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious—a collection of 
letters and essays written in the early 18th century by two British writers under a 
pseudonym—were read by the founders both before and after the Revolution.  Letter No. 
15 (Feb. 4, 1720) states:  “Freedom of speech is the great bulwark of liberty; they prosper 
and die together: And it is the terror of traitors and oppressors, and a barrier against them.  
It produces excellent writers, and encourages men of fine genius.”  The language from 
Cato’s Letter No. 15 is reflected in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which was used as 
the model for the Bill of Rights.  Similarly, Letter No. 32 (“Reflections Upon Libelling”) 
addresses the law of libel and its impact on the freedom of press.2   
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Of the 13 state constitutions adopted during the revolutionary period, 10 
contained protections for speech or the press.3  For example, the Massachusetts 
Constitution stated:  “The Liberty of the Press is essential to the security of freedom in a 
State, it ought not, therefore, be restrained in this Commonwealth.”4  The New 
Hampshire Constitution stated: “The Liberty of the press is essential to the security of 
freedom in a State; it ought, therefore, to be inviolably preserved.”5  The Vermont 
Constitution combined speech and press for the first time, explaining that “the People 
have a Right to Freedom of Speech, and of writing and publishing their Sentiments; 
therefore the Freedom of the Press ought not to be restrained.”6   
The states also expressed their views about freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press when holding conventions to decide whether to ratify the proposed federal 
constitution.  The Proposal of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention of 
December 12, 1787, states: “The people have a right to the freedom of speech, of writing, 
and of publishing their sentiments, therefore, the freedom of the press shall not be 
restrained by any law of the United States.”  Likewise, the Maryland Ratifying 
Convention Proposal of April 29, 1788, states:  “The people have a right to freedom of 
speech, of writing and publishing their sentiments, and therefore … the freedom of the 
press ought not be restrained, and the printing presses ought to be free to examine the 
proceedings of government, and the conduct of its officers.”  
Free Speech and the Revolutionary Cause 
The right to speak freely, to publish one’s sentiments, to criticize government and 
public officials, was so important to those who formed the new nation that they 
frequently referred to such rights when seeking help for their revolutionary cause and 
when forming a new government after independence. 
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In an attempt to draw support for the American Revolution from the Canadian 
provinces, the First Continental Congress sent a message to the inhabitants of Quebec in 
1774, highlighting its views of basic freedoms.  The address specifically mentions press 
freedom, stating, “The importance of [freedom of the press] consists, besides the 
advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal 
sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts 
between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby 
oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated into more honorable and just modes of 
conducting affairs.”7 
Interpretations of the First Amendment 
Only seven years after the First Amendment became part of the Constitution, it 
became clear how precarious freedom of speech and press would be in the new republic.  
A Federalist Congress and President John Adams were willing to enact and sign a law 
that history has clearly determined was a violation of the First Amendment.  (The term 
“Federalist” originally referred to supporters of the Constitution, but by the 1790s was the 
name of the political affiliation of Washington, Adams, Hamilton, and others opposed to 
Jefferson’s political views.)  The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 came about after the 
French Revolution and during a turbulent conflict with France.  The acts gave the 
president the power to criminalize criticism of the president and Congress (but not Vice 
President Thomas Jefferson, a political enemy).  Purportedly aimed at curbing French and 
Irish immigration and protecting national security, the laws were intended to decrease the 
number of voters who (1) disagreed with the Federalist Party and (2) supported Thomas 
Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican party, many of whom were Irish and French 
immigrants.  The laws gave the executive branch wide discretion to deport those who 
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might create problems for the government and to punish newspaper publishers who 
criticized the administration.8  
Early 20th Century Interpretations 
Although the First Amendment became part of the Constitution in 1791, it was 
not until the early part of the 20th century that the Supreme Court began to interpret it.  In 
1907, the Court issued its first opinion in a press freedom case, Patterson v. Colorado.  
This case involved a request for the Court to review, under the First Amendment, a 
contempt-of-court conviction of U.S. Senator Thomas Patterson, who published a 
newspaper editorial ridiculing the Colorado State Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court held that it lacked jurisdiction because “what constitutes contempt, as well as the 
time during which it may be committed, is a matter of local law.”9  
The conclusion of the Court in the Patterson case reflects one of the least-
understood characteristics of our constitutional system.  For much of the nation’s history, 
the Bill of Rights—especially the First Amendment and Fourth through Eighth 
Amendments—applied only to the federal government.  In other words, if a state violated 
someone’s right to freedom of speech and freedom of the press, the First Amendment 
provided no help.  The Supreme Court had confirmed in Barron v. Baltimore in 1833 that 
the framers wanted to provide protection from the new, central government and were less 
worried about state infringement.  Note the text of the First Amendment: “Congress shall 
make no law …” (emphasis added).  The process of eventually requiring the states to 
abide by most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights took a long time.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment, ratified after the Civil War, offered the basis for the change when it 
included a provision saying, “…nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
5 
 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”10  
During World War I, free speech became more restricted.  In 1917, Congress 
passed the Espionage Act, criminalizing “insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal 
of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States,” and making it a crime to 
obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the U.S. military.11  Later in the war, 
Congress passed the Sedition Act, which outlawed spoken or printed criticism of the 
federal government, the U.S. Constitution, or the American flag.12   
“Clear and Present Danger” 
In 1919, in the case of Schenck v. U.S., Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes set forth 
his “clear-and-present-danger” test, part of which states:  
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present 
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a 
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is 
at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a 
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as 
men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any 
constitutional right.13 
The events of this case began when Charles T. Schenck and Elizabeth Baer, members of 
the Socialist Party, were accused of urging draftees to oppose the draft and “not submit to 
intimidation.”  In upholding the convictions, Holmes wrote that not all speech is 
protected by the First Amendment, and he cited the now-famous example of falsely 
shouting “fire” in a crowded theater.  In the same month, March 1919, the Court decided 
another sedition case, Debs v. United States, upholding the conviction of socialist 
presidential candidate Eugene V. Debs under the Espionage Act.  Debs was convicted for 
making speeches opposing World War I.  Holmes applied the “clear and present danger” 
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test by stating that Debs’s speeches had the “natural tendency and reasonably probable 
effect” of obstructing military recruitment.14  Importantly, the “clear and present danger” 
test features two independent conditions: first, the threat that a substantive evil (such as 
overthrowing the government) might follow from some speech, and second, the high 
likelihood of that threat having a negative impact.15  
There is great irony in the way the Court first interpreted the First Amendment.  
The amendment had been largely dormant for 125 years, since it was ratified in 1791, yet 
when the Court finally began to interpret it, the Court showed how limited was the 
protection for controversial speech.  Schenck’s dissemination of circulars to young men 
called up for the draft (which Holmes recognized had no impact) and Debs’s relatively 
tame speech in Canton, Ohio, (which mostly discussed capitalism and socialism and did 
not encourage lawless action) were considered unprotected speech at the time.  Holmes 
justified this intrusion on the First Amendment because the country was at war. 
The Abrams Dissent 
Later in 1919, the Court issued its decision in Abrams v. U.S., a case involving the 
conviction of five Russian immigrants under the Sedition Act.  Many legal scholars and 
historians consider Holmes’s dissent in Abrams as a defining moment in the evolution of 
modern free speech jurisprudence.  Before exploring the dissent, it is necessary to 
understand the context of the Court’s decision.  The Act made it a crime to “willfully 
utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about 
the form of the Government of the United States” or to “willfully urge, incite, or advocate 
any curtailment of the production” of the things “necessary or essential to the prosecution 
of the war.”16  The Russian immigrants (which included Jacob Abrams) produced leaflets 
criticizing the U.S. military’s involvement in Russia and advocated a general strike in 
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factories that made military supplies.  As with the decisions in Schenck and Debs, the 
Court upheld the convictions.  However, unlike in those cases, Holmes dissented.  The 
possible reasons for Holmes’s change of heart will be explored in the next chapter. 
Joined by Justice Louis Brandeis, Holmes wrote a dissent in Abrams that remains 
famous as one of the Court’s best defenses of free speech.  In it, Holmes introduced the 
“marketplace of ideas” concept, stating that because weak or dangerous ideas eventually 
will be supplanted by better ideas, the government must not censor speech.17  It is a 
theory the Supreme Court has often used in deciding free speech and free press cases.  
Holmes insisted that his opinions in Schenck and Debs had applied the correct 
constitutional standard.  He repeated in Abrams that the First Amendment does not 
protect “speech that produces or is intended to produce clear and imminent danger that it 
will bring about forthwith ... substantive evils.”18  But in his Abrams dissent, he modified 
his views by holding that speech may be restricted only if there is an explicit effort to 
incite lawless acts.  Holmes wrote about how problematic it would be to assume that “the 
surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man ... would present any 
immediate danger.”19   
Free Speech Protections Gain Momentum 
After 1919, the First Amendment tide began to turn.  Although the Court upheld 
the New York criminal anarchy statute in the 1925 case, Gitlow v. New York, in which 
Benjamin Gitlow was convicted for writing The Left Wing Manifesto, the Court held that 
the free-speech clause of the First Amendment applies to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.20  In the 1931 case Stromberg v. California, the Court 
overturned the state court conviction of a 19-year-old Communist under a state law 
prohibiting the display of a red flag as “an emblem of opposition to the United States 
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government.”  Stromberg was the first case in which the Court recognized that protected 
speech included symbolic expression.21   
Later in 1931, the Court decided Near v. Minnesota, a case involving a Minnesota 
statute that gave state court judges the power to enjoin as “nuisances” any “malicious, 
scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical.”  In this case, a 
county attorney obtained a court order preventing further publication of The Saturday 
Press.  But the Court struck down the Minnesota law, holding that it was “the essence of 
censorship.”  The Court recognized that the primary aim of the First Amendment free 
press right was to prevent prior restraints of the press, thus holding that, except in very 
rare cases, such censorship is unconstitutional.22  While Chief Justice Charles Evans 
Hughes’s opinion strengthened the First Amendment protection against prior restraint, it 
also held that prior restraint may be permitted under some circumstances.23  Nevertheless, 
Hughes noted that although freedom of the press may be abused, it does not make it any 
less necessary to protect the press from prior restraint.  In fact, if government officials 
could determine which stories could and could not be published, a more serious evil 
would result: “Charges of reprehensible conduct, and in particular of official 
malfeasance, unquestionably create a public scandal, but the theory of the constitutional 
[guarantee] is that even a more serious public evil would be caused by authority to 
prevent publication,” Hughes wrote.24 
The Sullivan Case: A Victory for Press Freedom 
First Amendment protections against the punishment of speech that has already 
been disseminated (as opposed to the prior restraint of speech) took root in Hughes’s 
opinion in Near and ultimately bore fruit with the milestone First Amendment holding in 
New York Times v. Sullivan in 1964.  One of the most significant holdings from Sullivan 
9 
 
is the protection of the press against defamation claims.  Under the Alabama defamation 
law at issue in the New York Times case, editorial content did not need to be false, but 
merely capable of injuring someone’s reputation or bringing him “into public 
contempt.”25  The Court held that the law placed an unconstitutional burden on the 
freedom of the press:  “Raising as it does the possibility that a good-faith critic of 
government will be penalized for his criticism, the proposition relied on by the Alabama 
courts strikes at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free 
expression.”26  In the end, the Court established a new First Amendment test, protecting 
the right to criticize public officials from defamation claims, unless the plaintiff can 
prove the statement was made with knowledge that it was false—or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false.27   
Distinctions Between Speech and Press Clauses 
Scholars disagree over whether the press should have special rights.  If it does not, 
does that make the Press Clause a redundancy?  Is the Press Clause simply a natural 
extension of the Speech Clause, or does the Press Clause have a functional role to play?  
Although journalists tend to argue that the Press Clause exists for a reason and implies 
extra protection, the Supreme Court has distanced itself from that idea.  This was not 
always the case, however.  Dating back to the first U.S. Supreme Court cases, judges 
have avoided reading the Constitution as if it had superfluous language, and this tendency 
lends credence to the idea that the Press Clause ought to have a separate purpose.28  Yet 
some scholars argue that the Press Clause has, in the last half century, been treated by the 
Supreme Court as mere “surplus” language.29  
Historically, the Press Clause has served a different function from that of the 
Speech Clause.  The purpose of speech was to provide an outlet for personal expression 
10 
 
and the free flow of ideas.30  The purpose of the press was to educate the public, provide 
a forum for debate, and to expose government corruption and wrongdoing.  In 
“Awakening the Press Clause,” a 2011 article in the UCLA Law Review, Sonja R. West 
writes, “[I]t was believed that a free press afforded [the] capability of government 
preservation better than free speech or petitioning representatives ever could.”31  Despite 
the Supreme Court’s reluctance to recognize special privileges for members of 
professional newsgathering organizations, lower courts have generally upheld press 
access to crime scenes, disaster areas, illegal disorders, and police blotters.32  The 
military has a longstanding tradition of creating access to the press, particularly in war 
zones.33  There is a similar tradition at executions.34  And there is a longstanding tradition 
and some statutory protection for press galleries in criminal trials.35  In the 1980 case 
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia36 and again in the two Riverside Press decisions in the 
1980s,37 the Supreme Court has ruled courts must be open to the public—and also open 
to the press as a surrogate for the public.  The press has also been recognized as a conduit 
for government officials to disseminate important information to the public.38  Reaching 
further back in history, the distinct function of the press has been acknowledged in other 
ways.  During the pre-Revolutionary War Stamp Act rebellion, for example, Americans 
protected the press from targeted government taxation.  Much later, a Louisiana law 
imposing a license tax on all publishers of newspapers or magazines having circulation of 
more than 20,000 copies was held unconstitutional because it abridged the freedom of the 
press.39  It should be noted that newspapers can be taxed in the United States.  However, 
this politically motivated tax was clearly targeted at the critics of Senator Huey Long.  At 
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the time, large newspapers often criticized him, while small newspapers tended to support 
him. 
Today, the Press Clause does not seem to have its own meaning distinct from the 
First Amendment’s protection for expression that is in the Free Speech Clause. In the past 
few decades, the Court has found that the Press Clause provides no protection (1) against 
subpoena or search warrant, (2) from identifying sources, or (3) for newsroom work.40  
There is no right to information outside of the Freedom of Information Act, even if the 
government has no reason to keep the information secret.41  
The First Amendment and Public Schools 
One of the foundational cases involving the First Amendment and public schools 
is the 1969 case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.  The case 
arose from a dispute involving students who were suspended from two Iowa public 
schools (a middle school and a high school) because they wore armbands to protest the 
United States’ involvement in Vietnam.  The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 
students.  Writing for the majority, Justice Abe Fortas said: 
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of 
the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can 
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has 
been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years.42 
The Court also put protections in place so that schools would not have to sacrifice 
their educational mission in order to offer free speech: 
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts 
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of 
others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of speech.43 
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The Court did not address off-campus speech, but held that schools could, in exceptional 
circumstances, inhibit student speech “in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the 
campus during the authorized hours.”44  
The ruling tries to strike a balance: Student rights must be protected, but schools 
must be able to operate in an orderly fashion.  However, because of other cases that will 
be discussed here and in subsequent chapters, Tinker is not necessarily the starting point 
for discussion of students’ rights at school.  When it comes to the application of student 
rights across the United States, inconsistencies abound.  At the very least, one would 
assume that university students (who are adults) have more free speech rights than K-12 
students.  But this is not always the case.  Today, for example, high school students in 
California appear to enjoy more robust protections for their expression than do college 
students in Indiana.  This result comes from the fact that California statutory law has been 
interpreted to grant high school students many of the same protections for their free 
speech at school that they would receive by virtue of the First Amendment outside of 
school.  Meanwhile, university administrators in Indiana retain substantial authority to 
regulate speech within student newspapers.  Because Indiana has no laws specifically 
protecting student journalists, the status of free expression rights of university students in 
that state derives largely from decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  Indiana retains the authority to regulate speech by 
student journalists under applicable First Amendment precedents.45  
In the 1988 decision Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, which will be discussed in detail in 
later chapters, the Supreme Court outlined a two-level inquiry that courts employ when 
addressing the issue of student censorship.  The first question in this inquiry is whether 
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the student publication at issue “may appropriately be characterized as a forum for public 
expression.”46  The answer to this question hinges on whether “school authorities have by 
policy or by practice opened [the publication] for indiscriminate use by…some segment 
of the public, such as student organizations.”47  If school officials have done so, then the 
First Amendment applies with relative force, and school officials can only censor speech 
“when necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with school work or 
discipline…or the rights of others.”48  
If school officials have not created a public forum, by contrast, then the second 
question becomes whether the school officials have acted reasonably in censoring student 
speech.49  Under this more relaxed standard, officials may censor speech for an array of 
reasons that would be impermissible under a traditional First Amendment analysis, 
including the perceived acceptability of the speech and the “emotional maturity” of the 
intended audience.  
Two basic justifications underlie the Supreme Court’s decision to allow greater 
speech controls in this setting.  First, the Court held, “[t]he question whether the First 
Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech…is different from the 
question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote 
particular student speech.”50  This is true because “[t]he former question addresses 
educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the 
school premises…[while] [t]he latter question concerns educators’ authority over school-
sponsored…expressive activities…”51  The second justification will be explored in the 
next chapter. 
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Hazelwood and Higher Education 
The Hazelwood court declined to answer whether Hazelwood would apply in a 
university setting.52  In the 2005 case Hosty v. Carter, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit answered this question in the affirmative for courts within its 
circuit, holding that Hazelwood is the “starting point” for an analysis of regulations on a 
college student periodical.53  The main question before the Hosty court involved qualified 
immunity for a university dean, which will be explored in Chapter 4.  However, the case 
raised many other questions involving student press rights at public universities.  In this 
introductory chapter, the most important fact to mention is that a Supreme Court decision 
involving a high school newspaper was being invoked as a precedent for a university 
freedom of the press lawsuit, which alarmed many student press advocates.  Note the last 
line of the following statement by Judge Frank Easterbrook, who wrote the opinion in 
Hosty: 
To the extent that the justification for editorial control depends on the 
audience’s maturity, the difference between high school and university 
students may be important. (Not that any line could be bright; many high 
school seniors are older than some college freshmen, and junior colleges 
are similar to many high schools.) To the extent that the justification 
depends on other matters—not only the desire to ensure high standards for 
the student speech that is disseminated under [the school’s] auspices’…but 
also the goal of dissociating the school from ‘any position other than 
neutrality on matters of political controversy’…there is no sharp 
difference between high school and college papers (emphasis added).54 
In spite of other potential distinctions between the high school setting and the 
university setting, one of Hosty’s holdings is that the existence or non-existence of a 
public forum controls almost entirely the question of censorship by university officials.  
“If the paper operated in a public forum, the University could not vet its contents,” the 
court held, indicating that if the newspaper is a public forum, the university is severely 
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restricted from interfering with the content.55  At the same time, the court held that 
“underwritten student publications” that qualify as a “non-public forum” can be censored 
by university officials for “legitimate pedagogical reasons,” thus indicating that a great 
deal of censorship might be tolerated where the public forum question is answered in the 
negative.56  
State Protection 
While the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment sets a 
floor in terms of speech protection, a state may choose to provide greater protection for 
speech and press.  In the context of student speech generally and high school newspaper 
publications in particular, California has chosen to do just that.57  The California 
Education Code contains two relevant provisions that California courts have interpreted 
to provide greater protection for student speech than does the First Amendment as 
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hazelwood and other cases.  First, Section 
48907 provides (subject to statutorily enumerated exceptions58) that “[p]upils of the 
public schools…shall have the right to exercise freedom of speech and of the press 
including, but not limited to…the right of expression in official publications, whether or 
not the publications or other means of expression are supported financially by the school 
or by use of school facilities.”59  It further provides, “[p]upil editors of official school 
publications shall be responsible for assigning and editing the news, editorial, and feature 
content of their publications subject to the limitations of this section…”60 Second, 
Section 48950 of the Code grants California students the same First Amendment 
protections at school that they have out of school:  
A school district operating one or more high schools, a charter school, or a 
private secondary school shall not make or enforce a rule subjecting a high 
school pupil to disciplinary sanctions solely on the basis of conduct that is 
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speech or other communication that, when engaged in outside of the 
campus, is protected from governmental restriction by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 2 of Article I of 
the California Constitution.61 
Sections 48907 and 48950 provide more protection for student speech than do the 
opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court based on the First Amendment.62  Under the U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent in Hazelwood, non-public-forum speech can be subject to 
reasonable regulations in high schools; under the Seventh Circuit’s Hosty decision, this 
speech is also subject to regulation on the university level.  (Importantly, Hosty is binding 
in the Seventh Circuit only.  But as with many decisions of a U.S. court of appeals, courts 
outside of the Seventh Circuit (which includes Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin) may find 
the ruling to be persuasive and apply the Hosty standards to their own cases.  
In California, by contrast, “section 48907 confers editorial control of official 
student publications on the student editors alone, with very limited exceptions,” and this 
is the case whether or not the publication would qualify as a “public forum.”63  Thus—
even when a California high school does not open a publication to student groups or 
parents, thus creating a limited public forum, school officials may not exercise control 
over the content of the publication unless they can establish an applicable exception 
under Section 48907 or 48950.  Moreover, the statutory exceptions in California have 
generally been interpreted narrowly, and thus the California law supports student rights 
energetically.64 
Mixed Messages 
As will be explored later in this dissertation, Tinker v. Des Moines and Hazelwood 
v. Kuhlmeier, as well as subsequent court decisions applying these precedents, often send 
mixed messages as to First Amendment protections for K-12 students.  To make matters 
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more complicated, Hazelwood, especially as applied by other courts, is not limited only 
to students’ freedom of the press.  It has been applied more broadly to apply to other 
expressive activities that could be considered “school-sponsored” and allows for 
restrictions on speech “so long as [they] are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”65  For example, in 2004, in Bannon v. School District of Palm Beach County, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that a high school could restrict 
student art work on a mural painted as part of a beautification project because (1) the 
principal explicitly instructed students that none of the murals could be profane or 
offense, (2) a faculty member supervised the project, and (3) students were not told that 
the murals were a forum for expressing their political or religious views.66   
The Third Circuit's decision in 2013 in B.H. v. Easton Area School District 
adopted a very narrow reading of the Supreme Court’s precedents as to when a standard 
other than Tinker could be applied to student speech.67  The court held that the school 
could not restrict students’ right to wear “I ♥ boobies! Keep A BREAST” bracelets 
supporting breast cancer awareness.  Specifically, the court said that there are three 
narrow circumstances in which the government may restrict student speech even when 
there is no risk of substantial disruption or invasion of others’ rights: first, the 
government may restrict vulgar, lewd, profane, or plainly offensive speech in schools, 
even if it would not be obscene outside of school; second, the government may likewise 
restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use 
and that cannot plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue; 
and third, the government may impose restrictions on school-sponsored speech that are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.68  
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However, this narrow reading has not been universally adopted by courts and, in 
fact, many courts struggling with students’ out-of-school Internet conduct have not 
limited their analyses to Tinker’s standard.  In J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School 
District, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted the struggle over what standard to apply 
to cases involving websites created outside of school and students’ other Internet 
conduct.69  Additionally, in Tatro v. University of Minnesota, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court applied the Hazelwood standard, allowing the university to discipline a graduate 
student for a Facebook post that violated a regulation requiring respect, discretion, and 
confidentiality in connection with work on human cadavers.70  Therefore, the case law 
has not established a bright-line distinction between the Tinker standard for students’ 
freedom of speech and Hazelwood standard for students’ freedom of the press.  As this 
dissertation will demonstrate, the struggle to balance the First Amendment rights of 
students with other societal interests, including the orderly operation of the school, has 
been anything but easy.  This dissertation attempts to define the landscape of student 
press rights and, in the final chapter, offer a few solutions. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 
LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASES 
In the United States’ system of government, the portion of a judge’s opinion that 
is directly related to the facts of the case often has the same legitimacy as a statute 
enacted by a legislative body.  Judicial rulings are binding on all courts that are 
subservient to them in the legal hierarchy.  In addition, judicial opinions that explain the 
reasons for the judges’ decisions provide valuable commentary and insight into the issues 
and the competing interests involved and may discuss issues that need to be addressed in 
the future in other cases or by legislatures.  
Yet no matter how clear the standards appear to be when they come from judicial 
rulings, courts retain a substantial amount of discretion to interpret constitutional rights, 
statutes, rules promulgated by administrative agencies, and cases decided by other courts.  
Therefore, one of the main reasons judges write in-depth opinions that contain 
substantive and historical analysis and reasoning is to persuade others of the wisdom of 
their position.  Judges often draft lengthy opinions that analyze both sides of an issue 
before rendering a decision.  Courts of last resort—like state supreme courts and the 
United States Supreme Court—often engage in lengthy analysis for the primary purpose 
of explaining and supporting their views on an issue.  Judges often include dicta in their 
opinion, statements that are used to illustrate their argument or provide an example.  
Dicta, by definition, are not based on the facts of the case and therefore are not supposed 
to be cited as precedent by other courts in subsequent cases.  
Development of First Amendment Law 
To analyze the First Amendment rights of students in the present day, one must 
understand the seminal Supreme Court decisions that form the foundation of First 
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Amendment rights.  The Supreme Court’s authority to review the constitutionality of 
federal and state statutes was established in the early years of the republic.  The case that 
formed the legal basis for the Supreme Court’s power to strike down the actions of 
Congress was Marbury v. Madison in 1803.71  Before this decision, there was no clear 
authority for the courts to void an act of Congress that conflicted with the Constitution.  
The Constitution does not explicitly provide for judicial review.  In other words, Marbury 
v. Madison supports the proposition that the courts, not the legislative or executive 
branches, ultimately decide constitutional questions.72  
The Supreme Court did not begin ruling on First Amendment cases until more 
than a century after the Bill of Rights’ ratification in 1791.  Furthermore, freedom of 
speech and press in the First Amendment applied only to the federal government until 
1925, when the Supreme Court, using the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, concluded that speech was one of the liberties protected from state as well 
as federal infringement.  The Bill of Rights was proposed and ratified primarily for the 
purpose of providing explicit protection from the new federal government.  State 
governments—with which the people had more experience and which were considered 
more accountable—were seen as less of a threat.  Chief Justice Marshall, in the Barron v. 
Baltimore case in 1833, confirmed that the rights guaranteed by the First and the Fourth 
through the Eighth Amendments applied only to the federal government.73  Note the text 
of the First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law …” (emphasis added).  The First 
Amendment (1) did not prohibit sovereign states from passing laws restricting the 
freedom of speech or religion, and (2) did not apply to actions by the states or local 
governments until well after the post-Civil War ratification of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment.  The Fourteenth Amendment, in relevant part, provides that “No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States.”74  This was later interpreted in a way that allowed most of the Bill of 
Rights to be applied to states as well as the federal government.   
In 1907, the Supreme Court issued its first opinion in a press freedom case, 
Patterson v. Colorado.75  This case involved a request for the U.S. Supreme Court to 
review, under the First Amendment, the contempt-of-court conviction of U.S. Senator 
Thomas Patterson (who also published a Colorado newspaper) for articles and a political 
cartoon lampooning the Colorado State Supreme Court.  Ultimately, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, writing for the U.S. Supreme Court, held that the Court lacked 
jurisdiction because “What constitutes contempt, as well as the time during which it may 
be committed, is a matter of local law.”76 
The Court declined to decide whether the First Amendment applies to the states 
and local governments via the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court stated that the free-
speech and free-press guarantees of the First Amendment protected only against prior 
restraint and not “subsequent punishment.”77  This distinction is important. Today, this 
decision by Holmes (who later became a strong defender of free speech) is criticized as a 
misunderstanding of the scope of the First Amendment.  Courts no longer consider 
subsequent punishment of speech to be outside the protections of the First Amendment. If 
speech could be punished without limitation, individuals would likely censor themselves, 
rather than risk future punishment, giving the First Amendment little practical meaning. 
Wartime Interpretation of the First Amendment 
Nevertheless, during World War I, the government put several restrictions on 
speech.  In 1917, Congress passed the Espionage Act, criminalizing “insubordination, 
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disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States,” 
and making it a crime to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the U.S. 
military.78  Later in the war, Congress passed the Sedition Act, which outlawed spoken or 
printed criticism of the federal government, the U.S. Constitution, or the American flag.79   
One of the first challenges to the Espionage Act began in Philadelphia.  On 
August 13, 1917, members of the city’s Socialist Party gathered for their monthly 
meeting.  In the meeting, they directed their general secretary, Charles Schenck, to 
prepare a leaflet to mail to draft-age men.80  One side of the leaflet said:  “Long live the 
Constitution of the United States,” and it reprinted the text of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude.  The text also said, “A conscript is little 
better than a convict,”81 and it urged people to “come to the headquarters of the socialist 
party, and sign a petition to congress, for the repeal of the Conscription Act.”82  After 
federal officials learned of the leaflet, Schenck and fellow socialist Elizabeth Baer were 
tried and convicted for violating the Espionage Act.  (Two other defendants were found 
not guilty.) 
Those not familiar with this period of the Court’s history and the result of this 
case might assume that Schenck’s conviction would have been overturned for two main 
reasons.  First, the First Amendment specifically forbids Congress from abridging free 
speech.  The Espionage Act, which blatantly abridges free speech, was passed by 
Congress.  Second, by the time the Supreme Court heard this case, the war was over, with 
the United States and its allies as the victors.  However, writing the opinion of the Court, 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes upheld the conviction:  
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in 
saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their 
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constitutional rights.  But the character of every act depends upon the 
circumstances in which it is done.  The most stringent protection of free 
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and 
causing a panic.  It does not even protect a man from an injunction against 
uttering words that may have all the effect of force.  The question in every 
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of 
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring 
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.  It is a 
question of proximity and degree.  When a nation is at war many things 
that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that 
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court 
could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.83  
In the same month, March 1919, the Court decided Debs v. U.S., upholding the 
conviction of Socialist presidential candidate Eugene V. Debs under the Espionage Act.  
Debs was convicted for making speeches opposing America’s involvement in World War 
I.  Importantly, the speeches mostly discussed capitalism and socialism and did not call 
for unlawful action.  Instead, the speech urged “continuous, active, and public opposition 
to the war, through demonstrations, mass petitions, and all other means within our 
power.”84 Nevertheless, Holmes applied the “clear and present danger” test from the 
recently decided Schenck case by stating that Debs’s speeches had the “natural tendency 
and reasonably probable effect” of obstructing military recruitment.85   
Justice Holmes Reconsiders 
Later that same year, in 1919, Justices Holmes and Louis Brandeis took a step 
toward modern free speech rights in Abrams v. U.S.  This case involved the conviction of 
several Russian immigrants under the Sedition Act during World War I.  The Act made it 
a crime to “willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or 
abusive language about the form of the Government of the United States” or to “willfully 
urge, incite, or advocate any curtailment of the production” of the things “necessary or 
essential to the prosecution of the war.”86  The Russian immigrants (including Abrams) 
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produced leaflets criticizing the U.S. military’s involvement in Russia and advocated a 
general strike in factories that made military supplies.  They then tossed the leaflets out 
the window of a building in New York City.87  The Court, just as it did in Schenck and 
Debs, upheld the convictions.  However, unlike in those cases, Holmes dissented in 
Abrams.  His dissent is considered one of the most important defenses of free speech in 
the Court’s history.88  
Historians have debated Holmes’s change in position. Some believe that the June 
1919 publication of a Harvard Law Review article called “Freedom of Speech in War 
Time,” which advocated for more free speech under the First Amendment and 
specifically criticized Holmes’s opinions in Schenck and Debs, was partly responsible.  In 
the article, Professor Zechariah Chaffee Jr. wrote, “The true meaning of freedom of 
speech seems to be this.  One of the most important purposes of society and government 
is the discovery and spread of truth on subjects of general concern.  This is possible only 
through absolutely unlimited discussion.”89  
However, Hand’s biographer contends that Holmes’s correspondence with New 
York federal District Judge Learned Hand (cited by Chaffee in the same article) was the 
most important factor in Holmes’s change of opinion.  Hand’s 1917 decision in Masses 
Publishing Co. v. Patten—holding that the magazine The Masses could not be banned 
from the mail under the World War I Espionage Act—articulated a liberal understanding 
of First Amendment values two years before the Supreme Court grappled with the same 
issues.90  In his Abrams dissent, Holmes ultimately presented an argument strikingly 
similar to Hand’s defense of free speech.91  Holmes stood by his opinions in Schenck and 
Debs, but he altered his First Amendment standard, stating that the government could 
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constitutionally restrict and punish “speech that produces or is intended to produce clear 
and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith ... substantive evils” (emphasis 
added).92  
The critical difference seemed to be the use of the word “imminent” instead of 
“present” and the addition of the qualifier “forthwith.”  In making these adjustments, 
Holmes set forth a tougher standard of scrutiny, allowing speech restrictions only if there 
is a direct and immediate connection between an act of speech and a subsequent crime.  
Holmes wrote about how dubious and speculative it would be to assume that “the 
surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man ... would present any 
immediate danger.”93  More importantly, he argued for the social and political benefits of 
unrestrained free speech, stating that, “The best test of truth is the power of the thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon 
which their wishes safely can be carried out.”94   
Legal scholars often wonder why Holmes would argue to uphold Debs’s 
conviction but not the defendants in the Abrams case.  Despite the primitive method of 
distribution in Abrams (throwing pamphlets out the window of a New York building), the 
defendants did urge munitions workers to stop making weapons that were essential for 
the conduct of the war.  This action would seemingly constitute a more serious threat to 
the war effort than Debs’ relatively tame speech in Canton, Ohio.  Still, for reasons that 
may never be entirely clear, Holmes concluded that the First Amendment did not protect 
Debs, but did protect the Abrams defendants.  This demonstrates that the change in 
Holmes’s view had more to do with the evolution of his thinking about the First 
Amendment than with the facts of the two cases.  
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The Continuing Application of “Clear and Present Danger” 
The Supreme Court did not immediately embrace the principles identified by 
Holmes in his Abrams dissent.  Instead, the Court continued to use various modifications 
of Holmes’s “clear and present danger” analysis until 1969, when it established a direct 
incitement standard in Brandenburg v. Ohio that is much more akin to the Holmes dissent 
in Abrams.  In Brandenburg, the U.S. Supreme Court said that “constitutional guarantees 
of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the 
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”95  The 
standard created by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg makes it difficult for authorities 
to punish even potentially dangerous speech, because there has to be a direct connection 
between the speech and the lawless action committed by someone who was inspired by 
those words.  Unless someone acts upon the call for lawless action, and unless there is an 
immediate and direct connection between the speech and the act, the First Amendment 
protects the speech.  However, it is worth noting again that such a liberal understanding 
of the First Amendment did not permeate the Court until five decades after Holmes’ 
Abrams dissent.  In the 1920s, the Court was only beginning its journey toward more 
robust protection for controversial speech.  
The First Amendment Is Applied to the States 
In terms of free speech protection, a giant leap forward occurred in the 1925 case 
Gitlow v. New York.  Gitlow, a New York socialist, was convicted under New York’s 
Criminal Anarchy Law of 1902 for publishing a document called “Left Wing Manifesto,” 
and he challenged his conviction under the First Amendment.96  Although the Supreme 
Court upheld the conviction, the Court for the first time incorporated freedom of speech 
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under the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, saying:  “For present purposes we 
may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press ... are among the fundamental 
personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from impairment by the States.”97  The Gitlow decision was of transcendent 
importance because it allowed courts to apply the First Amendment when reviewing state 
and local laws.  
In 1931, the Court decided Stromberg v. California, in which it overturned the 
state court conviction of a 19-year-old Young Communist League member under a state 
law prohibiting the display of a red flag as “an emblem of opposition to the United States 
government.”98  This precedent became more important in the decades following the 
court’s decision in the case. 
Later in 1931, the Court made another leap forward in First Amendment rights in 
Near v. Minnesota.  While Schenck, Debs, and Gitlow were free speech cases, Near was a 
case involving freedom of the press.  This case involved a Minnesota statute that gave 
state court judges the power to enjoin as “nuisances” any “malicious, scandalous and 
defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical.”99  This granted state judges the 
extraordinary power to stop a publication either before it was disseminated or, as in the 
Near case, to prevent continued publication.  In the events leading up to the case, a 
county attorney obtained a court order preventing further publication of The Saturday 
Press.  However, the Court struck down the Minnesota law, holding that it was “the 
essence of censorship.”100  The primary aim of the First Amendment’s free-press right, 
according to the Court, was to prevent prior restraints of the press.  The Court held that, 
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except in very rare cases, censorship is unconstitutional.  Writing for the Court, Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes said,  
[W]e hold the statute, so far as it authorized the proceedings in this action 
under clause (b) of section one, to be an infringement of the liberty of the 
press guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. We should add that this 
decision rests upon the operation and effect of the statute, without regard 
to the question of the truth of the charges contained in the particular 
periodical. The fact that the public officers named in this case, and those 
associated with the charges of official dereliction, may be deemed to be 
impeccable cannot affect the conclusion that the statute imposes an 
unconstitutional restraint upon publication.101 
While Hughes’s opinion strengthened the First Amendment protection against prior 
restraint, it suggested such interference with publication would be acceptable under 
certain circumstances: 
[T]he protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. 
But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases. ‘When a 
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a 
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as 
men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any 
constitutional right.’ (quoting Schenck v. United States).  No one would 
question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its 
recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the 
number and location of troops. On similar grounds, the primary 
requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications. 
The security of the community life may be protected against incitements 
to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government.102 
The fact that freedom of the press may be abused by “miscreant purveyors of scandal,”103 
Hughes said, does not make it any less necessary to protect the press from prior restraint. 
In fact, a “more serious public evil”104 would result if government officials could 
determine which stories could and could not be published.  Hughes also wrote that 
freedom of the press, historically and constitutionally, has meant, “principally although 
not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship”105 (emphasis added).  
Libel laws could still provide an avenue of redress for public officials, he wrote.  
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Chief Justice Hughes’s opinion established certain exceptions to the prior restraint 
rule.  It is likely that, to secure the fifth vote for a majority in a Supreme Court with many 
conservative justices, he had to agree to such a list.  Nevertheless, since the Hughes 
“exceptions” are not based on the facts of the Near case, they are considered dicta and 
therefore should not be cited as precedent in subsequent cases. 
The Court Considers the Rights of Students 
During this era, the Court also began ruling on First Amendment cases directly 
involving schools, teachers, and students.  In the 1923 case of Meyer v. Nebraska, a 
parochial school instructor was convicted under a state law that prohibited teaching 
certain foreign languages in schools.106  The Supreme Court held that the law violated the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.107  Specifically, the Court said that, 
while the state has the authority to pass laws designed “to improve the quality of its 
citizens, physically, mentally, and morally,” 108 the exercise of that authority cannot 
unreasonably infringe on certain fundamental rights of individuals, including the right to 
acquire knowledge.  Meyer was one of the first cases to recognize and protect 
“substantive due process” rights, including “the right of the individual to contract, to 
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, 
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his 
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law 
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”109  The decision in this case 
also established that students possess at least some basic due process rights protected by 
the Constitution—a principle that would become extremely important in future cases 
involving schools. 
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Just as the Court liberalized its stance toward speech protections for the general 
population after World War I, the Court likewise underwent a rather fast expansion of 
student speech rights.  But initially, it looked like the Court was going to restrict such 
rights.  In a case that remained in effect for only three years, Minersville School District 
v. Gobitis, decided in 1940, the Court granted public schools and state legislatures great 
latitude to compel and regulate speech in the public schools.110  
Gobitis dealt with the expulsion of a Pennsylvania public school student and 
Jehovah’s Witness who refused to salute the American flag.  The Supreme Court upheld 
the school’s requirement that students salute the flag, as well as the students’ expulsion 
for violating that rule.  The Court reasoned that: 
The preciousness of the family relation, the authority and independence 
which give dignity to parenthood, indeed the enjoyment of all freedom, 
presuppose the kind of ordered society which is summarized by our flag. 
A society which is dedicated to the preservation of these ultimate values of 
civilization may in self-protection utilize the educational process for 
inculcating those almost unconscious feelings which bind men together in 
a comprehending loyalty, whatever may be their lesser differences and 
difficulties. That is to say, the process may be utilized so long as men's 
right to believe as they please, to win others to their way of belief, and 
their right to assemble in their chosen places of worship for the devotional 
ceremonies of their faith, are all fully respected.111 
Three years later, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette directly overruled 
Gobitis on First Amendment grounds.  Again, the Court considered the constitutionality 
of a regulation requiring children in public schools to salute the American flag.112  But 
this time, the Court held that the regulation was unconstitutional, stating: “[i]f there is any 
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”113  It is unusual for 
the Supreme Court to directly overrule a precedent that was only three years old, which 
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means the Court must have recognized how poorly it had addressed the issues raised in 
the Gobitis case.  
More than two decades after the Barnette ruling recognized some speech 
protections for students, a 1968 case, Pickering v. Board of Education enhanced speech 
rights for teachers.  A high school teacher brought a lawsuit to challenge his termination 
for writing a letter to the editor that criticized the local school board.114  The Supreme 
Court held that school officials violate the First Amendment when they terminate a public 
school teacher for speaking out as a citizen on matters of public concern.115  Pickering is 
noteworthy for its substantial protections for speech by teachers (and public employees 
more generally).  Teachers’ rights are inevitably intertwined with students’ rights when it 
comes to a student newspaper; many high school newspaper advisers are punished for 
allowing students to publish journalistically important but controversial articles about the 
school. 
There is perhaps no Supreme Court case more important to student First 
Amendment rights than the 1969 case Tinker v. Des Moines.  Students at a public high 
school and middle school, including 13-year-old Mary Beth Tinker, were suspended after 
they wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War.116  The Supreme Court held that 
the First Amendment rights of students can be infringed only when schools can 
demonstrate that the speech may cause material and substantial disruption to the 
operation of the school. 
Importantly, the Court, citing Meyer v. Nebraska, stated that “First Amendment 
rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are 
available to teachers and students.  It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers 
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shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate.”117  
The First Amendment Versus Other Societal Interests 
The Court’s expansion of student rights should be seen in the context of a general 
enhancement of First Amendment rights taking place during the 1960s and beyond.  If 
Tinker was a high-water mark for student freedom, New York Times v. Sullivan, decided 
five years earlier in 1964, was a high-water mark for journalists.   
In the case, an elected commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama, who supervised 
the police department, sued the newspaper after it published a full-page advertisement 
criticizing police treatment of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and other civil rights activists. 
Perhaps the most significant holding to come out of the Sullivan case is the substantial 
protection the Court granted to the press when defending defamation claims.  Under 
Alabama libel law, the plaintiff was not required to prove that the editorial content at 
issue was false, but merely that it tended to “injure” a person or bring him “into public 
contempt.”118  The Court held that, as applied to a public official, the law placed an 
unconstitutional burden on the freedom of the press:  “Raising as it does the possibility 
that a good-faith critic of government will be penalized for his criticism, the proposition 
relied on by the Alabama courts strikes at the very center of the constitutionally protected 
area of free expression.”119  In the end, the Court established a new First Amendment 
test, protecting the right to criticize public officials from defamation claims, unless the 
plaintiff “proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”120 
New York Times Co. v. United States seven years later was a similarly important 
case for press freedom, although not as strong an endorsement of First Amendment rights 
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as the Sullivan case.  New York Times v. U.S., commonly referred to as the “Pentagon 
Papers” case, involved the government’s request for an injunction against the New York 
Times’s and Washington Post’s publication of the contents of a classified study regarding 
the Vietnam War.121  In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion supported by six justices, the 
Court held that the government did not meet its burden of showing justification for the 
imposition of a prior restraint of expression.122  Like Near v. Minnesota, this case made 
clear that there is a heavy presumption against the constitutional validity of prior 
restraints, even in cases involving national security.  Courts and scholars continue to 
debate today how widely the Supreme Court in this case left the door open for prior 
restraints, or prosecutions of journalists, when the government claims serious threat to 
national security. 
The Question of Press Privilege 
In the 1972 Supreme Court decision Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court had a chance 
to recognize special privileges for members of the press.  However, the Court refused to 
uphold the right of journalists to keep sources confidential when the journalist has 
witnessed a crime and has been called before a grand jury.  Notably, five of the nine 
justices were prepared to recognize certain special rights for journalists.  Justice Potter 
Stewart wrote the opinion for the four dissenting Justices: 
The Court's crabbed view of the First Amendment reflects a disturbing 
insensitivity to the critical role of an independent press in our society. The 
question whether a reporter has a constitutional right to a confidential 
relationship with his source is of first impression here, but the principles 
that should guide our decision are as basic as any to be found in the 
Constitution. While Mr. Justice Powell’s enigmatic concurring opinion 
gives some hope of a more flexible view in the future, the Court in these 
cases holds that a newsman has no First Amendment right to protect his 
sources when called before a grand jury. The Court thus invites state and 
federal authorities to undermine the historic independence of the press by 
attempting to annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of 
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government. Not only will this decision impair performance of the press' 
constitutionally protected functions, but it will, I am convinced, in the long 
run, harm rather than help the administration of justice.123 
The “enigmatic” concurring opinion of Justice Lewis Powell, referred to here by Stewart, 
said the following:   
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the 
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the 
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to 
criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal 
interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way 
of adjudicating such questions.124 
In other words, a majority of the Court’s members were prepared to find some kind of 
privilege for journalists—thus recognizing the right to keep sources confidential in some 
circumstances.  The Branzburg Court stated in dicta that “news gathering is not without 
its First Amendment protections.”125  Although courts routinely limited some means of 
newsgathering, such as the use of hidden cameras,126 the press was still considered to 
have a right to use the “indispensible tools” of reporting.127 
The Branzburg case could hardly have had a worse set of facts on which to base 
such an important decision as to whether reporters have a right to keep sources 
confidential.  Branzburg witnessed the manufacturing of illegal drugs, and Justice Byron 
White concluded that he had to testify about what and whom he saw, just like any witness 
to a crime.   
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided the case of Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, which addressed the common-law right of access to judicial records.128  
After the criminal trial of several of President Nixon’s former advisors, television 
networks and others requested access to the certain tapes of conversations with the 
president in his offices.  The Supreme Court recognized a common-law right of access to 
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judicial records:  “It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to 
inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and 
documents.”  However, the Court also said that the right of access is not absolute.  
Decisions concerning access are left to the discretion of the trial court, and, in this case, 
the trial court did not err in deciding not to release the tapes.129  Ruling on statutory 
grounds, the Court held that the Presidential Recordings Act controls the procedure for 
releasing the tapes to the public.  The Court wrote: 
The release of the tapes is not required by the First Amendment guarantee 
of freedom of the press. The question here is not whether the press must 
be permitted access to public information to which the public generally 
has access, but whether the tapes, to which the public has never had 
physical access, must be made available for copying.130 
Despite the restrictions mentioned above, this case is nevertheless notable for recognizing 
the general common-law right to inspect and copy judicial records, a right which student 
journalists continue to enjoy today.   
The Supreme Court recognized a common-law right of access to judicial records.  
A common-law right refers to principles that emerge through court decisions or the 
“custom” of a community over time.  Such rights are not established by statutes.  Thus, 
they are likely to be less defined and may emerge through court rulings that are not 
always consistent.  Nevertheless, if a judge finds that common-law rights exist through 
long practice or because they are in the public interest, such rights have the same force of 
law as other types of judicial decisions.  But if the decision identifying a common-law 
right is not grounded in constitutional law (where the judge based the decision on a 
provision in the federal or a state constitution), a legislature can modify such a right. 
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Common-law rights are important to our legal system.  Legislative bodies cannot 
enact laws that cover all circumstances.  Courts must be able to identify rights that are 
neither explicitly granted by constitutions nor established through statutes. 
In 1978, the Supreme Court distanced itself even further from the idea of special 
press privileges.  In Hutchins v. KQED, a television station obtained a court injunction 
requiring a prison director to allow press access to areas of the prison from which reports 
of abuse had stemmed.  The Supreme Court overruled the decision, siding with the prison 
director and holding that the press had no right to inspect public prisons or jails or to 
interview inmates.131  In a decision with far-reaching implications, the majority asserted 
that there is “no right of access to government information or sources of information 
within the government’s control.”132  The justices argued that while the media play an 
important role as the “eyes and ears of the public,” they are “no substitute for or an 
adjunct of government and like the courts, they are ‘ill equipped’ to deal with problems 
of prison administration.”133  They reasoned that allowing the press access to the prison 
and prisoners, to report on allegations of prisoner abuse and sub-par living conditions, 
would “confuse the role of the media with that of government.”134  The majority took a 
very narrow reading of prior cases, interpreting them as providing a right to publish 
information, but not a right to special access to government information it hopes to 
publish.135  
The three justices who dissented to that opinion voiced strong objections to this 
view.  Stewart again argued for press privilege, writing that while he agreed that the Press 
Clause of the First Amendment provides no special right of access to government 
facilities, the press has “equal” access to such facilities as the public and that this should 
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be interpreted with “more flexibility to accommodate practical distinctions between the 
press and the general public.”136  He wrote that the TV station was “clearly entitled to 
some form of preliminary injunctive relief” from the prison director’s restrictions on 
press access.  He thought that the trial judge’s injunction went too far in allowing press 
access to areas of the prison not open to public inspection.137   
The Court continued to accept First Amendment cases and had the opportunity to 
refine the extent to which journalists are entitled to protection from libel suits.  The 1974 
case of Gertz v. Welch involves questions about the reach of First Amendment 
protections for speech about private persons.138  In New York Times v. Sullivan and later 
cases, the Court said that “actual malice” must be shown before an individual or media 
outlet can be held liable for false speech about public officials and public figures.  In 
Gertz, the Supreme Court held that states could—consistent with the First Amendment—
define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster 
of defamatory statements regarding a private individual.139  There are limits, however.  
The Court eliminated the possibility that innocent error with no fault involved could form 
the basis of a libel suit.  A plaintiff—even one who is a private person—must show at 
least negligence to prevail at trial and on appeal.  And the court held that states cannot 
permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages without requiring a showing proof of 
actual malice.140  Like New York Times v. Sullivan, Gertz is noteworthy because it 
identified contours of the constitutional limitations on state defamation laws. 
Although Gertz addressed a plaintiff that the Court considered a private figure, it 
is important to note that there is not a bright line between public figures and private 
persons.  First, the Court identified two types of public figures:  All-purpose public 
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figures and limited-purpose public figures.  All-purpose public figures are individuals in 
“positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figure for 
all purposes. … They invite attention and comment.”141  This category includes movie 
stars, elite professional athletes, and the heads of major corporations.  Limited-purpose 
public figures are people who are not particularly well known, but who have “thrust 
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the 
resolution of the issues involved.”142  The actual malice standard applies broadly to 
statements concerning all-purpose purpose public figures.  For limited-purpose public 
figures, the actual malice standard applies only to subject matter related to the 
controversy in question or to the field in which the individual is prominent, not to the 
person’s entire life.   
In libel suits, one of the key issues is often whether someone is a public figure or 
a private person.  It is an extremely important part of any libel case because the public 
figure’s burden of proving actual malice is much greater than that of a private person.  
Intolerance for Prior Restraint 
In the 1976 case of Nebraska Press Association v. Judge Stuart, the Supreme 
Court considered the constitutionality of a gag order restraining the press from publishing 
accounts of confessions made by the accused in a mass murder case.143  The defendant 
confessed to the sheriff at the jail, and the trial judge ordered the reporters present not to 
report the confession until a jury was seated.  The Supreme Court had to decide whether 
the judge’s gag order on the press was permitted by the First Amendment.  The Court 
held that, although in some cases a gag order may be imposed when necessary to ensure 
that a defendant is afforded the right to a fair trial, the specific order here was invalid as a 
prior restraint because the trial judge did not sufficiently consider other less restrictive 
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measures.144  This case is another notable example of the Supreme Court’s aversion to 
prior restraints of speech.  
The Court Grapples with Employee Rights 
In the 1983 case of Connick v. Myers, a government employee brought a civil 
rights action alleging that her employment was terminated because she exercised her 
constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech.145  The employee, who was slated to be 
transferred to another office and who objected to the transfer, distributed a questionnaire 
to co-workers to research what others thought of how transfers were handled in the 
office.  After distributing the questionnaire, she was terminated for refusing to accept the 
transfer and because distributing the questionnaire was considered an act of 
insubordination.  The Court held that the employee’s discharge did not offend the First 
Amendment because the questionnaire was not speech on a matter of public concern.  
Instead, it concerned matters only of the employee’s private interest.  The Court said:  
When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any 
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government 
officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without 
intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.  
Perhaps the government employer’s dismissal of the worker may not be 
fair, but ordinary dismissals from government service which violate no 
fixed tenure or applicable statute or regulation are not subject to judicial 
review even if the reasons for the dismissal are alleged to be mistaken or 
unreasonable.146  
In dicta, the court also noted, “While as a matter of good judgment, public officials 
should be receptive to constructive criticism offered by their employees, the First 
Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee 
complaints over internal office affairs.”147 
The Court’s decision in this matter establishes some of the constraints on speech 
that are allowable in the government employment context.  To understand these 
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constraints, it is important to note that the Supreme Court’s analysis turned on the fact 
that “the focus of the [employee’s] questions [was] not to evaluate the performance of the 
office but rather to gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her 
superiors.”148 
The Limits of High School Student Speech 
In the 1986 Supreme Court case Bethel School District v. Fraser (another case 
involving student speech), a high school student was suspended for delivering a sexually 
suggestive speech to the student body in which he nominated his fellow classmate for an 
elective school office.149  The Supreme Court said that the suspension did not violate the 
student’s free speech rights.  Explaining why this case was different from Tinker, the 
Court said:   
Unlike the sanctions imposed on the students wearing armbands in Tinker, 
the penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to any political 
viewpoint.  The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials 
from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as 
respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational mission.  A 
high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit 
monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage 
students.  Accordingly, it was perfectly appropriate for the school to 
disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and 
lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of 
public school education.150 
A Supreme Court case held in even lower regard than Bethel (by student free 
speech advocates) is the 1988 case Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier.  In Hazelwood, the Supreme 
Court again considered what protections the First Amendment provides for student 
speech—but this time the context was student journalism.151  A high school principal 
removed two articles in the school paper that he believed demonstrated poor journalism 
and were inappropriate for a high school audience.  The authors of those articles claimed 
a violation of their First Amendment rights and sued.  The Supreme Court said that a 
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school can impose restrictions on student speech in school-sponsored expressive 
activities so long as its actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns 
and the school has not created a public forum (a place or publication open either by 
policy or practice to all expression). 
Looking at the facts before it, the Court found that the principal: 
could reasonably have concluded that the students who had written and 
edited these articles had not sufficiently mastered those portions of the 
Journalism II curriculum that pertained to the treatment of controversial 
issues and personal attacks, the need to protect the privacy of individuals 
whose most intimate concerns are to be revealed in the newspaper, and 
“the legal, moral, and ethical restrictions imposed upon journalists within 
[a] school community” that includes adolescent subjects and readers.152   
There are two basic justifications underlying the Supreme Court’s decision to 
allow greater speech controls in this setting.  First, the Court held, “[t]he question 
whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech…is 
different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively 
to promote particular student speech.”153  This is true because “[t]he former question 
addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression that happens to 
occur on the school premises…[while] [t]he latter question concerns educators’ authority 
over school-sponsored…expressive activities…”154  Second, the Supreme Court has 
noted additional concerns: (1) preserving the ability to educate, (2) considering the 
relative maturity of students, and (3) recognizing the possibility that the views of students 
will be erroneously attributed to the school.  As the Court explained:  
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second form of 
student expression to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the 
activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to 
material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the 
views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the 
school.155 
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Courts have long held that young people are not entitled to the same First 
Amendment protection as adults.  An example would be sexually graphic material, which 
the courts have consistently held can be kept away from young people even though adults 
have a right to see such material.156  The existence of different First Amendment 
standards for adults and children makes it more challenging for courts and legislatures to 
establish standards for student expression.  Judges and law-making bodies cannot simply 
apply the First Amendment rights that adults enjoy, but must instead determine how 
much freedom should be given to those who may not be mature enough to handle it 
responsibly.  There have always been certain limitations on First Amendment rights.  The 
courts seem to be saying that for young people, these limitations are best viewed through 
the lens of responsible citizenship. 
Although Hazelwood has been denounced by supporters of the First Amendment, 
there are times when it is appropriate for a student media advisor or even a principal to 
refuse to publish articles.  The difficulty is recognizing when a principal is blocking an 
article (1) because it is embarrassing, or (2) because there are legitimate journalistic 
reasons for preventing publication.  Of course, principals do not usually have a 
journalism background and may not recognize good or bad journalism when they see it. 
The Rights of College Students 
A question that the Hazelwood Court explicitly declined to answer is whether 
Hazelwood would apply in a university setting in a similar fashion to the way it applies to 
a high school.157  In Hosty v. Carter (which will be examined in detail in Chapter 4 of the 
dissertation), the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit answered this 
question in the affirmative for courts within its circuit, holding that Hazelwood is the 
“starting point” for an analysis of regulations on a college student periodical.158  
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Although technically Hosty applies only to the states in the Seventh Circuit—Indiana, 
Illinois, and Wisconsin—judges in other jurisdictions have been persuaded that Judge 
Easterbrook’s analysis should be applied to their cases. 
The Seventh Circuit’s Hosty decision sent shock waves through the student 
newspaper community, with many First Amendment advocates fearing a domino effect of 
further free-speech setbacks.  However, it is important to note that there is a post-
Hazelwood (but pre-Hosty) Supreme Court case that shows strong support for free speech 
on college campuses, and it happened to involve a student newspaper.  In the 1995 case 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, the publishers of a student 
newspaper with a Christian editorial viewpoint sued the University of Virginia, 
challenging the denial of funds from a student activities fund to pay printing costs of 
publications of student groups.159  The justification for the denial of funds was made on 
the basis a university policy that limited the use of funds for “religious organizations.”160  
The students alleged that the university denied their right to free speech by discriminating 
against the content they wished to publish.  The Supreme Court held that the denial of 
funding amounted to viewpoint discrimination.161  Rejecting claims that the university’s 
policy was not discriminatory (because it denied funding to all religious organizations), 
the Court said that the exclusion of several views on an issue is just as offensive to the 
First Amendment as the exclusion of one.  The Court also said that scarce resources 
cannot justify viewpoint discrimination:  It is the state’s responsibility to allocate scarce 
resources on an acceptable neutral principle.162  Accordingly, the Court held that the 
University’s decision denied the students’ right of free speech. 
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Drug-Related Messages 
The 2000s saw a case that complicates the question of how far a school’s power 
stretches in the regulation of student speech.  Is the power confined to school property?  
Or does it reach school-sponsored events off school property?  The facts underlying the 
case of Morse v. Frederick are memorable:  A student was disciplined for holding up a 
banner that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at an off-campus, school-sponsored event.163  
(The event was held during normal school hours, and teachers were present.164)  The 
student challenged his suspension as a violation of his First Amendment rights.  The 
Supreme Court upheld the school’s discipline of the student.  Specifically, the Court said: 
It was reasonable for [the principal] to conclude that the banner promoted 
illegal drug use—in violation of established school policy—and that 
failing to act would send a powerful message to the students in her charge, 
including Frederick, about how serious the school was about the dangers 
of illegal drug use.  The First Amendment does not require schools to 
tolerate at school events student expression that contributes to those 
dangers.165   
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer questioned how far the Court’s 
reasoning could extend, wondering whether the Court would support punishing the 
student for flying a “WINE SiPs 4 JESUS” banner—which could quite reasonably be 
construed either as a protected religious message or as a pro-alcohol message.”166 
Instead of directly addressing the limits of school officials’ authority to punish 
off-campus speech in Morse, the Court created a fact-specific exception to free speech 
when it comes to messages that promote illegal drug use at a school-sponsored activity.  
Legal scholars argue that “Morse effectively expanded the school’s authority to punish 
student expression” to off-campus speech with “ramifications for speech on the Internet” 
because the speech at issue in Morse did not cause any material or substantial disruption 
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to the school or to the rights of others, occurred at a public event off campus, and could 
not reasonably be seen to bear the school’s imprimatur.167  
The pre-Morse trend was toward limiting school officials’ authority over off-
campus speech.168  However, Morse seemed to give school officials more discretion to 
punish speech promoting drug use when it originates or is available off campus.  Because 
the content of the speech in Morse was drug-related—and the Court based its decision on 
the need for school officials to discourage such advocacy—the Morse decision has not 
been widely used to strike down controversial expression.  For example, in the 2009 case 
B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 School District, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit declined to apply Morse because the speech in Farmington did not involve 
illegal drug use, but rather involved racism and the use of the Confederate flag.  Thus, the 
court applied the Tinker standard instead.169   
The next chapter will discuss federal cases at the K-12 level.  In the 1960s, cases 
such as Burnside v. Byars and Zucker v. Panitz strengthened protections for student 
expression.  In the 1980s, the pendulum began to swing in the other direction, toward 
diminished rights for students, in cases such as Romano v. Harrington and Poling v. 
Murphy. The last decade of the 20th century and first decade of the 21st century saw a 
nationwide struggle over school districts’ free-speech policies, particularly in light of 
growing problems such as gang speech and bullying.  However, despite widespread 
concern about these issues, courts nevertheless consistently displayed their distaste for 
vague policies.  The next chapter also explores the disagreement among lower federal 
courts about the circumstances under which off-campus speech may be punished by 
school officials.   
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CHAPTER THREE: 
 
FEDERAL CASES AT THE K-12 LEVEL 
Federal Court Disagreement 
It is well understood that in many circumstances, school officials have the 
authority to limit student speech on their campuses and in school-sponsored events and 
publications.  However, the line between school administrators’ authority to carry out a 
school’s educational mission and students’ constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom 
of speech is often hard to draw, and federal district and circuit courts have struggled to 
agree on the boundaries.  The school’s policies must be written with precision and must 
not interfere with any more First Amendment protection than is necessary.  As C. Eric 
Wood noted in the law review article “Learning on the Razor’s Edge,” “a broad and 
encompassing speech restriction may be struck down on overbreadth or vagueness 
grounds.  Conversely, a narrow and specific speech restriction may be struck down on 
viewpoint discrimination grounds.  The difficulty of successfully balancing these 
competing considerations cannot be underestimated.”170 
Growth of Student Rights in the 1960s 
Three years before the Supreme Court solidified a baseline standard of First 
Amendment rights for students in the 1969 Tinker v. Des Moines decision, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (with jurisdiction over Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Texas), made a leap forward with regard to student rights in Burnside v. 
Byars.171  Students at a Mississippi high school obtained “freedom buttons” from a local 
civil rights organization and began wearing and distributing them at school.172  The local 
board of education enacted a regulation that banned the wearing and distribution of the 
buttons, which said, “One Man One Vote.”173  The students brought a civil rights action, 
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requesting a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of the regulation.  The district 
court denied the injunction, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the affidavits and 
testimony before the district court revealed that the student protest posed no interference 
with educational activity and did not support a conclusion that there was a commotion or 
that the buttons distracted the students.  The court wrote: 
We wish to make it quite clear that we do not applaud any attempt to 
undermine the authority of the school. We support all efforts made by the 
school to fashion reasonable regulations for the conduct of their students 
and enforcement of the punishment incurred when such regulations are 
violated. Obedience to duly constituted authority is a valuable tool, and 
respect for those in authority must be instilled in our young people. But, 
with all of this in mind, we must also emphasize that school officials 
cannot ignore expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to 
contend.174  
This case may have influenced the language for Tinker’s “material and 
substantial” disruption test adopted three years later by the Supreme Court.  The Burnside 
court wrote: 
[Public school officials] cannot infringe on their students’ right to free and 
unrestricted expression as guaranteed to them under the First Amendment 
to the Constitution, where the exercise of such rights in the school 
buildings and school rooms do not materially and substantially interfere 
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school (emphasis added).175  
The Burnside opinion signaled the willingness of the courts to protect student rights when 
the exercise of such rights do not interfere with the operations of the school.  The 
willingness of the courts to limit the authority of school officials under some 
circumstances—as reflected in Burnside and Tinker—was an important development in 
terms of balancing the First Amendment rights of students with the needs of school 
officials to maintain order.  
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Three months after the Supreme Court’s Tinker decision in 1969, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York applied the Tinker standard to 
student media, apparently the first time a federal district court had done so.176  In Zucker 
v. Panitz, a group of students at New Rochelle High School formed a club called Student 
Committee Against the War in Vietnam, and sought to publish an advertisement in the 
school newspaper stating their opposition to the war.  The text of the advertisement said, 
“The United States government is pursuing a policy in Viet Nam which is both repugnant 
to moral and international law and dangerous to the future of humanity. We can stop it. 
We must stop it.”177  The principal told the student newspaper editor not to publish the 
advertisement, and two parents brought suit on behalf of their children.  In his ruling, 
District Judge Charles Miller Metzner sided with the students.  He said that the 
defendants’ main argument was that the war is “not a school-related activity” and 
therefore not appropriate for discussion within the school newspaper.  The defendants 
also claimed that advertising in the newspaper, The Huguenot Herald, was limited to 
purely commercial messages.  In an energetic defense of student press rights, Judge 
Metzner wrote:  
If the Huguenot Herald’s contents were truly as flaccid as the defendants’ 
argument implies, it would indeed be a sterile publication. Furthermore, its 
function as an educational device surely could not be served if such were 
the content of the paper. However, it is clear that the newspaper is more 
than a mere activity time and place sheet. The factual core of defendants’ 
argument falls with a perusal of the newspapers submitted to the court. 
They illustrate that the newspaper is being used as a communications 
media [sic] regarding controversial topics and that the teaching of 
journalism includes dissemination of such ideas. Such a school paper is 
truly an educational device.178 
Metzner noted that the school paper does appear to be open to the free expression 
of ideas in both the news and editorial sections.  Citing Tinker, the judge wrote that 
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abridging such a forum would be “patently unfair in light of the free speech doctrine.”179  
The judge concluded his opinion with a stern lecture aimed at those who would attempt 
to silence the opinions of students: 
This lawsuit arises at a time when many in the educational community 
oppose the tactics of the young in securing a political voice. It would be 
both incongruous and dangerous for this court to hold that students who 
wish to express their views on matters intimately related to them, through 
traditionally accepted nondisruptive modes of communication, may be 
precluded from doing so by that same adult community.180 
With its specific defense of student press rights, the Zucker decision showed that courts 
could apply Tinker as a strong bulwark against unwarranted administrative censorship of 
student media in public schools.  
The 1970s: Schools Show Discomfort With Student Freedom 
Protections for free speech and free expression continued their evolution in the 
1976 case Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District.  In this case, high school 
students in Ohio brought a class action suit against a city school district, the school board, 
and the superintendent.  The students alleged that the defendants had violated their First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights by (1) refusing to approve certain books as texts or 
library books, (2) ordering the removal of certain books, and (3) issuing regulations 
prohibiting teacher and student discussions concerning the removed books.181  After the 
district court dismissed most of the students’ claims, the Sixth Circuit (with jurisdiction 
over Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee) reversed in part.  The court held that the 
removal of the books based on their content violated the students’ First Amendment 
rights.  The Court said, “If one of the English teachers considered Joseph Heller’s Catch 
22 to be one of the more important modern American novels (as, indeed, at least one did), 
we assume that no one would dispute that the First Amendment’s protection of academic 
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freedom would protect both his right to say so in class and his students’ right to hear him 
and to find and read the book.”182  This decision illustrates the court system’s aversion to 
viewpoint discrimination, as well as its priority in placing the right to acquire knowledge 
above a particular constituency’s discomfort with certain points of view.  Government 
entities, including schools, may impose reasonable regulations over the use of their 
facilities, while respecting the First Amendment rights of students.  What schools cannot 
do is discriminate on the basis of the students’ views.  For example, principals should not 
permit the publication of an article that praises the school while rejecting one that 
criticizes it. 
The 1977 case Gambino v. Fairfax County School Board further solidified student 
press rights (at least in the Fourth Circuit, with jurisdiction over Maryland, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia).  Although cultural attitudes 
toward topics such as sex began to change in the 1960s, many schools were still 
uncomfortable with open discussions of sexual topics in the 1970s—just as many schools 
are still concerned about discussions of such topics today.  In Gambino, student editors of 
a school-sponsored newspaper in Virginia surveyed students on sexual activity, 
discovering that many students took no precautions to avoid pregnancy.183  Their news 
story included information about the availability and effectiveness of certain forms of 
birth control.  The school principal said the story violated a school policy prohibiting the 
teaching of sex education.  However, the federal district court and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sided with the students.  The school had argued that the 
student newspaper was not a public forum, but an “in-house organ of the school system, 
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funded and sponsored by the Board [of Education].”184  However, the Fourth Circuit 
Court disagreed: 
Upon considering the Board’s general policy toward student publications, 
as well as past articles in The Farm News, the district court found that the 
newspaper was established as a public forum for student expression, and 
therefore is subject to first amendment protection. It also concluded that 
the students are not a captive audience merely because of their compulsory 
attendance at the school. Finally, the court concluded that because the 
newspaper was established as a public forum and not as an official 
publication, it cannot be viewed as part of the curriculum; accordingly, the 
general power of the Board to regulate course content does not apply.185 
In his dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Donald Russell echoed the sentiments of earlier 
generations, which still hold sway over many school boards in certain areas of the 
country today—i.e., that any discussion of sex is harmful because it could potentially lead 
to promiscuity. 
A school administration certainly has a legitimate concern in eliminating 
from its curriculum material which may reasonably be considered as 
conducive to immorality and not appropriate to proper academic 
education…186 
Judge Russell also did not understand how school officials could forbid its 
teachers from discussing sex education but could be “powerless” to forbid its pupils from 
doing the same thing in a school-funded publication.187  Nevertheless, the students’ right 
to discuss topics of their own choosing, even in a school publication, carried the day in 
this case.   
Foreshadowing the Debate Over Off-Campus Speech 
As the preceding case illustrates, by the late 1970s (the decade following Tinker), 
students had some clearly established protections for expression at school, even if certain 
officials were uncomfortable with those protections.  In other words, the courts had 
established limits to the ability of school officials to punish or censor in the 
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circumstances raised by the facts of the cases discussed above.  However, the debate over 
a school’s power to punish students’ speech off campus was only beginning.  In 1986, in 
Klein v. Smith, a student gave a teacher a crude gesture (a raised middle finger) at a 
restaurant parking lot after school hours.  The United States District Court in Maine 
rejected the school’s claim that the gesture undermined the teacher’s ability to discipline 
students at school.188  Even though the Klein case involved in-person, off-campus 
interaction, the Klein court’s language would suggest that online comments about a 
teacher would also be protected:  
The student was not engaged in any school activity or associated in any 
way with school premises or his role as a student. Any possible connection 
between his act of “giving the finger” to a person who happens to be one 
of his teachers and the proper and orderly operation of the school's 
activities is, on the record here made, far too attenuated to support 
discipline against Klein for violating the rule prohibiting vulgar or 
discourteous conduct toward a teacher.189 
The court continued:  
The public interest may be thought to be best served if schools and 
teachers practice the historical orthodoxies of our political freedom while 
they preach the temporally transitory orthodoxies of “taste.” They may 
legitimately, and should, seek to inculcate the latter, but they may not, in 
the effort to do so, transgress upon the former. In the final analysis, under 
our Constitution individual liberty of expression must be accorded its day 
even at the expense of the promotion of aesthetic sophistication.190 
However, a crude statement or gesture in a parking lot is fleeting; a crude 
comment on a website is likely to be permanent.  Decades later, in the age of the Internet, 
the line of permissibility beyond which schools can punish students for the website 
equivalent of a “middle finger in an off-campus parking lot” would become more 
complicated than it was at the time of Klein.  Furthermore, Klein foreshadowed another 
problem that would become increasingly commonplace in public schools: the anger of a 
teacher or other school authority who feels he or she has been disrespected by students. 
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Klein foreshadowed the upcoming problems of the Internet era, when personal insults 
would become amplified through the Internet’s widespread availability, permanence, and 
easy accessibility both on and off campus. 
Initial Rejection of Hazelwood 
In 1988, the Supreme Court’s Hazelwood decision, discussed in the preceding 
chapter, caused a stir among free speech advocates who feared a domino effect of federal 
court rulings curtailing student and teacher expression rights.  However, Romano v. 
Harrington, decided one year after Hazelwood, illustrated that such an outcome was not 
inevitable.  In Romano, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York had an opportunity to apply Hazelwood but declined.  A tenured English teacher at 
a New York public high school was terminated from his position as advisor to the student 
newspaper (but not from his full-time English teaching position) after the newspaper 
published an editorial arguing against creating a federal holiday for Martin Luther King, 
Jr.191  When he brought suit under the First Amendment, the school filed a motion to 
dismiss, arguing that Hazelwood granted the school extensive editorial control over 
student newspapers.  Writing for the court, District Judge Raymond Dearie disagreed, 
saying: 
If Harrington’s conduct constituted unconstitutional reprisal for the 
exercise of First Amendment rights, such conduct may chill another 
advisor’s willingness to give student writers the level of constitutional 
freedom to which they are entitled and may circumscribe the student 
editors’ decisions regarding what to publish because of their concerns of 
indirect retaliation against their advisor or direct retaliation against a 
member of the student body. The Court finds that it would be anomalous 
to conclude that defendants can avoid plaintiff’s allegations on the ground 
that the actual injury in this case was inflicted on the faculty advisor rather 
than on the students directly.192 
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Dearie’s opinion is important not only for its insight into the chilling effect of 
censorship, but also for its articulation of the relationship between student and advisor, 
especially in cases in which students may be afraid to express certain viewpoints out of a 
concern for a retaliation against their teacher or advisor.  
Speech Tightly Regulated at Assemblies 
Although courts have often disagreed about how much regulation is permissible 
when it comes to student media, courts have mostly approved of a school’s ability to 
regulate what happens at a school assembly or ceremony.  In the 1989 case Poling v. 
Murphy, a high school student in Tennessee filed suit against school administrators and 
the local board of education, alleging that the defendants had violated his First 
Amendment rights by removing him from a school election after he made what school 
authorities considered inappropriate remarks during a school assembly.193  After making 
a tasteless joke about “a baby in a trashbag,” the student said: 
I just made you laugh at something incredibly sick. If I can do this to you, 
then the administration could probably take advantage of you also. For 
example, have you noticed that each year there are less and less 
assemblies? How many of you would like at least a chance at open 
campus? Would you like a better chance of having the prom in Johnson 
City? Is there something in this school you would like changed? The 
administration plays tricks with your mind and they hope you won't 
notice. Because of the administration's iron grip, our school has been kept 
behind other schools like Science Hill. If you want to break this grip, vote 
for me for president. I can try to bring back student rights that you have 
missed and maybe get things that you always wanted. All you have to do 
is vote for me, Dean Poling!194 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee granted 
summary judgment in favor of school officials, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed, holding that the defendants had the right to restrict speech at the school 
assembly because the election itself and the election assembly were school-sponsored 
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activities.  The case is noteworthy for its holding that “[t]he art of stating one’s views 
without indulging in personalities and without unnecessarily hurting the feelings of others 
surely has a legitimate place in any high school curriculum” and is thus a “legitimate 
pedagogical concern.”195  This decision is also surprising because—even though this was 
just a student election—political speech has always enjoyed substantial First Amendment 
protection.  In fact, Judge Merritt, in his dissent, declared that the court applied the wrong 
First Amendment test and therefore reached the wrong result.  Citing Barnette and 
Tinker, Merritt said: 
The applicable First Amendment cases hold that when a high school 
student engages in political or “pure speech” in a school forum the student 
is protected by the First Amendment under a test substantially similar to 
that for adults. … Political speech of students that does not threaten to 
foment “substantial disorder,” “disruption” or “invasion of privacy” is still 
protected under the First Amendment. Because the majority has used the 
wrong standard, it has reached the wrong result. There is no evidence in 
this case of “substantial disorder,” “disruption” or “invasion of privacy.” 
Dean Poling's speech to 800 students at the high school assembly was 
“political speech,” pure and simple. It was not a vulgar speech like the one 
found unprotected in Bethel or a gross invasion of the right of privacy of 
an unwed, pregnant student as in Hazelwood. Poling was running for 
president of the student body of his school. He made a tough populist 
speech, short but not sweet. His main point was this: If you want to break 
the iron grip of this school, vote for me for President. I can try to bring 
back student rights that you have missed and maybe get things that you 
have always wanted. All you have to do is vote for me, Dean Poling. His 
fellow students from the hills and hollows of rural upper East Tennessee 
stood and cheered, but they were not disruptive. Although critical of the 
administration and of one particular teacher, the speech cannot be 
classified as one which “materially disrupts classwork or involves 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 
513, 89 S.Ct. at 740. If the school administration can silence a student 
criticizing it for being narrow minded and authoritarian, how can students 
engage in political dialogue with their educators about their education?196 
However, Merritt’s opinion did not carry the day; instead, courts came to the 
opposite conclusion starting in 1986 when the majority opinion in Poling was adopted by 
courts in other jurisdictions.  In Bethel School District v. Fraser, the U.S. Supreme Court 
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upheld a student’s suspension after he gave a speech at a school assembly in support of a 
candidate for student body president that contained sexual innuendo.  Now decades later, 
courts often apply Fraser to such cases.  For example, in 2009, a federal district court in 
Colorado applied Fraser in Corder v. Lewis Palmer School District, in which a principal 
required approval for a high school valedictorian’s speech prior to the graduation 
ceremony.197  When the student gave a different speech than that which was approved, 
the principal required her to publicly apologize.  The Tenth Circuit (with jurisdiction over 
Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming) determined that the 
school district did not violate the student’s free speech rights by requiring the review of 
the content of her speech prior to its presentation or by compelling her apology. 
Symbolic Expression Continues to Be Protected 
In a 1992 case with echoes of both Tinker and Burnside, sons and daughters of 
striking teachers wore “scab” stickers to an Oregon public school (the word “scab” 
referring to a worker who accepted employment or replaced a union worker during a 
strike).  The stickers also contained various pro-union and pro-teacher slogans.198  When 
their school ordered the students to remove the stickers, the students brought suit, arguing 
the requirement violated their rights under the First Amendment.  In Chandler v. 
McMinnville School District, the district court dismissed the case, but the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (with jurisdiction over Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington) reversed and remanded.  The Court 
of Appeals held that the “scab” buttons were improperly suppressed where nothing in the 
complaint or in the district court’s analysis substantiated the conclusion that such buttons 
were inherently disruptive.  The case, like the Tinker and Burnside cases, illustrates the 
court system’s aversion to restricting students’ symbolic expression worn on clothing. 
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The School Assembly/School Media Dichotomy 
It is interesting that courts have granted school officials substantial discretion to 
punish student speech at an assembly but have been less willing to curtail school 
interference with student media.  In contrast to the permanence of newspapers or even 
buttons on clothing, speeches at school assemblies are usually fleeting—and this was 
even more true in the days before students had smartphones with cameras that record 
video.  By examining cases involving student press rights, one immediately notices that 
there is something about school assemblies that persuades courts to give school officials 
more leeway to regulate and punish student speech.  The fact that students are a captive 
audience at a school-sponsored event could be a factor.  Another factor could be that it is 
done “live” and “in person” and school officials (and courts) think anything beyond 
banal, innocuous statements could lead to a lack of respect for authority.  In any case, 
some comments made at school assemblies—which courts allowed to be punished—
would be protected by the First Amendment if communicated in some other way.   
Distaste for Vague Policies 
The last decade of the 20th century and first decade of the 21st century saw courts 
around the country struggle over school districts’ free-speech policies, particularly in 
light of growing problems such as gang speech and bullying.  However, despite 
widespread concern about these issues, courts nevertheless consistently displayed their 
impatience for vague policies that give school officials too much discretion to ban or 
punish disfavored speech.  In Stephenson v. Davenport Community School District (a 
1997 Iowa case), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (with jurisdiction over 
Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota) found 
a school’s anti-gang rules unconstitutionally vague.  The Court said the rules “fail[ed] to 
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provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct” and “allow[ed] school administrators and 
local police unfettered discretion to decide what represents a gang symbol.”199   
In the 2001 Pennsylvania case Saxe v. State College Area School District, a 
school district adopted an anti-harassment policy that broadly prohibited certain forms of 
expression.200  The policy defined harassment as follows: 
Harassment means verbal or physical conduct based on one's actual or 
perceived race, religion, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, 
disability, or other personal characteristics, and which has the purpose or 
effect of substantially interfering with a student's educational performance 
or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment.201 
Additionally, the policy included the following as examples of harassment: 
Harassment can include any unwelcome verbal, written or physical 
conduct which offends, denigrates or belittles an individual because of any 
of the characteristics described above. Such conduct includes, but is not 
limited to, unsolicited derogatory remarks, jokes, demeaning comments or 
behaviors, slurs, mimicking, name calling, graffiti, innuendo, gestures, 
physical contact, stalking, threatening, bullying, extorting or the display or 
circulation of written material or pictures.202 
Several students brought suit, arguing that the policy was unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment’s free speech clause.  After the district court upheld the anti-
discrimination policy by holding that the policy restricted only speech that was already 
proscribed by state and federal law, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed and struck down the policy as overbroad, meaning that it displaced more First 
Amendment protection than was necessary to accomplish the goal of the school’s 
regulations.  The fact that the policy may have only proscribed speech that would fall 
within the scope of federal or state laws did not affect this holding.   
Some may find it strange for the courts to place so much emphasis on whether the 
school sponsored the assembly or the school newspaper.  Yet, the argument that anyone 
hearing a speech at an assembly or reading an article in the school newspaper will believe 
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the content represents the official position of the school or has been approved by school 
officials in advance is unconvincing.  In looking for “objective standards” that help them 
decide whether First Amendment rights have been violated, courts have placed too much 
emphasis on whether the activity where the speech was disseminated was a school-
sponsored event.  The U.S. Supreme Court followed exactly this logic in Morse v. 
Frederick, in which the court seemed so focused on the event being sponsored by the 
school that it overlooked the satirical and meaningless message on Frederick’s banner.203  
Courts may continue to draw this distinction rather than undertake the more difficult task 
of determining the boundaries of First Amendment speech based on its content, rather 
than the setting in which it is delivered or written.  
In any case, because the policy in Saxe prohibited a substantial amount of non-
vulgar, non-sponsored student speech and the policy’s restrictions were not necessary to 
prevent substantial disruption or interference with the work of the school or the rights of 
other students, the policy was overbroad under the Supreme Court’s Tinker standard.  
Writing for the court, Judge Samuel Alito (who was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 2006), said: “As subsequent federal cases have made clear, Tinker requires a specific 
and significant fear of disruption, not just some remote apprehension of disturbance.”204  
Likewise, in 2008, in Gillman v. School Board for Holmes County, Florida, the district 
court held that a school’s ban on “illegal organizations” and “secret societies” was 
unconstitutionally vague.205   
The Challenge of Internet Speech 
Can courts extend Tinker’s “material and substantial disruption” test to off-
campus speech?  Not only is the law unsettled on this question, but what is “on” or “off” 
campus has also become more complicated in the age of the Internet.  The 2001 case 
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Killion v. Franklin Regional School District illustrates the problem.  In Killion, a student 
in Pennsylvania wrote an email making fun of his coach, including remarks about his 
coach’s genitals.  The student sent the email to a friend but did not show it to anyone on 
campus.  Importantly, school computers were not used for either the creation or the 
reading of the message.  But later, a different student, who had been forwarded a copy of 
the email on a home computer, printed out the email and brought it to school.  The United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania said:   
Although there is limited case law on the issue, courts considering speech 
that occurs off school grounds have concluded (relying on Supreme Court 
decisions) that school officials' authority over off-campus expression is 
much more limited than expression on school grounds.206 
This language suggests that schools generally carry a heavier burden to punish 
off-campus speech, compared to on-campus speech.  However, this statement left 
unanswered the question of whether the email in this case was on-campus speech or off-
campus speech.  Was it off-campus speech because it was created by a student on his 
home computer after school hours?  Or was it on-campus speech because a different 
student printed it and brought it to school?  The court did not directly answer that 
question and decided to apply Tinker’s “material and substantial disruption” test. 
In the court’s view, the email did not interfere with the school’s ability to 
discipline its students.207  The court said: “[w]e cannot accept, without more, that the 
childish and boorish antics of a minor could impair the administrators’ abilities to 
discipline students and maintain control.”208  Thus, the student’s suspension “violates the 
First Amendment because defendants failed to satisfy Tinker's substantial disruption 
test.”209  With regard to the question of whether the email constituted on-campus or off-
campus speech, the court indulged in the judicial equivalent of throwing up one’s hands: 
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Although plaintiffs urge that a heightened standard applies because the 
speech at issue occurred off school grounds, we need not resolve this 
issue. The overwhelming weight of authority has analyzed student speech 
(whether on or off campus) in accordance with Tinker. Further, because 
the … list was brought on campus, albeit by an unknown person, Tinker 
applies.210 
Some courts have found that Tinker extends to student speech generated off 
campus but which the speaker distributed on campus.  This theory is based on cases 
involving independent student newspapers seeking distribution on or near campus.211  
Other courts have extended this principle to online blog posts, social networking profiles, 
and websites devoted to school news, campus gossip, or parody of school topics or 
officials, when a student showed it to fellow students or accessed the content on 
campus.212  In the 2008 law review article “Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age,” 
Mary-Rose Papandrea wrote: 
Most courts taking this sort of territorial approach make clear that it must 
be the student-speaker himself—and not another pupil or school 
administrator—who has accessed the speech at school or otherwise caused 
the speech or a copy of it to physically appear on campus.213 
In 2002, in Coy v. Board of Education, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio held that Fraser did not apply to a website containing indecent language 
when the school administration, at the time the student was expelled, had no evidence 
that any other student viewed the student’s website.214  
This case brings up another issue: the tendency for a certain group of courts to 
decide how much First Amendment protection certain speech should receive based on 
whether students on campus have seen the speech.  This leads down an uncertain road.  
Where is the cutoff?  What if one student saw it?  Or 10?  Or 20?  Is there a number that 
the courts should have in mind in deciding whether the speech was distributed on 
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campus?  This standard would seem problematic at best in the days of the Internet, when 
text and other forms of media are available to everyone.   
Court Sets Criteria for Limited Public Forum 
In 2003, the same court (but a different judge) dealt with a case involving a 
student newspaper.  In Draudt v. Wooster City School District Board of Education, the 
principal of Wooster High School in Ohio seized all copies of the December 20, 2002, 
edition of the student newspaper.  The issue contained an article addressing underage 
drinking, specifically the alleged lenient punishments some student athletes received after 
they were caught drinking.215  Two students were identified by name in the article, 
leading the principal and district superintendent to believe the article was “potentially 
defamatory.”216  The administrators also disputed other facts contained in the article.  On 
December 23, 2002, the Board issued the following statement:   
The Wooster Blade, the district student newspaper, printed a story in the 
latest edition that referred to two students by name and state [sic] that one 
of the students “... openly admits to consuming alcohol at the event and, 
like the five other violators, will receive community service as 
punishment.” The article mentioned elsewhere that “the school ... 
punished and convicted six ... students of drinking.” These statements are 
entirely untrue and factually inaccurate. They are potentially defamatory 
or libelous and may constitute a violation of law.217 
The District Court held that public or limited public forums are protected by the 
Tinker-based standard, which requires proof that the censored material is either unlawful 
or substantially disruptive.  In contrast, non-public forum publications are subject to the 
more administration-friendly Hazelwood standard, requiring only that the censorship be 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. The court held that the paper was a limited 
public forum.  Importantly, for the first time since Hazelwood, a court set out explicit 
criteria for determining whether a school intended to create a limited public forum:   
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The Supreme Court instructs courts to look at six factors: 1) whether the 
students produced the newspaper as part of the high school curriculum; 2) 
whether students receive credits and grades for completing the course; 3) 
whether a member of the faculty oversaw the production; 4) whether the 
school deviated from its policy of producing the paper as part of the 
educational curriculum; 5) the degree of control the administration and the 
faculty advisor exercise; and 6) applicable written policy statements of the 
board.218 
A Rare Clear-Cut Case 
First Amendment advocates often find themselves in the awkward position of 
defending mean-spirited attacks by immature students—a position that has little public 
support.  Thus, First Amendment advocates are thankful when a case like 2004’s Dean v. 
Utica Community Schools comes along, and advocates can passionately defend their 
position.  In 2004, Dean v. Utica provided a clear-cut example of the purpose of a student 
newspaper and the limits of administrative censorship.  In the case, students at a 
Michigan high school attempted to publish a story in their student newspaper, the Arrow, 
about a lawsuit filed against their school district alleging that diesel fumes from the 
district’s bus garage constituted a nuisance and harmed the health of homeowners who 
lived near the lot where the buses idled for extended periods of time.219  The principal 
forwarded a draft of the article to the superintendent, who told the principal to remove the 
article.  “The only reason given … for the removal of the article was that the district was 
involved in litigation and it ‘would be inappropriate for the school newspaper to 
comment on that.’”220 
When editor Katy Dean sought relief through a lawsuit, the court held that the 
student newspaper was a limited public forum for purposes of free speech analysis, and 
that the school district violated the free speech component of the First Amendment by 
suppressing the article.221  Furthermore, “The Arrow’s decision to publish an article on 
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the … lawsuit was consistent with the traditions of the paper and the inherent nature of 
newspaper journalism in a democracy.”222  In a rousing defense of the importance of 
student newspapers, and journalism in general, Judge Arthur Tarnow wrote: 
The newspaper class at Utica High School is intended to teach journalism. 
A core value of being a journalist is to understand the role of the press in a 
free society. That role is to provide an independent source of information 
so that a citizen can make informed decisions. It is often the case that this 
core value of journalistic independence requires a journalist to question 
authority rather than side with authority. Thus, if the role of the press in a 
democratic society is to have any value, all journalists—including student 
journalists—must be allowed to publish viewpoints contrary to those of 
state authorities without intervention or censorship by the authorities 
themselves. Without protection, the freedoms of speech and press are 
meaningless and the press becomes a mere channel for official thought.223 
The court added that, even if the paper was a non-public forum to which the Hazelwood 
standard applied, the court ruled that the censorship of the Arrow did not reasonably 
relate to legitimate pedagogical concerns.  The school district’s reasoning was even less 
convincing in light of the fact that local newspapers had already published information 
about the lawsuit.  
Violent Threats Not Tolerated 
Most cases are not as clear-cut as Dean v. Utica.  If all censorship cases centered 
on schools trying to suppress unflattering facts, courts would have a much easier time 
deciding First Amendment cases.  However, courts often have given schools leeway on 
the Tinker standard when the speech includes threats of violence or might lead to 
discipline problems in the school.  Such was the case in a 2007 decision involving a 
student in upstate New York.  In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Central 
School District, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (with 
jurisdiction over Connecticut, New York, and Vermont) found material and substantial 
disruption to the school after an incident involving a student’s use of AOL Instant 
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Messenger to send a message to friends.  In this case, a student, after school hours and 
using his own computer, had sent an animated icon to friends showing the teacher being 
shot.224  The court held that it was immaterial that the icon was clearly intended as a joke, 
and therefore the school could punish the student for the illustration attached to the 
messages.225   
Threats Versus Insults 
Most courts have distinguished between cases such as Wisniewski, in which the 
speech includes threats or references to violence against school officials, and cases 
involving speech that merely disparages school officials.  Some courts have adopted the 
approach of allowing school officials to punish any speech whose audience is related to 
the campus and which may reasonably be expected to come to the attention of school 
officials.  In one Connecticut case, Doninger v. Niehoff , decided in 2008, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals (with jurisdiction over Connecticut, New York, and Vermont) 
affirmed a district court ruling that the school could punish a student for writing a blog 
post expressing her frustration over the school’s decision to relocate a planned on-campus 
music festival she had helped plan and encouraging her readers to call the school to 
complain.226  The district court in that case had held that the school could punish the 
student under Fraser because the blog post called school officials “douchebags,” thereby 
interfering with the school’s “‘highly appropriate function … to prohibit the use of vulgar 
and offensive terms in public discourse.”’227  On appeal, the Second Circuit court refused 
to address whether Fraser could apply to off-campus speech and resolved the case on 
Tinker grounds, holding that it was foreseeable that her post would create a risk of 
substantial disruption at the school because she had urged readers to call and complain.228  
(The outcome, of course, may have been different if she had not used the word 
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“douchebags,” but had simply urged her readers to call and complain.)  The Second 
Circuit and other courts have used this “reasonably foreseeable” test to bring online 
speech relating to schools under the “punitive jurisdiction” of school officials, meaning 
school officials have the right to decide whether students can be punished for certain off-
campus speech.229   
Schools Gain Power to Punish Off-Campus Speech 
There is disagreement among lower courts about the circumstances under which 
off-campus speech may be punished by school officials.  However, as Doninger suggests, 
there may be a growing trend toward expanding schools’ ability to punish behavior off 
campus.  The trend seems to favor schools’ interest in reaching outside the schoolyard to 
punish students for behavior on the Internet, particularly when such off-campus online 
speech negatively portrays school officials or becomes a topic of discussion among 
students while at school.  It is interesting to consider how much “discussion” at school is 
too much.  In other words, do courts want to base First Amendment rights of a speaker on 
the reaction of some group of people or the intended audience?  Such a standard might 
result in the following absurdity: If students do not care about the message, then the 
speaker receives full First Amendment rights.  If the students energetically discuss it, 
then First Amendment rights are limited.  
While courts have consistently upheld school policies restricting student speech 
on campus, particularly when the speech is expressed in school-sponsored forums, the 
practice of regulating on-campus speech is a far cry from allowing school officials to 
reach into students’ homes and punish them for wholly off-campus speech which school 
officials find offensive or which they feel compelled to respond to in their capacity as 
educators.   
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Problems With School Intervention in Off-Campus Speech 
Schools should not be the government authority responsible for dealing with 
threatening or harassing speech that takes place wholly off campus.  There are civil and 
criminal legal remedies school officials may pursue if they feel harassed, defamed, or 
threatened by anyone off campus—student or not.  A school may decide to move a 
student or a teacher to a different class as a result of such off-campus disputes; however, 
it could be argued that this is a personnel issue rather than a discipline issue.   
In sum, the risks to First Amendment rights are greatly increased when school 
officials have the authority to punish students for off-campus speech.  Although a 
student’s off-campus speech may eventually finds its way on campus, school officials 
should not be allowed to punish students for their private, off-campus conversations.  
Regrettably, it is necessary sometimes for school officials to deal with social ills and 
controversies that affect their campus community and to educate students about a variety 
of issues that arise outside of school.  If racial tensions are running high off campus, a 
school official may choose to have an assembly promoting racial harmony.  But that 
same school official should not have the authority to punish a student for a racist remark 
made on the student’s Facebook page after school hours and using the student’s personal 
computer. 
Setting the boundaries of appropriate student speech in day-to-day off-campus life 
is the parents’ role.  It is the parent, not the government or the school, who has the 
primary authority and right to determine the values and norms expected of children in 
their personal lives.  It is the parents’ job to establish the child’s religion, morals, and 
goals. Although the school plays an important part of teaching community-wide culture, 
values and expectations, this role is diminished outside the schoolhouse gates.  Granting 
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school officials the authority to regulate off-campus student speech it considers offensive 
or vulgar is an unacceptable intrusion on parental rights and an invasion of privacy of 
students. 
Division Grows Over What Counts as “On Campus” 
The following two cases illustrate the inconsistency federal circuit courts of 
appeal exhibit regarding the issue of on-campus versus off-campus speech.  In a 2011 
case in Pennsylvania, Layshock v. Hermitage School District, a student used an off-
campus computer to access a social networking website and create a fake Internet profile 
of his high school principal.  The school district suspended the student.230  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the district’s response to the student’s 
conduct violated the First Amendment because, among other reasons, there was not an 
adequate link between the speech and the school.  Administrators’ efforts to shut down 
student access to the profile on school computers and the student “buzz” about the profile 
resulted in a “rather minimal” disturbance and did not satisfy the Tinker standard.  The 
court matter-of-factly stated: 
We are asked to determine if a school district can punish a student for 
expressive conduct that originated outside of the schoolhouse, did not 
disturb the school environment and was not related to any school 
sponsored event. We hold that, under these circumstances, the First 
Amendment prohibits the school from reaching beyond the schoolyard to 
impose what might otherwise be appropriate discipline.231 
The school district also claimed that the student’s speech should be treated as “on-
campus” speech because it was aimed at the principal, was accessed on campus by the 
student, and would probably come to the attention of the school district and the principal. 
The district court held that the student’s punishment was not appropriate under Fraser 
because “[t]here is no evidence that Justin engaged in any lewd or profane speech while 
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in school.”232  It also held that the student’s punishment was not appropriate under Tinker 
because the School District did “not establish … a sufficient [link] between the student’s 
speech and a substantial disruption of the school environment.”233  
However, in a concurring opinion, Judge Kent Jordan (joined by Judge Thomas 
Vanaskie) argued that Tinker can and should be applied to off-campus speech in certain 
circumstances: 
We cannot sidestep the central tension between good order and expressive 
rights by leaning on property lines. With the tools of modern technology, a 
student could, with malice aforethought, engineer egregiously disruptive 
events and, if the trouble-maker were savvy enough to tweet the 
organizing communications from his or her cellphone while standing one 
foot outside school property, the school administrators might succeed in 
heading off the actual disruption in the building but would be left 
powerless to discipline the student.234  
The same year that the Third Circuit decided Layshock (2011), the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was presented with a case that also involved off-campus 
speech, but this time, the controversial material was about a student.  In Kowalski v. 
Berkeley County Schools, a West Virginia student used her home computer to create a 
web page that ridiculed a classmate.235   
The webpage contained comments accusing Shay N. of having herpes and 
being a “slut,” as well as photographs reinforcing those defamatory 
accusations by depicting a sign across her pelvic area, which stated, 
“Warning: Enter at your own risk” and labeling her portrait as that of a 
“whore.” One student's posting dismissed any concern for Shay N.'s 
reaction with a comment that said, “screw her.” This is not the conduct 
and speech that our educational system is required to tolerate….236 
Given the targeted, defamatory nature of Kowalski's speech, aimed at a fellow classmate, 
it created “actual or nascent” substantial disorder and disruption in the school, according 
to the court.237  Administrators suspended the student from school for five days and 
imposed a 90-day “social suspension” disallowing her from participating in school-
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sponsored extracurricular activities.  The student alleged that the administration violated 
her First Amendment rights, but the Fourth Circuit disagreed.  Because there was a strong 
link (often called a “nexus” in legal language) between the student’s speech and the 
school’s pedagogical interests, and because the speech was “materially and substantially 
disruptive,” it was foreseeable that her conduct would create problems for the school.  
Writing for the court, Circuit Judge Paul Niemeyer said school administrators “must be 
able to prevent and punish harassment and bullying in order to provide a safe school 
environment conducive to learning.”238 
Does Parody Fall Under Fraser? 
In the 2011 Pennsylvania case Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals applied Fraser (even though the case did not involve a speech at 
a school assembly) to uphold the suspension of student who posted an unflattering parody 
of his school principal, James McGonigle, on MySpace.com.  Riddled with vulgarities 
and spelling and punctuation errors, the parody contained the following information on 
the “About Me” section: 
HELLO CHILDREN[.] yes. it's your oh so wonderful, hairy, 
expressionless, sex addict, fagass, put on this world with a small dick 
PRINCIPAL[.] I have come to myspace so i can pervert the minds of other 
principal's [sic] to be just like me. I know, I know, you're all thrilled[.] 
Another reason I came to myspace is because—I am keeping an eye on 
you students (who[m] I care for so much)[.] For those who want to be my 
friend, and aren't in my school[,] I love children, sex (any kind), dogs, 
long walks on the beach, tv, being a dick head, and last but not least my 
darling wife who looks like a man (who satisfies my needs)239 
The parody did not cause a substantial disruption under Tinker, but was found to fall 
under Fraser because it was particularly offensive and vulgar, which violated school 
policy.  The court wrote: 
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J.S.'s speech is not the type of speech that the Tinker Court so vehemently 
protected. I agree with the majority that the facts in the record fail to 
demonstrate substantial disruption at the School. But the profile's potential 
to cause disruption was reasonably foreseeable, and that is sufficient ... . 
Two forms of disruption were foreseeable. First, the MySpace page posed 
a reasonably foreseeable threat of interference with the educational 
environment. If J.S.'s speech went unpunished, it would undermine 
McGonigle's authority and disrupt the educational process. Second, J.S.'s 
speech posed a reasonably foreseeable threat of disrupting the operations 
of the classroom. It was foreseeable that J.S.'s false accusations and 
malicious comments would disrupt [McGonigle’s] ability to perform [his] 
job.240 
Thus, according to the Third Circuit in this case, schools may infringe on student speech 
generated off campus through implementation of existing conduct policies.   
Social Commentary Trumps Vulgarity 
In 2013, the Third Circuit faced another dispute in Pennsylvania over First 
Amendment rights at school.  However, because the expression was considered to be 
commentary on a social issue rather than mere vulgarity, the students stood a better 
chance of winning their case.  In B.H. v. Easton Area School District, when two middle-
school students purchased bracelets bearing the slogan “I ♥ boobies! (KEEP A 
BREAST)” as part of a national breast-cancer-awareness campaign, the school district 
banned the bracelets.241  The students brought suit asking for a preliminary injunction 
barring enforcement of the ban, and the district court held that the ban violated the 
students’ rights to free speech and issued a preliminary injunction against it.  The Third 
Circuit affirmed, and—in so doing—fashioned a three-part test for cases in this area of 
the law: 
(1) plainly lewd speech, which offends for the same reasons obscenity 
offends, may be categorically restricted regardless of whether it comments 
on political or social issues, (2) speech that does not rise to the level of 
plainly lewd but that a reasonable observer could interpret as lewd may be 
categorically restricted as long as it cannot plausibly be interpreted as 
commenting on political or social issues, and (3) speech that does not rise 
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to the level of plainly lewd and that could plausibly be interpreted as 
commenting on political or social issues may not be categorically 
restricted. Because the bracelets here are not plainly lewd and because 
they comment on a social issue, they may not be categorically banned 
under Fraser. The School District has also failed to show that the bracelets 
threatened to substantially disrupt the school under Tinker.242  
Protection (or Lack Thereof) for University Students 
All of the preceding federal cases involved First Amendment disputes at the K-12 
level.  However, federal courts also regularly address First Amendment disputes at the 
postsecondary level.  Some courts, to the bewilderment of First Amendment advocates, 
apply K-12 precedents to cases at the college and university level.  Student media 
advocacy organizations such as the Student Press Law Center based in Washington, D.C., 
have become increasingly concerned about the idea of courts treating adult students—
even graduate students—as the legal equivalent of middle school students in cases 
involving disputes between students and universities.  Federal cases involving First 
Amendment protection at the university level will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
FEDERAL CASES AT THE UNIVERSITY LEVEL 
Although some student press advocates are concerned about recent decisions 
curtailing the speech and press rights of college students, First Amendment protections 
for postsecondary school students are on much firmer footing than are protections for K-
12 students.   
The 1960 and 1970s: Students and Editorial Control 
The birth of college press freedom began even before Tinker, when an Alabama 
federal district court in 1967 ruled in favor of a student editor in Dickey v. Alabama State 
Board of Education.  In Dickey, a disagreement over content in the student newspaper 
resulted in student editor Gary Dickey’s suspension from Troy State University.243  
Dickey wrote an editorial commenting on the governor and state legislature’s insistence 
that no articles be published that were critical of them.  The president of the university, 
Dr. Frank Rose, disagreed with this policy, and Dickey wanted to write an article 
supporting the president.  As the court noted: 
It is without controversy in this case that the basis for the denial of 
Dickey's right to publish his editorial supporting Dr. Rose was a rule that 
had been invoked at Troy State College to the effect that there could be no 
editorials written in the school paper which were critical of the Governor 
of the State of Alabama or the Alabama Legislature. The rule did not 
prohibit editorials or articles of a laudatory nature concerning the 
Governor or the Legislature.244 
Dickey was told by his advisor that he could not publish the column.  Instead, 
Dickey decided to run a blank space in place of the article with the word “censored.”  For 
this action, Dickey was suspended, and he subsequently took his case to federal court, 
claiming a violation of his First Amendment rights.  In ordering that Dickey be allowed 
to return to the school, the district court judge said:  
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State school officials cannot infringe on their students' right of free and 
unrestricted expression as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United 
States where the exercise of such right does not materially and 
substantially interfere with requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school.245 
For decades after this court decision, university press freedom continued to grow.  In fact, 
Marc Abrams in the book Law of the Student Press calls the period after Dickey a “30-
plus year winning streak for America’s college student media when contesting 
administrative censorship.”246  
In a continuation of legal protections for university press freedom, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in the 1973 case Bazaar v. Fortune that officials at 
the University of Mississippi could not censor publication of “earthy language” in the 
school’s literary magazine.  Circuit Judge Lewis R. Morgan said: 
The University here is clearly an arm of the state and this single fact will 
always distinguish it from the purely private publisher as far as censorship 
rights are concerned. It seems a well-established rule that once a 
University recognizes a student activity which has elements of free 
expression, it can act to censor that expression only if it acts consistent 
with First Amendment constitutional guarantees.247 
The same year (1973), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard 
arguments in Joyner v. Whiting.  In this case, the Echo student newspaper at North 
Carolina Central University published an editorial urging students to fight efforts to 
integrate their historically African-American college.  The president tried to withhold 
funding from the newspaper, citing “standard journalistic criteria” and a lack of content 
showing “the full spectrum of views” on campus.  President Whiting wrote the following 
letter to student editor Johnnie Edward Joyner: 
In my view the September 16 issue of the Campus Echo does not meet 
standard journalistic criteria nor does it represent fairly the full spectrum 
of views on this campus. Because of this, I am writing to advise that funds 
for the publication of additional issues will be withheld until agreement 
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can be reached regarding the standards to which further publications will 
adhere. If consensus cannot be established then this University will not 
sponsor a campus newspaper. That portion of remaining funds collected or 
allocated to the Campus Echo budget will accrue to the credit of all 
contributing students for this school year.248 
The president's attorneys explained to him that because North Carolina Central 
University is a state institution, he could not refuse to financially support the newspaper.  
Undeterred, the president halted the paper's financial support and refunded to each 
student a share of the activity fee allocated to the Echo.  As a result, several issues of the 
Echo were published without the university's financial support, but the paper ultimately 
could not survive without its subsidy from student fees. 
Circuit Judge John D. Butzner rejected the university’s argument:   
Fortunately, we travel through well charted waters to determine whether 
the permanent denial of financial support to the newspaper because of its 
editorial policy abridged the freedom of the press. The First Amendment is 
fully applicable to the states … and precedent establishes “that state 
colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from [its] sweep.” A 
college, acting “as the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech 
. . . simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to be 
abhorrent.” … It may well be that a college need not establish a campus 
newspaper, or, if a paper has been established, the college may 
permanently discontinue publication for reasons wholly unrelated to the 
First Amendment. But if a college has a student newspaper, its publication 
cannot be suppressed because college officials dislike its editorial 
comment.”249 
The 1980s and 1990s: Students and Offensive Material 
As with the previous decade, the decade of the 1980s was also a positive time for 
press freedom advocates at the university level.  In 1983, the case Stanley v. Magrath was 
decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.  The dispute began when the 
University of Minnesota’s board of regents were angered over a finals week humor issue 
of the student newspaper: 
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In June 1979 the “Finals Week” edition or “Humor Issue” of the 
Minnesota Daily, styled in the format of sensationalist newspapers, 
contained articles, advertisements, and cartoons satirizing Christ, the 
Roman Catholic Church, evangelical religion, public figures, numerous 
social, political, and ethnic groups, social customs, popular trends, and 
liberal ideas. In addressing these subjects, the paper frequently used 
scatological language and explicit and implicit references to sexual acts. 
There was, for example, a blasphemous “interview” with Jesus on the 
Cross that would offend anyone of good taste, whether with or without 
religion. No contention is made, however, that the newspaper met the legal 
definition of obscenity.250 
In a maneuver reminiscent of the Joyner case from the previous decade, the university 
attempted to change the funding for the student newspaper by allowing students to 
request a refund of the portion of their student activity fee that went to the paper.  Circuit 
Judge Richard S. Arnold would not allow the university to take such action: 
[The university’s] stated reason was solicitude for students who objected 
to buying a newspaper they did not want. Our study of the record, 
however, leaves us with the definite and firm conviction that this change 
in funding would not have occurred absent the public hue and cry that the 
Daily's offensive contents provoked. Reducing the revenues available to 
the newspaper is therefore forbidden by the First Amendment, as made 
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth, and the Daily is entitled to an 
injunction restoring the former system of funding.251 
The Circuit Court’s decision overturned an earlier ruling by a federal district court, which 
illustrates the fact that even federal courts can be uncomfortable with the First 
Amendment’s protection of offensive material.   
In the 1996 California case Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, a tenured 
professor of English brought suit under the First Amendment after he was disciplined for 
violating his college’s sexual harassment policy by using profanity and discussing sex, 
pornography, obscenity, cannibalism, and other controversial topics in a confrontational, 
devil’s advocate style in class.252  One student believed the sexual comments, some of 
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which involved consensual sex with children, “were directed intentionally at her and 
other female students in a humiliating and harassing manner.”253   
The school ordered the professor to: 
1. Provide a syllabus concerning his teaching style, purpose, content, and 
method to his students at the beginning of class and to the department chair by 
certain deadlines; 
2. Attend a sexual harassment seminar within ninety days; 
3. Undergo a formal evaluation procedure in accordance with the collective 
bargaining agreement; and 
4. Become sensitive to the particular needs and backgrounds of his students, and 
to modify his teaching strategy when it becomes apparent that his techniques 
create a climate which impedes the students' ability to learn. 
Cohen was, additionally, advised that further violation of the Policy would 
result in further discipline “up to and including suspension or termination” 
and the Board ordered that its decision be placed in Cohen's personnel 
file.254 
The Ninth Circuit held that the policy was unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
the teacher’s in-class speech, noting that the speech did not fall within the policy’s core 
definition of sexual harassment and that the teacher had used this teaching style for years.   
2000s: Courts Begin Limiting University Student Speech 
In the first decade of the new millennium, a line of cases showed that courts were 
tending to rule against students pursuing First Amendment claims against their 
universities.  But before this development began, university press freedom was 
energetically endorsed in a federal case in 2001.  In Kincaid v. Gibson, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that administrators at Kentucky State University 
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violated students’ rights by refusing to distribute the school yearbook.255  University 
officials objected to the content of the yearbook and the color of its cover, among other 
things.  However, their main objection was that the yearbook looked amateurish and 
would be an embarrassment to the university.  The court held that: (1) the yearbook was a 
limited public forum for First Amendment purposes; (2) By confiscating all copies of the 
yearbook, university officials did not impose reasonable time, place, and manner 
restriction upon the speech in the limited public forum; (3) the Hazelwood case did not 
apply at the university level; and (4) school officials’ conduct violated the First 
Amendment even if yearbook was not considered a public forum.  In the ruling, Judge R. 
Guy Cole wrote, “There is little if any difference between hiding from public view the 
words and pictures students use to portray their college experience, and forcing students 
to publish a state-sponsored script. In either case, the government alters student 
expression by obliterating it.”256  Cole’s ruling continued the legacy of the Supreme 
Court’s Barnette case, when Justice Robert H. Jackson warned against any attempt by a 
state official to “prescribe what shall be orthodox.”  
However, student press advocates were disappointed when, in 2002, the Ninth 
Circuit—the same court that protected the professor in Cohen—applied the Hazelwood 
test to a university dispute in California.  Brown v. Li arose because university policy 
required a graduate student to submit his thesis to a committee for final approval before 
filing the thesis with the university library.257  In accordance with this policy, the student 
submitted his thesis to the committee, which approved the thesis.  Graduate thesis papers 
often contain an “acknowledgements” section wherein students thank certain people for 
their help or moral support.  However, the student then inserted a 
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“disacknowledgements” section into his thesis—criticizing people for perceived 
wrongs—and attempted to file the thesis in the university library.  When members of the 
committee realized this, they prohibited the student from filing the thesis but still allowed 
him to receive his degree.  Applying the Hazelwood test, the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
committee’s actions, holding that the assignment was part of the student’s curriculum and 
the committee’s decision was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical objective: 
teaching the student the proper format for a scientific paper.  The court said: 
The parties have not identified, nor have we found, any Supreme Court 
case discussing the appropriate standard for reviewing a university's 
regulation of students' curricular speech. It is thus an open question 
whether Hazelwood articulates the standard for reviewing a university's 
assessment of a student's academic work. We conclude that it does.258 
Because of the explicitly stated requirements for the format of a thesis, the court 
concluded that the university committee had every right to order the removal of the 
“disacknowledgements” section in accordance with the proper format for academic 
papers.  However, some student press advocates believe applying the K-12 case 
Hazelwood to a university was a serious error, portending a coming era when judges 
would apply principles from cases involving middle school and high school students to 
the university context.  On the other hand, the facts of the case—considering that the 
format of a thesis would be seen as within the purview of the university’s authority to 
establish curriculum requirements—suggest that the case will have limited precedential 
value when it comes to disputes involving more common forms of student expression. 
The Hosty Bombshell 
In 2005, in Hosty v. Carter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
applied Hazelwood in a case involving a newspaper at a public university in Illinois.  
When the Governors State University student newspaper, The Innovator, began printing 
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articles that were critical of university employees, the dean told the printer that the 
university would not pay for any issues that had not been reviewed and approved in 
advance.259  The students who worked at the newspaper filed suit against the dean 
(Patricia Carter), the university, and others for depriving them of First Amendment rights 
in violation of a federal law known as “Section 1983” that authorizes a civil suit seeking 
damages against public officials.  
The narrow (5-4) Hosty decision (which affects states in the Seventh Circuit, with 
jurisdiction over Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin) has been the subject of debate and 
handwringing by advocates for a free student press.  Free-press advocates were 
disappointed by the court’s decision that the Hazelwood standard (established by the 
Supreme Court in a high school case) can apply in the university setting.  Some student 
press advocates believe that opening the door to Hazelwood at the college level makes 
Hosty a dangerous decision for student press freedom.  The court could just as easily have 
gone the other way (as the dissenters did, which will be discussed below) in recognizing 
the distinction between the appropriate level of control over students who are children 
and students who are adults.   
The Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whether the more 
administration-friendly standard in Hazelwood applies equally in the context of public 
university education (as opposed to elementary or high school education).  In a footnote 
to Hazelwood, the Supreme Court said: “[a] number of lower federal courts have 
similarly recognized that educators’ decisions with regard to the content of school-
sponsored newspapers, dramatic productions, and other expressive activities are entitled 
to substantial deference. We need not now decide whether the same degree of deference 
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is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and 
university level.”260  
Writing for the majority in Hosty, Judge Easterbrook referred to this footnote: 
…Plaintiffs argue, and the district court held, that Hazelwood is 
inapplicable to university newspapers and that post-secondary educators 
therefore cannot ever insist that student newspapers be submitted for 
review and approval. Yet this footnote does not even hint at the possibility 
of an on/off switch: high school papers reviewable, college papers not 
reviewable. It addresses degrees of deference. Whether some review is 
possible depends on the answer to the public-forum question, which does 
not (automatically) vary with the speakers’ age.261 
It is odd that the majority of the en banc court (the full court of appeals) agreed 
with Easterbrook, considering the back-and-forth nature of his decision (at times leaning 
toward the students, but at other times leaning toward the university)—as well as his 
inability to settle on the status of the newspaper.  Was it a public forum?  If so, what 
kind?  In contrast, the dissenters had a clearer argument, which will be discussed below. 
Easterbrook noted that the newspaper in Hosty was subsidized by the university, 
and “[f]reedom of speech does not imply that someone else must pay.”262  He reasoned 
that the student newspaper might be a “designated public forum” or “limited-purpose 
public forum,” both of which have some censorship protections, requiring the university 
to show that the regulation or administrative action is content-neutral; that it serves a 
substantial government interest; that there is not a total ban on communication; and that it 
is no more restrictive than is necessary to serve the government interest.263   
Easterbrook never took a clear position on what kind of forum existed.  Frank 
LoMonte of the Student Press Law Center criticized Judge Easterbrook’s failure to 
ultimately determine whether the newspaper was a limited public forum.  In LoMonte’s 
opinion, Easterbrook was too preoccupied with the question of whether school officials 
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had immunity from the lawsuit.  In an article for The First Amendment Law Review, 
LoMonte wrote: 
The court embarked on a rambling and not entirely coherent expedition 
through forum doctrine, suggesting without firmly concluding that the 
Innovator likely would have qualified for heightened First Amendment 
status as a designated public forum--a question mooted when the case was 
pretermitted on immunity grounds.264 
In the student newspaper context, the forum analysis can be confusing because 
many student newspapers are subsidized in some manner by the university with which 
they are connected. Such subsidy can take different forms.  For example, a university 
may provide any combination of funds, physical space, materials, logistical support 
services, salaries for faculty advisors, or even course credit or extra credit for journalism 
student participation in the newspaper.  If there is any form of sponsorship or subsidy by 
the university, the student newspaper could be a limited public forum, which can open the 
door to disputes about the purposes for which the forum was created and whether the 
university has sufficiently justified the restriction on speech.   
Hosty’s Numerous Problems 
Hosty was an appeal decided solely on the issue of qualified official immunity of 
Dean Carter and others—not on the merits of a constitutional challenge.  Nevertheless, 
that did not stop Judge Frank Easterbrook from discussing several other questions—only 
to leave them unresolved.  These questions involved (1) the forum status of the 
newspaper, (2) the relationship between the forum status and the possible violation of the 
students’ First Amendment rights, (3) the relationship (if any) between the forum status 
and immunity, and (4) the decision of what to do if the students’ First Amendment rights 
were violated—e.g., did university officials infringe “clearly established rights,” thus 
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losing the immunity that is normally granted to public officials in the exercise of their 
duties? 
The Hosty case is both important and frustrating.  Several key issues are left 
dangling that could have been resolved with a more comprehensive and thoughtful 
opinion.  Easterbrook did not explain how the determination of the newspaper’s forum 
status relates to whether Dean Carter and other administrators enjoy immunity for their 
actions.  He concluded that the rights at stake were not clearly established and therefore 
immunity is upheld.  However, he does not explain whether the forum status of the 
newspaper had some impact on whether the First Amendment rights of the students were 
sufficiently established for the administrators to know what they were doing was a 
violation of those rights.  He implied that the newspaper was a limited public forum 
because of the subsidies offered by the university, but because he stopped short of 
concluding it was such a forum, he did not explain why that distinction matters.  If it is a 
public forum, the university is limited by the First Amendment from interfering with the 
content or operation of the newspaper.  But since the case is based on immunity and 
Section 1983 liability, the question of forum status is not given proper attention. 
Hosty and Qualified Immunity 
The immunity question posed to the court in Hosty was whether the constitutional 
rights of the student editors were so clearly established that Dean Carter should have 
known she was violating them when taking the action she did.  The protection offered by 
qualified immunity has been developed in case law over a period of many years to 
prevent administrative officials from constantly facing lawsuits over their decisions.  It is 
a difficult standard to meet, and thus many lawsuits brought against public officials are 
unsuccessful.  
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The court concluded that because of the lack of precedent in this area, Carter did 
not knowingly violate clearly established rights.  Easterbrook wrote: “One might well say 
as a ‘broad general proposition’ something like ‘public officials may not censor speech in 
a designated public forum,’ but whether Dean Carter was bound to know that the 
Innovator operated in such a forum is a different question altogether.”265  The Hosty 
majority used the district court’s decision as a way to narrow the question presented in 
such a way to find in favor of the public official:   
The district court held that any reasonable college administrator should 
have known that (a) the approach of Hazelwood does not apply to 
colleges; and (b) only speech that is part of the curriculum is subject to 
supervision. We have held that neither of these propositions is correct—
that Hazelwood’s framework is generally applicable and depends in large 
measure on the operation of public-forum analysis rather than the 
distinction between curricular and extra-curricular activities. 
But even if student newspapers at high schools and colleges 
operate under different constitutional frameworks, as both the district 
judge and our panel thought, it greatly overstates the certainty of the law 
to say that any reasonable college administrator had to know that rule. 
…266 
The majority also justified narrowing its decision by citing the arguments of the parties:  
For reasons that should by now be evident, the implementation of 
Hazelwood means that both legal and factual uncertainties dog the 
litigation—and it is the function of qualified immunity to ensure that such 
uncertainties are resolved by prospective relief rather than by financial 
exactions from public employees.267   
Hosty and Prior Review 
Judge Terence T. Evans, writing for the four dissenters, said: “Prior to 
Hazelwood, courts were consistently clear that university administrators could not require 
prior review of student media or otherwise censor student newspapers.”268  Evans also 
said: 
The Innovator, as opposed to writing merely about football games, 
actually chose to publish hard-hitting stories. And these articles were 
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critical of the school administration. In response, rather than applauding 
the young journalists, the University decided to prohibit publication unless 
a school official reviewed the paper's content before it was printed. Few 
restrictions on speech seem to run more afoul of basic First Amendment 
values. First, prior restraints are particularly noxious under the 
Constitution. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559, 96 
S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976) (“prior restraints on speech and 
publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on 
First Amendment rights”); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713, 51 S.Ct. 
625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931) (“it has been generally, if not universally, 
considered that it is the chief purpose of the [First Amendment's free 
press] guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication”). Second, 
and even more fundamental, as Justice Frankfurter stated (albeit in 
somewhat dated language) in Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 
673–74, 64 S.Ct. 1240, 88 L.Ed. 1525 (1944), “one of the prerogatives of 
American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures.” 
College students—voting-age citizens and potential future leaders—
should feel free to question, challenge, and criticize government action. 
Nevertheless, as a result of today's holding, Dean Carter could have 
censored the Innovator by merely establishing “legitimate pedagogical 
reasons.” This court now gives the green light to school administrators to 
restrict student speech in a manner inconsistent with the First 
Amendment.269 
The decision in Hosty was simply to recognize that because Hazelwood applies at 
the university level, the existing law was not clear enough to strip the university 
administrator of immunity.  This leaves somewhat unsettled the extent to which student 
journalists can seek First Amendment protection when university administrations 
exercise prior review over student newspapers in Indiana, Wisconsin, and Illinois. 
Despite Hosty, Protections Still Exist 
It is important to remember that the Hosty decision did not overrule the 
precedents that protect student First Amendment rights.  The Seventh Circuit’s decision 
in Hosty cannot supplant or supersede the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.  For 
example, in a 2000 concurring opinion, Justice David Souter recognized that the Supreme 
Court’s “university cases have dealt with restrictions imposed from outside the academy 
on individual teachers’ speech or associations,” whereas “cases dealing with the right of 
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teaching institutions to limit expressive freedom of students have been confined to high 
schools, whose students and their schools’ relation to them are different and at least 
arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in college education” (emphasis 
added).270  
At the time of Hosty, only one of the U.S. Appeal Circuits held that the 
Hazelwood analysis cannot be applied in a university context.  In a footnote in Student 
Government Association v. Board of Trustees, the First Circuit incorrectly suggested in 
1989 that the Supreme Court in Hazelwood had actually decided the issue.271  Other 
circuits had either adopted the Hazelwood analysis in the university setting or had applied 
it in a modified form.272  Yet, while Hazelwood somewhat altered the context (whether at 
the university or high school level), Hazelwood probably did not change the results of the 
substantive law when it comes to a university-level publication or other expressive 
activity.  
In Ward v. Polite¸ a 2012 decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit, the court expressly held that Hazelwood applies in the university setting.273  
Ward involved the dismissal of a student from Eastern Michigan University’s graduate 
counseling program.  The student in a practicum course requested to refer, rather than 
directly counsel, a homosexual client, because the student believed the counseling would 
conflict with the student’s personal religious beliefs.  Ultimately, the court reversed the 
summary judgment that had been entered in the university’s favor and permitted the 
student’s First Amendment claim to proceed to trial.274  In dicta concerning student 
newspapers, the Ward court made clear that the context of the Hazelwood analysis could 
vary greatly between the university and high school settings:  
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Nothing in Hazelwood suggests a stop-go distinction between student 
speech at the high school and university levels, and we decline to create 
one. … By requiring restrictions on student speech to be reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns, Hazelwood allows teachers 
and administrators to account for the “level of maturity” of the student. 
Although it may be reasonable for a principal to delete a story about 
teenage pregnancy from a high school newspaper, the same could not 
(likely) be said about a college newspaper. To the extent that the 
justification for editorial control depends on the audience’s maturity, the 
difference between high school and university students makes all the 
difference.275  
The Ward court also suggested that it is the public forum analysis that may 
typically be unfriendly to students’ freedom of expression:  
Hazelwood also features a question crucial to the resolution of all school-
speech cases, whether at the high school or university level: Whose speech 
is it? The closer expression comes to school-sponsored speech, the less 
likely the First Amendment protects it.  And the less the speech has to do 
with the curriculum and school-sponsored activities, the less likely any 
suppression will further a legitimate pedagogical concern, which is why 
the First Amendment permits suppression under those circumstances only 
if the speech causes substantial disruption of or material interference with 
school activities.276  
It is interesting to contemplate the relationship between a school-sponsored 
publication (such as a university alumni magazine) and the subsidizing of a school 
newspaper.  The Ward court suggests that if it is school-sponsored speech, less First 
Amendment protection is available to student journalists.  Hosty and other cases suggest 
that if the paper is subsidized with university money, it is more likely to be a limited 
public forum and thus students will get greater First Amendment protection.  At what 
point does subsidy (thus enhanced First Amendment rights for students) become school-
sponsored (limited First Amendment rights for students)?   
This quandary suggests that public forum status may be the wrong standard to use 
in student First Amendment cases, and a review of legal articles echoes the confusion 
surrounding public forum analysis.  In a 2009 issue of Nova Law Review, Marc Rohr 
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explored “the ongoing mystery of the limited public forum,” concluding with a simple 
plea: “Above all, give us clarity, please.”277  If legal scholars and judges cannot agree on 
what a public forum is, perhaps it is the wrong principle to use in deciding First 
Amendment cases.  
Both the Hosty and Ward decisions suggest that the applicability of Hazelwood in 
the university setting will not alter the conclusion that traditional university student 
newspapers (i.e., newspapers produced and managed by students and that are 
extracurricular activities) are beyond the editorial control or censorship of university 
faculty and administrators.  Instead, the various distinctions between the university 
setting and the high school or elementary school settings are borne out in the application 
of the Hazelwood analysis; i.e., university student newspapers are typically public forums 
while high school student newspapers are not typically public forums.  Subsequent 
decisions in the Seventh Circuit applying Hosty confirm this assertion.278  
Likewise, other circuits that have applied Hazelwood in the university setting 
have maintained the same pre-existing robust First Amendment protection for traditional 
student newspapers.  In Husain v. Springer279, the Second Circuit held: 
The Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, therefore, have adopted the 
position that the establishment of a student media outlet, in essence, 
necessarily involves the creation of a limited public forum where the only 
restraint is on the speakers who can participate (i.e., students) and where 
there can be no restrictions on the content of the outlet except with respect 
to content that threatens the maintenance of order at the university. Two 
other circuits, while also recognizing that student media outlets often 
enjoy First Amendment protection from interference by school 
administrators, have taken a less expansive view. The Sixth and Seventh 
Circuits agree that the establishment of a student media outlet can create a 
limited public forum but have concluded that the scope of that forum can 
be restricted by the school. In other words, these courts do not consider the 
creation of a student media outlet as categorically involving the creation of 
a limited public forum within which students may speak on essentially any 
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subject without fear of reprisal, but rather look to the context of the public 
university’s treatment of a student media outlet, including its intent in 
creating the outlet and practices with respect to the outlet, in order to 
determine what First Amendment protection the outlet, and those that 
participate in it, receive.   
Nevertheless, although the treatment of forum analysis with 
respect to student media outlets at public universities has differed in some 
respects in the various circuits, all the circuits that have considered the 
issue have determined that, at the very least, when a public university 
creates or subsidizes a student newspaper and imposes no ex ante 
restrictions on the content that the newspaper may contain, neither the 
school nor its officials may interfere with the viewpoints expressed in the 
publication without running afoul of the First Amendment. 
We agree that, at a minimum, when a public university establishes 
a student media outlet and requires no initial restrictions on content, it may 
not censor, retaliate, or otherwise chill that outlet’s speech, or the speech 
of the student journalists who produce it, on the basis of content or 
viewpoints expressed through that outlet. This holding is fully consistent 
with and, indeed, substantially follows from, our decisions, and those of 
the Supreme Court, in other cases addressing limited public fora.280  
Hosty’s Silver Lining 
A silver lining from Hosty is that it ultimately inspired a greater level of 
protection for student newspapers at public universities in Illinois.  Shortly after the 
Hosty decision, the Illinois legislature reacted to the case by enacting the Illinois College 
Campus Press Act, which explicitly declared all student-run newspapers at Illinois public 
universities to be public forums in which university administrators could have no 
editorial control or ability to censor content.281  The federal courts in Illinois have 
expressly held that the Act supersedes the holding in Hosty to the extent of any 
conflict.282   
This is an interesting issue when it comes to the power of courts.  It is an 
important feature of our democratic system that judicial rulings are subject to 
modification by legislative bodies (federal judges are not accountable to the people —
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legislators are).  However, if federal courts base the ruling on a constitutional provision, 
legislation cannot modify the ruling. 
It could be argued that, at least in the state of Illinois, the Hosty decision has no 
lasting practical effect.  If anything, the Hosty decision ultimately generated more 
vigorous protections for student journalists by encouraging the Illinois legislature to pass 
the Illinois College Campus Press Act.  Furthermore, the ruling focused the attention of 
the student press community about the extent to which student journalists should be free 
to choose the content of their publications.  This act, as well as other state legislatures’ 
attempts to protect student-produced media, will be the focus of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
 
STATE LEGISLATION AND STATE COURT CASES 
The extent to which students are protected by the First Amendment when they 
publish a school newspaper or disseminate information in some other form has long been 
the subject of dispute and, as earlier chapters have demonstrated, has been mostly 
undefined by the courts.  In recent years, various state legislatures have passed laws 
granting more extensive and explicit protection to student journalists by limiting the 
authority of school administrators to restrain publication in advance or otherwise censor 
the students’ work.  Some of those laws also provide immunity from liability for school 
districts that are prevented from interfering with student press freedom.  Although the 
laws vary in how they provide greater First Amendment protection, they seem to suggest 
a growing recognition by some state legislators that student publications are important, 
both to readers, who become better informed about school activities and issues, and for 
students, who use the publication as a laboratory to develop their skills.  Interest in 
passing legislation may have been inspired by several court decisions, including the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hosty v. Carter, discussed earlier in this dissertation. 
Eight states (Arkansas, California, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, and Oregon) have passed laws strengthening protection for student 
expression, particularly with regard to school-sponsored publications.  Some statutes 
protect secondary school students, some protect university students, while others protect 
both.  This chapter will discuss the statutes and examine the impact of these laws, 
especially as they have been interpreted by state courts. 
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Overview of State Statutes Protecting Student Expression 
Before analyzing any of these statutes, it is appropriate to provide a general 
overview of the kinds of protections that have been enacted by these state legislatures, 
and whom these statutes are supposed to protect.  For example, the laws in Oregon 
(passed in 2007) and Massachusetts (1988) protect students only in public high 
schools.283  The Illinois statute (2007) protects only students at public colleges.284  
Illinois’s statute may suggest a recognition on the part of legislators that younger 
students, whose journalism skills have yet to be developed, should be more closely 
supervised and their work subjected to closer supervision by school officials before 
publication.  Importantly, most of the statutes, while providing protection for student 
media and expression, recognize exceptions for reasons such as campus disturbance, rule-
breaking, and illegal activity.  
California Includes Private Schools 
California’s statute—by far the most comprehensive—dates back to 1977 and has 
been expanded since then.285  Known as the “Leonard Law,” the California statute 
provides protections for free expression to students in all public schools, including 
colleges and universities, all charter schools, as well as providing some protection for 
students in private high schools.286  California’s law states, in part: 
Pupils of the public schools, including charter schools, shall have the right 
to exercise freedom of speech and of the press including, but not limited 
to, the use of bulletin boards, the distribution of printed materials or 
petitions, the wearing of buttons, badges, and other insignia, and the right 
of expression in official publications, whether or not the publications or 
other means of expression are supported financially by the school or by 
use of school facilities, except that expression shall be prohibited which is 
obscene, libelous, or slanderous. Also prohibited shall be material that so 
incites pupils as to create a clear and present danger of the commission of 
unlawful acts on school premises or the violation of lawful school 
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regulations, or the substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the 
school.287 
It is worth noting that the First Amendment, and almost the entire Constitution, 
applies only to government entities, and public schools are units of local or state 
government.  (The Thirteenth Amendment, outlawing slavery, could be interpreted as a 
section of the Constitution that directly applies to private individuals.  But there is a 
difference between not requiring a private individual or entity to do something as 
opposed to telling a private individual or entity that it cannot do something.)  Private 
institutions are not obligated to extend First Amendment rights to their employees or 
students.  Nevertheless, California has tried to extend greater speech and expression 
rights to students who attend private schools.   
California courts have so far upheld the statute as it applies to private schools. In 
1994, the Santa Clara County Superior Court heard Robert J. Corry v. Leland Stanford 
Junior University, in which Stanford contested the constitutionality of California’s 
educational statute 94367 (the “Leonard Law”) guaranteeing private university students 
the same free speech rights on campus as they would have off campus.  The trial court 
ruled against Stanford, and there was no appeal.288  Two other cases, Antebi v. Occidental 
College289 and Yu v. University of La Verne290, have involved the application of the 
statute but not the constitutionality of the statute.  These cases seem to suggest that the 
law is enforceable; the only questions involve its specific application.  
Some statutes also limit the scope of protection, covering only those publications 
created under the guidance of a staff advisor or teacher.291  For example, Subheading C 
of California’s statute states:  
…it shall be the responsibility of a journalism adviser or advisers of pupil 
publications within each school to supervise the production of the pupil 
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staff, to maintain professional standards of English and journalism, and to 
maintain the provisions of this section.292 
For all the strength of California’s statute, it also demonstrates the difficulty of 
laws keeping up with technology.  For example, California’s statute contains more than 
400 words, and was amended in 2008, but says nothing about social media.293  
Students Decide Content 
One of the most important elements of several of the laws is a recognition that 
students—and not teachers or administrators—should determine the content of their 
publications.  In California, Iowa, and Oregon, student expressive freedom statutes grant 
student journalists the right to freely assign, write, and edit the content (news, opinion, 
and features sections) of their journalism publications.294  For example, Iowa’s statute, 
“Student Exercise of Free Expression,” passed in 1989, states, “Student editors of official 
school publications shall assign and edit the news, editorial, and feature content of their 
publications subject to the limitations of this section.”295   
Ban on Prior Restraint 
Another key area of protection for the student press is the ban on prior restraint by 
school administrators.  Several state student press statutes, including those in California, 
Colorado, Illinois, and Iowa, explicitly prohibit the exercise of prior restraint by school 
administrators.296  Thus, Colorado’s statute, “Rights of Free Expression for Public School 
Students,” states: 
(1) The general assembly declares that students of the public schools shall 
have the right to exercise freedom of speech and of the press, and no 
expression contained in a student publication, whether or not such 
publication is school-sponsored, shall be subject to prior restraint except 
for the types of expression described in subsection (3) of this section. This 
section shall not prevent the advisor from encouraging expression which is 
consistent with high standards of English and journalism. (2) If a 
publication written substantially by students is made generally available 
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throughout a public school, it shall be a public forum for students of such 
school. (3) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to authorize the 
publication or distribution in any media by students of the following: 
(a)  Expression that is obscene; 
(b)  Expression that is libelous, slanderous, or defamatory under state law; 
(c)  Expression that is false as to any person who is not a public figure or 
involved in a matter of public concern; or 
(d)  Expression that creates a clear and present danger of the commission 
of unlawful acts, the violation of lawful school regulations, or the 
material and substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the 
school or that violates the rights of others to privacy or that threatens 
violence to property or persons.297 
This provision in Illinois state law, which was upheld and reinforced by a federal 
court,298 says the following: 
All campus media produced primarily by students at a State-sponsored 
institution of higher learning is a public forum for expression by the 
student journalists and editors at the particular institution. Campus media, 
whether campus-sponsored or noncampus-sponsored, is not subject to 
prior review by public officials of a State-sponsored institution of higher 
learning.299 
Expression Beyond Student Media 
Statutes in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Oregon, and Massachusetts provide 
that students’ freedom of expression extends to school-sponsored speech, with certain 
limitations (such as time, place, and manner restrictions) that will be discussed below.300  
California, Iowa, and Massachusetts grant students freedom of expression in all forms, 
also with certain limitations.301  And the Massachusetts student press freedom statute 
additionally provides for freedom of assembly: 
The right of students to freedom of expression in the public schools of the 
commonwealth shall not be abridged, provided that such right shall not 
cause any disruption or disorder within the school. Freedom of expression 
shall include without limitation, the rights and responsibilities of students, 
collectively and individually, (a) to express their views through speech 
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and symbols, (b) to write, publish and disseminate their views, (c) to 
assemble peaceably on school property for the purpose of expressing their 
opinions. Any assembly planned by students during regularly scheduled 
school hours shall be held only at a time and place approved in advance by 
the school principal or his designee. 
No expression made by students in the exercise of such rights shall 
be deemed to be an expression of school policy and no school officials 
shall be held responsible in any civil or criminal action for any expression 
made or published by the students.302 
Immunity for School Officials 
As the Massachusetts statute (above) demonstrates, legislators seemed to 
recognize that by limiting the discretion of school officials to regulate the content of 
student publications, teachers and principals may be vulnerable to lawsuits by those 
harmed by such publications.  That is why several of the statutes, in addition to 
Massachusetts’s, grant immunity to school officials from such lawsuits.  In Colorado, 
Iowa, and Kansas, student press statutes protect schools, school districts, and school 
officials from liability for the content of student journalism publications.303  
Statutes in Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, and Massachusetts state that the content of 
student publications cannot be assumed to represent the policies of the sponsoring or host 
school or district.304  In Kansas, the student press freedom statute shifts liability for 
student publications from the district to the student when the students involved are 
adults.305 Kansas’s statute, in its entirety, says the following: 
(a) The liberty of the press in student publications shall be protected. 
School employees may regulate the number, length, frequency, 
distribution and format of student publications. Material shall not be 
suppressed solely because it involves political or controversial subject 
matter. 
 
(b) Review of material prepared for student publications and 
encouragement of the expression of such material in a manner that is 
consistent with high standards of English and journalism shall not be 
deemed to be or construed as a restraint on publication of the material or 
an abridgment of the right to freedom of expression in student 
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publications. 
 
(c) Publication or other expression that is libelous, slanderous or obscene 
or matter that commands, requests, induces, encourages, commends or 
promotes conduct that is defined by law as a crime or conduct that 
constitutes a ground or grounds for the suspension or expulsion of students 
as enumerated in K.S.A. 72-8901, and amendments thereto, or which 
creates a material or substantial disruption of the normal school activity is 
not protected by this act. 
 
(d) Subject to the limitations imposed by this section, student editors of 
student publications are responsible for determining the news, opinion, 
and advertising content of such publications. Student publication advisers 
and other certified employees who supervise or direct the preparation of 
material for expression in student publications are responsible for teaching 
and encouraging free and responsible expression of material and high 
standards of English and journalism. No such adviser or employee shall be 
terminated from employment, transferred, or relieved of duties imposed 
under this subsection for refusal to abridge or infringe upon the right to 
freedom of expression conferred by this act. 
 
(e) No publication or other expression of matter by students in the exercise 
of rights under this act shall be deemed to be an expression of school 
district policy. No school district, member of the board of education or 
employee thereof, shall be held responsible in any civil or criminal action 
for any publication or other expression of matter by students in the 
exercise of rights under this act. Student editors and other students of a 
school district, if such student editors and other students have attained the 
age of majority, shall be held liable in any civil or criminal action for 
matter expressed in student publications to the extent of any such student 
editor's or other student's responsibility for and involvement in the 
preparation and publication of such matter.306 
Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 
The rights students enjoy under state statutes are not limitless.  Most states 
exclude from protection some speech, such as threats of violence, speech that incites 
disturbance, and libel.  The Arkansas Student Publications Act also forbids publications 
that constitute an “unwarranted invasion of privacy, as defined by state law.”307  While 
these limitations are necessary, they also leave a large gray area for censorship-prone 
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school officials.  The level of speech protection afforded to students is an uncertain 
question that state courts have grappled with since the first statutes were passed. 
School administrators in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Oregon, 
and Massachusetts are authorized to implement reasonable restrictions on the time, place, 
and manner of student expression.308  Further, schools in most of these states (often 
through the journalism advisor) may censor articles or other speech deemed possibly 
obscene309 or libelous,310 or that meet a number of listed exceptions to the freedom of 
expression, including materials which could incite “material and substantial disruption” 
on campus,311 violence,312 gang activity,313 law-breaking,314 or rule breaking.315  
Statutes differ in the amount of expressive freedom explicitly granted to students.  
A Colorado statute providing freedom of expression in schools was found by the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals to be limited to written materials.316  Statutes in Arkansas, 
Colorado, and Oregon exclude any content that would constitute an invasion of 
privacy.317  What is missing from those laws (except for those pointing to other specific 
statutes) is an explicit definition of privacy that would alert those who prepare student 
publications that they are encroaching on privacy rights.  
Because most students on K-12 campuses are minors, their rights to privacy are 
greater than those afforded to adults.  Thus, school administrators in these states retain 
significant control over some types of content.  Some statutes also allow for exceptions to 
press freedom for materials deemed harassment, threats, or intimidation.318  For example, 
Illinois’s College Campus Press Act contains the following amendment: “Nothing in this 
Act prohibits the imposition of discipline for harassment, threats, or intimidation, unless 
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constitutionally protected, or for speech that is not constitutionally protected, including 
obscenity or incitement.”319 
There are also some differences in the roles and amount of protection afforded to 
advisors.  California and Iowa require that the advisors “supervise” and “maintain 
professional standards” in addition to enforcing the limits of student expression (such as 
preventing content which could incite violence or rule breaking).320  Advisers in 
Colorado, Kansas, and Oregon have lesser authority and are authorized only to 
“encourage” or “teach” professional standards, proper English, and other aspects of these 
statutes.321  In California, Iowa, and Kansas, school journalism advisors are also 
protected from retaliation by the school administration over objections to the content of 
the student press.322  In other words, a principal cannot fire a journalism advisor because 
the principal dislikes an article in the student newspaper. 
Additionally, many state legislatures include provisions that protect the 
administration of the school from liability for student publications, in order to abolish one 
of the justifications for regulation of student speech stated by the Hazelwood court.323  
(Justice White expressed concern in Hazelwood that the views of an individual speaker 
could be “erroneously attributed to the school.”324)  Thus, Colorado law states:  
No expression made by students in the exercise of freedom of speech or 
freedom of the press shall be deemed to be an expression of school policy, 
and no school district or employee, or parent, or legal guardian, or official 
of such school district shall be held liable in any civil or criminal action 
for any expression made or published by students.325   
Providing such immunity is necessary; after all, it would be unfair to tell school 
officials, on the one hand, that they cannot censor student publications except for the few 
reasons outlined in the statute, but on the other hand, expose them to potential liability.  
Legislators likely believed this immunity would encourage school principals and other 
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officials to permit controversial or objectionable content to be disseminated when they 
otherwise would prevent such publication.   
Some state statutes also affirmatively provide for the right to sue when a school 
district violates a student’s freedom of expression. For example, California law states that 
“a student enrolled in an institution … may commence a civil action to obtain appropriate 
injunctive and declaratory relief as determined by the court.”326  Because school officials 
have been held liable for violating First Amendment rights of students in cases involving 
the creation of parody websites that do not use school facilities, this is a potentially strong 
incentive for school officials to allow publication of material they would have censored 
in the past.   
How These Laws Reflect Legislators’ Views  
Most state legislatures have not enacted statutes protecting student speech.  
Reasons for not passing statutes protecting student speech may include the following 
reasons. 
• It is simply not a priority.  Because legislators have so many other issues to 
deal with, they don’t consider this problem to be urgent.   
• There is no organized group supporting First Amendment rights for students 
the way lobbyists promote special interests.  
• Legislators fear that robust protection for student speech would embolden 
students to be disrespectful or disruptive, with no consequences. 
In states that have passed such legislation, these statutes could be said to reflect 
legislators’ recognition of student newspapers as an important element in campus life.  
These statutes could also suggest legislators’ recognition that freedom of expression is 
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essential if students are to understand the important lessons of civics and journalism that 
participation in student press can teach.  Whatever the case, these laws generally aim to 
strike a balance between the school’s need to ensure appropriate student conduct during 
school hours and the need for student journalists to exercise the freedom of the press to 
its greatest extent.  This balance is reflected in the protections these statues provide both 
to student journalists and to the schools. 
By barring administrators from exercising prior restraint against content presumed 
to fall under one of the exceptions, legislators are allowing students who write and 
publish during their school careers to develop skills they will use during their journalism 
careers. By giving students autonomy to decide what goes in their publications, 
legislators are also allowing students to make mistakes that would be more serious if 
printed in a professional publication. 
As some of the statutes recognize, it is important that school officials retain some 
authority to prevent the publication of material they consider to be poor journalism.  
After all, many students have underdeveloped research, interviewing, and writing skills, 
and teachers or others who supervise newspapers must be able to prevent the publication 
of articles that fail to adhere to minimum standards of journalism.  Unfortunately, there is 
always the possibility that school administrators may claim that they are restraining a 
publication because it is shoddy journalism, when the real reason is that the content is 
potentially embarrassing to the school. 
Federal Versus State Courts 
As discussed earlier, in states that passed statutes protecting student expression 
rights after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hazelwood, the federal courts have often 
recognized that the state statutes extend First Amendment rights to students beyond what 
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courts say the U.S. Constitution requires.  But what about state courts?  There are 
significant differences between state and federal courts, due partly to the method of 
selection and caseloads of their judges.  Federal court judges are appointed by the 
president of the United States and serve life terms.327  State court judges are selected by a 
variety of means including appointment by state or local political leaders or direct 
election by local voters and their terms vary from one state to the next.328  As a result, 
state court judges may be more susceptible to political bias or currying favor with voters.  
Because of their broader jurisdiction, state courts also hear far more cases in a given year 
than federal courts.329  Thus, outcomes in state courts may differ from those in federal 
courts hearing the same kinds of cases.  
Reliance on State Statutes 
In free-speech cases, state courts usually have interpreted student rights based on 
the language of the statute (if they have one) and supported the position that these statutes 
expand, rather than limit, students’ rights to free speech.  Iowa’s legislature, for example, 
has provided substantial protections to student journalists.  Iowa Code Section 280.22, 
adopted in 1989, after the Supreme Court’s Hazelwood decision, says the following: 
1. Except as limited by this section, students of the public schools have the right 
to exercise freedom of speech, including the right of expression in official 
school publications. 
2. Students shall not express, publish, or distribute any of the following: 
a. Materials which are obscene. 
b. Materials which are libelous or slanderous under chapter 659. 
c. Materials which encourage students to do any of the following: 
(1) Commit unlawful acts. 
(2) Violate lawful school regulations. 
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(3) Cause the material and substantial disruption of the orderly 
operation of the school. 
3. There shall be no prior restraint of material prepared for official school 
publications except when the material violates this section. 
4. Each board of directors of a public school shall adopt rules in the form of a 
written publications code, which shall include reasonable provisions for the 
time, place, and manner of conducting such activities within its jurisdiction. 
The board shall make the code available to the students and their parents. 
5. Student editors of official school publications shall assign and edit the news, 
editorial, and feature content of their publications subject to the limitations of 
this section. Journalism advisers of students producing official school 
publications shall supervise the production of the student staff, to maintain 
professional standards of English and journalism, and to comply with this 
section. 
6. Any expression made by students in the exercise of free speech, including 
student expression in official school publications, shall not be deemed to be an 
expression of school policy, and the public school district and school 
employees or officials shall not be liable in any civil or criminal action for any 
student expression made or published by students, unless the school 
employees or officials have interfered with or altered the content of the 
student speech or expression, and then only to the extent of the interference or 
alteration of the speech or expression. 
7. “Official school publications” means material produced by students in the 
journalism, newspaper, yearbook, or writing classes and distributed to the 
student body either free or for a fee. 
8. This section does not prohibit a board of directors of a public school from 
adopting otherwise valid rules relating to oral communications by students 
upon the premises of each school.330 
While applauded by student press freedom advocates, the above statute is 
imperfect.  For example, it does not cover privacy, suggesting that lawmakers often do 
not think about public disclosure of private information or false light when writing laws 
concerning student press rights.  In addition, it prohibits obscene publications, but 
someone can publish something sexually graphic and controversial without meeting the 
Miller standards for obscenity.  Under Miller, to be considered obscene, the material must 
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be “…works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray 
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”331  A student newspaper, of course, 
can show revealing and disturbing material without being sexually stimulating.   
Lange v. Diercks: Protecting the Teacher 
To date, Iowa’s state courts have addressed student free speech rights under 
Section 280.22 in only one case: Lange v. Diercks in 2011.  The following quote is from 
the appellate court, which reversed the trial court decision in favor of the school district.  
In Lange, Appeals Court Judge Mary E. Tabor wrote: 
More than two decades ago, the United States Supreme Court decided that 
school administrators did not violate the First Amendment by exercising 
editorial control over student newspapers as long as their limits on 
expression were reasonably related to educational concerns. … A handful 
of states, including Iowa, responded to Hazelwood by enacting statutes 
more protective of student journalists' free speech rights. This appeal 
marks our first opportunity to interpret Iowa's Student Free Expression 
Law, Iowa Code section 280.22 (2009).332 
The case began when a journalism teacher was punished by the principal for 
allowing students to publish “inappropriate articles” (the administration’s description) in 
two different issues of the Waukon High School student newspaper.333 In a memorandum 
supporting their motion for summary judgment, principal Dan Diercks and the Allamakee 
Community School District stated that they considered the following content of the 2008 
April Fools’ edition to be “of concern”:   
• Changing the title of the paper from Tribe–Une to Bribe–Une; 
• Referring to “Keysux Senior High School” in the masthead (a derogatory 
twist of the name of their cross-county rival's mascot Kee Hawks334 
• Designating the edition as “Issue 66 Volume 6 66 Sixth Avenue N.W.”; 
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• Articles headlined “Tierney to the Rescue”; “Sophomores Not Allowed to 
Grand March”; “Cheerleaders on ‘Roids' “; “New Jim Floor Settles”; and 
“Cell Phones Allowed”; 
• An article headlined “Meth Lab Found in Biology Lab, Matt Breitbach Faces 
Criminal Charges” with an accompanying photo of biology teacher Breitbach; 
• Photographs of a student wearing a headband; a student wearing a hooded 
sweatshirt and displaying “gang signs”; a student with a dead cat; and a 
student football player; and 
• Quotes from one student who said he would “like to go to a Chippendale's 
tryout” after graduation; one student who said she wanted to be “an all-
American gangster, dog” after graduation; and one student who said he 
“totally, like, want[s] to be a super model for Victoria's Secret!”335 
Lange, the teacher, argued that the April Fools’ edition was clearly satire, with 
every page of the April 2, 2008, publication containing the following disclaimer: “This 
issue is a parody created in celebration of April Fools' Day. It contains no factual 
information.” Nevertheless, the following fall, on August 28, 2008, Diercks sent a formal 
reprimand to Lange, saying that “numerous inappropriate text, comments, and articles 
were created, edited, and printed” in the April Fools’ edition of the student newspaper.  
The reprimand also said a “multitude of people from within our school district and a 
neighboring school district of Eastern Allamakee were offended by this edition. [The] 
administration and the school board felt that the issue was inappropriate and done with 
poor judgment, casting a dark shadow on our school district.”336  The reprimand, in the 
form of the letter, was the total punishment.  
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The district’s dissatisfaction with Lange’s handling of the newspaper continued 
the following fall.  Diercks and the District again expressed concern with materials in the 
September 30, 2009, edition.  In their memorandum supporting their motion for summary 
judgment, they stated that they “considered ... the following content of the September 30, 
2009 edition ... to be of concern”: 
• An article about smoking and tobacco use headlined “Students Chew, Use 
Tobacco” and an accompanying picture of a baby smoking a cigarette; 
• An article headlined “Fashion Guidelines Shift the Focus”; 
• A photograph of a student wearing clothing prohibited by the dress code; and 
• A quote from a student that if he could be “any famous person,” he would 
choose to be “Jay Z because he is a gangster.” 
On October 1, 2009, Diercks wrote a second formal reprimand to Lange.  This 
reprimand stated that “[n]umerous inappropriate and questionable text, comments, 
pictures, and articles were created, edited, and printed in [the September 30, 2009] 
edition.”  The letter said staff and community members within the school district were 
offended by this edition, and that the administration felt that the issue “undermined our 
school district's goals.”  The administration also said Lange would be suspended for two 
days without pay, but later retracted that part of the letter, substituting it with a new 
reprimand. The new reprimand added a complaint about the September 30, 2009, edition; 
namely, that it “contain[ed] one article that tacitly encouraged the use of tobacco products 
by students within the school setting.”  This complaint arose because of a decades-old 
photo (origin unknown) of a baby smoking a cigarette).  The new reprimand also said that 
“[e]ncouraging a violation of law (the use of tobacco products on school premises) is an 
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exception to Iowa law that grants broad liberties to student journalists.”  The letter went 
on to say that “this issue caused anger and embarrassment to students, parents and others, 
and the necessity of dealing with complaints [generated by the publication of September 
30, 2009,] caused a significant and material disruption to the operation of the school 
district.”  Importantly, the letter incorporated language from section 280.22(2), noting 
that encouragement of illegal activity is unprotected speech for student journalists.337   
These facts show that the statute protects a significant amount of speech.  The principal 
had to find that the article encouraged a violation of law and school rules—smoking by 
underage students—in order to justify the reprimand. 
On January 22, 2010, Lange filed a petition for declaratory judgment against 
Diercks and the district, asking the court to conclude the publications did not violate 
section 280.22 and to order the district to remove the reprimands from his personnel file 
and permanently expunge them.  In October 2010 both sides moved for summary 
judgment.  On January 13, 2011, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
district and Diercks.  Lange appealed, asking the Iowa Court of Appeals to reverse the 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Diercks and the District and to remand to the trial 
court his motion for summary judgment. The Iowa Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the 
journalism teacher:   
Because school administrators cannot point to any specific content in the 
publications that encouraged students to engage in activities barred by the 
statute, we reverse the grant of summary judgment for the district and 
principal. We direct the district court to enter summary judgment for the 
teacher. Under any definition of the term “encourage,” the content at issue 
did not fit within the narrow categories of expression prohibited by section 
280.22(2). We further conclude supplemental relief is appropriate; 
removing the reprimands from the teacher's personnel file is necessary to 
protect students' free speech as contemplated by section 280.22.338 
The court also said: 
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As an initial matter, we believe that the district court mistakenly assumed 
that our legislature intended to codify Hazelwood. In 1989, the Iowa 
General Assembly enacted section 280.22 in reaction to the Supreme 
Court's decision one year earlier in Hazelwood. We are persuaded it did so 
for the purpose of giving students more robust free-expression rights than 
those articulated by the Supreme Court. Commentators uniformly agree 
that section 280.22 prohibits school officials from exercising prior 
restraint of student publications to the extent allowed under Hazelwood.339 
The school district did not appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court.  Importantly, no 
Iowa court has cited or referenced Lange v. Diercks since it was decided in 2011, 
suggesting that this anti-Hazelwood statute, enacted by the Iowa legislature to protect 
student free expression, is effective in deterring schools from infringing on student 
expression rights.   
The absence of post-Lange decisions by an Iowa court suggests that the statute 
discourages school officials from interfering with the content of student publications.  
Nevertheless, there may be instances in which school officials exercised censorial power 
in violation of the statute that were not tested in court either because the journalism 
teacher did not want to anger superiors by bringing a lawsuit or because the teacher did 
not have access to legal representation to bring such a suit. 
Smith v. Novato: “The Risk Must Be Taken” 
A 2007 case in California demonstrates how controversial an article or editorial 
can become even though it appears in a student newspaper with limited circulation. In 
Smith v. Novato Unified School District, the Court of Appeals for the First District of 
California reversed a lower court decision that had ruled in favor of the school district.   
This complex case does not involve censorship per se, but illustrates the complicated 
landscape that schools must negotiate in their attempts to maintain order, foster an 
environment of tolerance, and yet protect student speech—all at the same time.  The 
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events of the case begin in the fall of 2001.  A student, Andrew D. Smith, wrote an 
editorial for a California high school newspaper, The Buzz, titled “Immigration,” which 
contained the following statements:  
• “I'll even bet that if I took a stroll through the Canal district in San Rafael that 
I would find a lot of people that would answer a question of mine with ‘que?’, 
meaning that they don't speak English and don't know what the heck I'm 
talking about.” 
• “Seems to me that the only reason why they can't speak English is because 
they are illegal.” 
• “40% of all immigrants in America live in California ... because Mexico is 
right across the border, comprende?” 
• “[I]f they can't legally work, they have to make money illegal way [sic]. This 
might include drug dealing, robbery, or even welfare. Others prefer to work 
with manual labor while being paid under the table tax free.” 
• “If a person looks suspicious then just stop them and ask a few questions, and 
if they answer ‘que?’, detain them and see if they are legal.” 
• “Others seem to think that there should be a huge wall along the Mexican/U.S. 
border.” 
• “Criminals usually flee here in order to escape their punishment.”340 
Understandably, tempers flared after the article was published, resulting in angry 
phone calls from parents and even “community meetings” held at the school.  However, 
the student, angry at the negative reaction, was not deterred.  Six months later, he wrote a 
second, equally inflammatory article.  The district reacted to the second article by 
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publicly apologizing and promising not to allow the publication of any other such articles 
on the immigration issue.  Smith’s parents filed suit, alleging violations of Smith’s right 
to free speech under the United States and California Constitutions and the California 
Education Code.  The suit also challenged the district's speech policies as “facially 
invalid.”—meaning that the policy would be unconstitutional under all circumstances, no 
matter how it was applied.  The plaintiffs sought an injunction prohibiting further 
infringement of speech and nominal damages of one dollar.341 
The trial court ruled in favor of the district and the individual defendants on all 
causes of action. The judgment included an award of costs to the district, meaning that 
the plaintiff may be responsible for thousands of dollars of legal bills incurred by the 
school district in defending the lawsuit.342  (Courts generally require each side to pay 
their own expenses because the awarding of costs can discourage future meritorious 
lawsuits from being filed.)  However, the higher court—the California Court of 
Appeals—disagreed with the judgment, saying: 
The District sent the clear message that no further speech similar to 
“Immigration” would be tolerated. In the aftermath of “Immigration” the 
District succumbed to the fear of disruption and discontent. While 
understandable, this was not permissible. “[I]n our system, 
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to 
overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute 
regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's 
opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or 
on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an 
argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take 
this risk … and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—
this kind of openness—that is the basis of our national strength and of the 
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this 
relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.” … When faced with 
offensive student speech, school districts must proceed cautiously with 
due regard to the valuable rights at stake, rather than reacting impulsively 
because of protest about the speech.343 
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Noting that classrooms should be models for the marketplace of ideas, the court of 
appeals also said: 
It is to the District's credit that it resisted the temptation to censor Smith's 
second, similarly provocative opinion editorial, “Reverse Racism,” which 
was published about six months later, in May 2002. Nevertheless, we are 
bound to conclude that the District's response to “Immigration” infringed 
on Smith's right to exercise freedom of speech and violated section 
48907.344  
Those who are uncomfortable with students having so much freedom may wonder 
why the school, which had a chance to stop the second article, nevertheless allowed the 
article to be published despite the inevitable fallout.  The answer may simply be that 
California’s student press protections, which date to the 1970s, have been instilled in the 
public school system in a deeper way than in other states.  Put another way: Because the 
article did not clearly fall within an exception to speech protections, the school chose not 
to censor.  
This case showed the willingness of California courts to grant students—even 
with limited journalism experience and skills—the same rights that adults would enjoy in 
a non-school context unless the student speech falls within one of the few exceptions.  
School officials in California may be justified in wondering whether there are any limits 
to student speech if it does not involve libel or obscenity.  Yet there are many subjects 
about which students can write that can cause problems for school officials that do not 
fall into one of those categories of speech. 
Vulgar Speech in States with Student Expression Protections 
In 1996, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court similarly found that vulgar 
student speech was protected under state law.  In Pyle v. School Committee of South 
Hadley, a unanimous Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the state’s student 
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speech statute protected students’ rights to engage in even vulgar speech that is not in a 
school-sponsored forum so long as it does not cause an actual disruption at school.345  In 
this case, two public school students were punished for wearing T-shirts which their 
school administrators thought were vulgar and offensive.346  One read “See Dick Drink. 
See Dick Drive. See Dick Die. Don’t be a Dick” and another read “Coed Naked Band: 
Do It To the Rhythm.”347   
The students argued that the school’s dress code violated their freedom of 
expression, as protected by the state statute regarding student speech.348  The court, in 
finding for the students, noted the wording of the statute: “[t]he right of students to 
freedom of expression in the public schools of the commonwealth shall not be abridged, 
provided that such right shall not cause any disruption or disorder within the school.”349 
The statute contained no exceptions for vulgarity.  Therefore, because the speech did not 
cause a disruption, the court held that the statute was unambiguous as to its protections of 
students’ speech in this context.350   
However, even in states with strong student-expression statutes, such as 
California, students do not always prevail in court.  In Lopez v. Tulare Joint Union High 
School District, students made a similar argument in asserting the right to use profanity at 
school in an artistic context.351  In this case, students sued school officials who had 
censored the script of a student-produced film made in connection with a film arts 
class.352  The film attempted to address the problems of teenage pregnancy, following the 
difficult lives of two teen protagonists and their baby, resulting in turmoil, conflict, and a 
heart-wrenching separation.353  The film dialogue included sparse use of curse words and 
vulgar phrases, which the students thought appropriate to the material and which their 
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advisor approved.354  The school board demanded the vulgarities be cut from the film.355  
In so doing, school officials “made no finding on whether the profanity at issue was 
legally obscene, but rested its decision solely on the grounds of educational 
suitability.”356  The Court found that under state law schools have the authority to censor 
“four letter words” even in the context of student publications, because of the “special 
nature of the high school environment.”357  In finding for the school district, the court 
reasoned that “[c]ensorship of ‘four letter words’ does not unduly hinder the students’ 
ability to express their ideas or opinions on any subject. It enjoins only the indecent 
manner in which an idea is expressed.”358   
In comparing the two cases, one notes that both states have statutes strongly 
protecting student expression.  However, in the Pyle case, the vulgarity was manifested in 
sexual innuendo (which was protected), while in Lopez, the vulgarity took the form of 
four-letter words (which was not protected).  The Lopez case shows that young people do 
not always enjoy the same First Amendment rights as adults.  A film with profanity 
would obviously be constitutionally protected if made by adults, even if widely 
distributed.  
Speech Published on Social Media 
One of the most nuanced areas of student speech jurisprudence is the distinction 
state courts make between types of speech: verbal, student newspaper, social media, or 
otherwise.  When courts decide cases in states with no student speech statutes, it matters 
a great deal what platform the student uses to express himself or herself. 
In the 2012 case Tatro v. University of Minnesota, the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota addressed the issue of whether a state university violated a student’s free 
speech rights by disciplining Amanda Tatro, a 31-year-old undergraduate student in the 
125 
 
Mortuary Science Program, for posting jokes about embalming cadavers on her Facebook 
page.359  Tatro was a highly unusual case that suggests the difficulty courts are having 
(and will continue to have) with cases involving social media.  For example, who could 
view Tatro’s posts?  The answer is complicated.  Tatro’s posts were not viewable by 
anyone with an Internet connection; they were viewable only by Tatro’s “friends” and 
“friends of friends.”  However, with Facebook and other social media, anyone with 
access to otherwise private material can forward it to someone else, and a private joke 
can quickly “go viral” and be accessed by untold numbers of people. 
In one post, Tatro referred to a cadaver as “Bernie,” a reference to the movie 
Weekend at Bernie’s, in which two men try to fool people into believing their dead friend 
Bernie is alive.  As Facebook users know, a post begins with the user’s name, so a post 
often sounds like a person is writing about himself or herself in the third person.  Such is 
the case with this post: 
Amanda Beth Tatro realized with great sadness that my best friend, 
Bernie, will no longer be with me as of Friday next week. I wish to 
accompany him to the resort.  Now where will I go or who will I hang 
with when I need to gather my sanity? Bye, bye Bernie. Lock of hair in 
my pocket.360 
A fellow student read the posts and reported Tatro to the department director. After 
meeting with other faculty, the department director notified university police.361  The 
university's disciplinary body charged Tatro with violating rules involving privacy and 
respect for deceased individuals.  Tatro was informed that her grade in the lab course had 
been lowered from a C+ to an F, and she was forced to complete a mandatory psychiatric 
evaluation, among other consequences.  Tatro sought judicial review, arguing that the 
disciplinary actions for her off-campus speech violated her First Amendment rights.  The 
ACLU of Minnesota filed a friend-of-the-court brief on behalf of Tatro.362   
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Tatro conceded that her free speech rights are curtailed to some extent in the 
context of professional obligations to the morgue and that there were limitations on what 
she could post on Facebook about her work with human cadavers, but she argued that the 
university’s rule was overbroad, encompassing any speech about the program.  The court 
(which treated the student’s social media speech as on-campus speech throughout the 
proceedings), disagreed, finding that the university’s rules for the program were narrowly 
tailored and based on established professional standards.  It held that the university did 
not violate Tatro’s free speech rights by sanctioning her.363  Although the ACLU of 
Minnesota expressed disappointment in the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in this 
case, it noted some positive developments as a result of this ruling.  For example, the 
court agreed that the Tinker line of cases was not appropriate in the context of this case. 
Although Tatro planned to seek further review of the court's decision, she died 
unexpectedly on June 29, 2012.364   
A 2014 case from the U.S. District Court for Minnesota cites the Tatro case.  In 
Keefe v. Adams, a student who was removed from Central Lake College’s associate 
degree nursing program brought A Section 1983 action against the college administrators, 
alleging that they denied him due process and violated his right to free speech.  (It will be 
recalled that Section 1983 is a federal statute allowing civil suits against public officials 
and those acting under “color of law” for deprivation of constitutional rights.)  Among 
many other inflammatory statements, he had called a classmate a “stupid bitch” on 
Facebook.365  The administrators asserted that they did not violate Keefe's First 
Amendment rights by disciplining him for his statements on Facebook. Citing Tatro, the 
defendants said that “courts have upheld against First Amendment challenge academic 
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discipline for inappropriate social media postings that violate academic professional 
standards.” They contended that they enforced recognized nursing standards against 
Craig Keefe and that their interest in enforcing those standards outweighed any First 
Amendment interest asserted by him.366  The college’s motion for summary judgment 
was granted. 
Few people would condone the behavior of Tatro or Keefe.  Nevertheless, such 
cases raise difficult questions about how far a school may go in disciplining adult 
students when administrators dislike a student’s statements published on social media.  A 
2010 article in The Chronicle of Higher Education noted that medical students, as a rite 
of passage in the early 1900s, often posed with pictures of cadavers or skeletons.367  The 
book Dissection: Photographs of a Rite of Passage in American Medicine: 1880-1930 
includes more than 100 photographs of medical students posing with their cadavers.368  In 
the early 20th Century, people would undoubtedly have been horrified if they had known 
their doctors had posed with cadavers when they were medical students.  Of course, this 
information was known by only a select few and was kept secret.  It was a private joke.  
In the age of social media, students must understand that there is no such thing as a 
private joke.  Students must come to grips with the fact that their statements and behavior 
will affect them in ways previous generations did not have to contend with.  As the 
Chronicle article noted, medical schools are beginning to address this problem by adding 
a social media component to their ethics classes.369  Beyond the legal questions 
surrounding social media postings, students must understand that their online behavior 
will affect them in the professional world.  
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Hazelwood’s Occasional Bright Side 
Despite the numerous obstacles faced by students living in states without anti-
Hazelwood statutes, court decisions sometimes find in their favor even under the 
Hazelwood standard.  For example, in Griffith v. Butte School District No. 1, the Supreme 
Court of Montana considered the case of a former high school student who alleged that 
school officials violated her right to freedom of speech when it refused to allow her to 
deliver a graduation speech that contained religious references.370  Before the ceremony, 
the student and her father met with the principal, who gave them a copy of the school 
district’s policies and reminded the student that religious references would not be allowed 
in students’ graduation speeches.371 
The court, in applying the Hazelwood standard, found that the district violated the 
student’s constitutional right to free speech because the proposed speech did not fall 
within any of the three recognized situations in which it is permissible for school officials 
to impose a viewpoint-based limitation on student speech.372  The court found it 
untenable that the speech could be “perceived to bear the imprimatur of the school” and 
that allowing it would violate the Establishment Clause, finding that “Griffith’s cursory 
references to her personal religious beliefs could [not reasonably] be viewed by those in 
attendance at the … graduation ceremony as a religious endorsement by the School 
District.”373   
Speech About Speech 
It’s clear that under the Hazelwood standard a student’s right to free speech is 
limited, but what about speech that refers to unprotected speech?  Just such an issue arose 
in 1993 in Desilets on Behalf of Desilets v. Clearview Regional Board of Education, in 
which the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey addressed whether 
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schools can, under Hazelwood, censor speech reviewing or describing speech that would 
be unprotected at school.374   
Judges have allowed schools to suppress student speech that is vulgar.  However, 
in Desilets, the court made it clear that there is a difference between (1) unprotected 
speech that is vulgar and (2) protected speech that describes another work that is vulgar.  
In Desilets, a junior high student sued school officials, alleging that they violated the 
student’s constitutional rights when they censored from the student newspaper the his 
reviews of R-rated movies.375  The reviews, which were approved for publication by the 
journalism teacher,376 contained nothing offensive, lewd, vulgar, obscene, libelous, 
insulting to the rights of others, or likely to be disruptive of or interfere with orderly 
school conduct and discipline.  Nor was the language inappropriate for immature 
audiences.377  However, the school claimed that because the reviews were about R-rated 
movies, which would be inappropriate for immature audiences to view, it had a legitimate 
pedagogical reason to censor the articles under the Hazelwood standard.378   
The appeals court distinguished the facts of this case from those in Hazelwood, 
noting that “the material in Hazelwood was censored because of its content and 
journalistic style.  In the instant matter, it is conceded that the censorship had nothing to 
do with the style of the review.  Nor was the content of the reviews a basis for the 
censorship, but only its subject matter.”379  The court stressed the importance of this 
distinction, explaining that “content is what is written; subject is what is written about”380 
and “the pedagogical interests of the school do not extend beyond the style and content of 
the article.”381   
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The court noted that decisions “concerning the appropriateness of a movie’s 
content is ultimately a parental one, not an educational one” and that the censorship was 
an extreme reaction to fears of parental objections.382  The court noted that a simple 
disclaimer would prevent any parent from misinterpreting the publication of the review in 
the newspaper as an endorsement by the school.383  
While student expression rights prevailed in this instance, the fact that the school 
district relied on the Hazelwood standard demonstrates the need for stronger student 
expression protections through state legislation. 
Strictly Verbal Speech 
In the 2012 case People v. Rapp, the Court of Appeals of Michigan heard an 
appeal of a criminal case in which the defendant was convicted of the misdemeanor of 
disrupting campus officials after he angrily confronted a campus parking enforcement 
officer about a parking ticket.384  The defendant was charged with violating Michigan 
State University Ordinance 15.05, which states: “[n]o person shall disrupt the normal 
activity or molest the property of any person, firm, or agency while that person, firm, or 
agency is carrying out service, activity or agreement for or with the University.”  The 
issue heard on this appeal was whether the language in the ordinance (making it an 
offense to “disrupt the normal activity” of a protected person) was facially overbroad.385  
Among the reasons the court sided with the prosecution was a distinction between this 
case and the one relied upon by the lower courts (City of Houston v. Hill ).386  Hill is a 
U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with a similar ordinance, passed by city government, 
that criminalized verbal interruptions of any nature whatsoever of police.  The ordinance 
was found unconstitutionally overbroad.387  The Court of Appeals of Michigan pointed 
out that, unlike in Hill, the campus ordinance in Rapp did not target verbal speech.388 
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Viewpoint Discrimination 
In a New York case involving campus speech, a parent asserted that his child’s 
school infringed upon THE child’s First Amendment rights by not allowing him to set up 
a booth providing information on alternative career paths to military service at a career 
day to which military recruiters were invited.  In Macula v. Board of Education, the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York examined whether school officials 
engaged in viewpoint discrimination by allowing military recruiters into the school but 
prohibiting the plaintiff from setting up a “truth-in” table.389  The court explained that in 
a nonpublic forum like a school, officials may repress speech so long as they do so in a 
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral manner.390  The majority held that the school had not 
violated the parent’s First Amendment rights because it had not endorsed the military’s 
message or created a forum for military speech—it was merely complying with a statute 
that mandates allowing military recruiters on campus.  As such, the school was not 
expressing disagreement with the parent’s views by denying his request to set up a “truth-
in” table during college days.  Perhaps most people would find this reasoning 
unconvincing.  After all, why would the issue be that the school was endorsing the 
message?  That point hardly seems relevant to the First Amendment issues. 
The dissenters argued that the information the plaintiff sought to provide was a 
direct counterpoint to information that would be presented by the military recruiters.  
Therefore, the school’s decision was not viewpoint neutral because it allowed the 
recruiters to present their information but barred the plaintiff from doing the same.391  
But the court rejected that argument. 
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Libel, Defamation, and Invasion of Privacy 
When school officials consider suppressing student speech, they sometimes 
invoke state statutes that allow them to act when the content is potentially libelous.  But 
some cases are brought not when students are demanding the right to publish, but when 
teachers or students want to stop the publication of an article they think will be harmful.   
In Salek v. Passaic Collegiate School, the Appellate Division of the Superior 
Court of New Jersey decided a lawsuit brought by a faculty member who objected to 
pictures in the yearbook that implied the teacher wanted to engage in sexual relationship 
with another faculty member.392  A section of the yearbook titled “The Funny Pages” 
contained pictures of students and faculty with supposedly humorous captions, including 
a picture of the plaintiff sitting next to and facing another teacher and a caption that read 
“Not tonight Ms. Salek. I have a headache.”393  The teacher unsuccessfully argued that 
Hazelwood required school officials to exercise greater censorship over the content 
and/or style of the yearbook.394  The court held that the mere desire on the part of school 
officials to avoid upsetting the teacher would not have justified the censorship of the 
publication.395  
In Walko v. Kean College of New Jersey, a college administrator brought a 
defamation suit against the college newspaper for a fake advertisement in a “spoof” 
edition.396  After examining the fake ad, the court held that the entire spoof section 
contained not a single serious article that could be read as a factual statement or anything 
other than a joke and therefore the ad was protected expression under the First 
Amendment.397  The Court said: “What is at stake here is the balance to be struck 
between the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press, and the individual's 
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interest in reputation, peace of mind, and freedom from emotional distress. On these 
facts, freedom of the press outweighs the individual's interest.”398 
In examining student press law jurisprudence, it is remarkable how often April 
Fools’ Day and spoof editions of student newspapers result in lawsuits.  Although humor 
and satire are important forms of expression that deserve strong protection, journalism 
teachers and advisors may be forgiven for discouraging spoof editions in what is 
otherwise a serious publication reporting factual news for the school community.  Spoof 
editions tend to showcase a lack of maturity and judgment on the part of some students, 
often resulting in hurtful and embarrassing material.  
Incitement, Disturbance, and Threats 
One area where states without student speech statutes grant schools broad 
discretion is when the student speech is considered threatening or may lead to disruptions 
within the school.  In J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, a Pennsylvania 
school district’s decision to permanently expel a middle school student because of a 
website containing threatening and derogatory comments about one of his teachers and 
his principal, was found to be within the school’s authority.  The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania wrestled with the issue of whether a website created off campus would fall 
under the constitutional jurisprudence for student speech.  As the court noted, “The most 
striking web page regarding Mrs. [Kathleen] Fulmer … was captioned, ‘Why Should She 
Die?’ Immediately below this heading, the page requested the reader to ‘Take a look at 
the diagram and the reasons I gave, then give me $20 to help pay for the hitman.’ “399  
When school let out for the summer, he received a letter from the school district 
informing them that it was aware of the website and that it intended to suspend J.S. for 
three days, asserting that J.S. had violated school district policies on “threat[s] to a 
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teacher, harassment of a teacher and principal, and disrespect to a teacher and principal, 
each resulting in actual harm to the health, safety and welfare of the school 
community.”400  After hearings, the school district eventually decided to expel J.S.401  
J.S. appealed the expulsion to the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton 
County, arguing that the school district violated his First Amendment rights.402  The 
Pennsylvania court took a “cautious approach that considered and balanced both the 
constitutional rights of the student with the preservation of order and a proper educational 
environment.”403  The court found that there was a sufficient connection between the 
website and the school to consider the speech as occurring on-campus.404  While no one 
disputed that the website was created off campus, the court found that “J.S. facilitated the 
on-campus nature of the speech by accessing the web site on a school computer in a 
classroom, showing the site to another student, and by informing other students at school 
of the existence of the web site.”405  Learning of the website, faculty members and school 
administration also accessed the web site at school.406  The court stated that it was 
important that by its content, it was clear that J.S.’s website was “aimed not at a random 
audience, but at the specific audience of students and others connected with this 
particular school district” and that it was “inevitable” that the website would circulate on 
school property.407  
The court considered several factors, known as the “Perkins Test” (derived from 
the 2001 Wisconsin case State v. Perkins408) in determining whether the content of J.S.’s 
website constituted a true threat.  The test includes how the recipient and other listeners 
reacted to the alleged threat; whether the threat was conditional; whether it was 
communicated directly to its victim; whether the makers of the threat had made similar 
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statements to the victim on other occasions; and whether the victim had reason to believe 
that the maker of the threat had a propensity to engage in violence.409  The only factor 
under which J.S.’s website could be considered a “true threat” was his teacher’s reaction 
(she suffered “severe mental and physical harm”).410  The death threat was not 
accompanied by anything indicating it would or could be carried out.411  The court 
decided that the website, taken as a whole, was not a true threat, but “a sophomoric, 
crude, highly offensive and perhaps misguided attempt at humor or parody.”412   
Nonetheless, if the speech disrupted school work, it would still be unprotected 
speech.413  J.S. argued that his speech was protected under Tinker because it caused 
minimal disruption.414 The court disagreed, noting that while “there must be more than 
some mild distraction or curiosity created by the speech ... complete chaos is not 
required.”415  The court found that the website had actually caused substantial disruption 
on campus, including the direct and indirect impact of the emotional and physical harm to 
his teacher.416  The court noted that “as a result of Mrs. Fulmer's inability to return to 
work, three substitute teachers were required to be utilized which disrupted the 
educational process of the students.”417  Because the speech was not protected by the 
First Amendment, the school did not violate J.S.’s rights by expelling him.418  The court 
wrote:  
In sum, the web site created disorder and significantly and adversely 
impacted the delivery of instruction. Indeed, it was specifically aimed at 
this particular school district and seemed designed to create precisely this 
sort of upheaval. Based upon these facts, we are satisfied that the School 
District has demonstrated that J.S.'s web site created an actual and 
substantial interference with the work of the school to a magnitude that 
satisfies the requirements of Tinker.419  
The issue of disruptive speech was also the subject of the 1997 New York State 
case Board of Education of Monticello Central School Dist. v. Commissioner of 
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Education.  Citing the Hazelwood standard, the court in this case noted that the test for 
disruptive speech is whether school officials have reason to believe the speech will 
“substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other 
students.”420  A student had written articles in an off-campus newspaper encouraging 
students to deface and defile the campus.421  A school official testified that he was 
“scared when he read the newspaper because he simply did not know how the students 
would react to the article in question.”422  The court concluded that, given the plain 
language of the speech, school officials could reasonably have found that the article 
constituted a threat to the quiet order of the school.423 
The New York courts faced the issue of student threats again in 2012 in Saad-El-
Din v. Steiner, in which a student was punished for threatening to blow up the school.424  
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York was posed with the question 
of whether a student must intend the speech as a threat or to cause actual disruption on 
campus in order for it to fall outside the First Amendment protections.425  The court held 
that schools do not need to prove either actual or inevitable disruption, but that the 
student speech was reasonably likely to result in disruption.426  The court held that 
although no one testified that they thought the student would actually blow up the school 
(students thought it was a joke), “it was nevertheless reasonably foreseeable that such a 
threat … would create a substantial disruption within the school.”427  
In the absence of state laws protecting students’ freedom of speech at school, 
courts skew toward diminished rights.  Although it is not realistic to expect that all state 
legislatures will eventually adopt laws with strong student speech and press protection, 
such efforts on the state level remain important.  As the concluding chapter will explain, 
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there are other avenues available—beyond amending state educational statutes—for those 
who want stronger protection for student journalists. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
CONCLUSION 
Student Speech Rights Should Be Strengthened 
Both high school and college students are entitled to greater First Amendment 
protection than they are currently given in most states.  By providing enhanced First 
Amendment protection, courts, legislators, and school officials will help students to learn 
valuable lessons about the importance of free expression in a democratic society and will 
better protect discussion of public issues.  In a dissent from Hazelwood, Justice Brennan 
cautioned that the Supreme Court majority’s approach could give license to a regime of 
“thought control” in which unprincipled administrators “can camouflage viewpoint 
discrimination as the ‘mere’ protection of students from sensitive topics”: 
[Censorship] in no way furthers the curricular purposes of a student 
newspaper, unless one believes that the purpose of the school newspaper is 
to teach students that the press ought never report bad news, express 
unpopular views, or print a thought that might upset its sponsors.428 
Prior restraint may be tolerated in certain circumstances in public high schools, but a 
public school principal should be required to publish his or her reasons for such action, 
and the reasons must satisfy certain criteria.  This idea, along with other policy 
recommendations for public and private schools, will be discussed below. 
Student Newspapers Fill an Important Role 
With nationwide newspaper cutbacks, fewer reporters cover the high school and 
college beat.  Students help fill the void with their reporting.  Student reporting—even at 
the high school level—has uncovered important stories that might otherwise not be 
brought to public view.  In September 2013, students writing for an Ohio high school 
newspaper looked at public records and discovered that what their high school’s 
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administration had called an “alleged assault” by a student was actually an alleged 
rape.429  In November 2013, students at a Staten Island high school broke a story about 
how the answers to Department of Education standardized tests were posted online before 
the test was administered.430  These are just two recent examples of how students can 
develop journalism skills while also helping to hold public institutions accountable. 
The California Model 
While the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment sets a 
floor in terms of speech protection, a state may choose to provide greater protection for 
speech and press, either under its constitution or statutory law, as long as it does not 
infringe upon other constitutionally protected rights.  Several state legislatures have 
extended First Amendment protection to student journalists—both in K-12 and at the 
college level—when their state courts seemed unwilling to enhance such rights.431 
In the context of student speech generally and high school newspaper publications 
in particular, California has gone further than any other state in protecting these rights.432  
The California Education Code contains two relevant provisions that California courts 
have interpreted as providing greater protection for student speech than does the First 
Amendment (as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hazelwood and other cases).  
First, Section 48907, which was added to the code in 1977, provides that “[p]upils of the 
public schools…shall have the right to exercise freedom of speech and of the press 
including, but not limited to…the right of expression in official publications, whether or 
not the publications or other means of expression are supported financially by the school 
or by use of school facilities.”433  It further provides, “[p]upil editors of official school 
publications shall be responsible for assigning and editing the news, editorial, and feature 
content of their publications subject to the limitations of this section…”434  Second, 
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Section 48950 of the Code grants California students the same First Amendment 
protections at school as they possess outside of school:  
A school district operating one or more high schools, a charter school, or a 
private secondary school shall not make or enforce a rule subjecting a high 
school pupil to disciplinary sanctions solely on the basis of conduct that is 
speech or other communication that, when engaged in outside of the 
campus, is protected from governmental restriction by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 2 of Article I of 
the California Constitution.435 
Taken together, Sections 48907 and 48950 provide more protection for student 
speech than do the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court based on the First Amendment.436  
In California, even when a high school does not open a publication to student 
groups or parents, which might have the effect of creating a limited public forum, school 
officials may not exercise control over the content of the publication unless they can 
establish an applicable exception under sections 48907 or 48950.  Exceptions include 
expression that is “obscene, libelous, or slanderous,” as well as “material that so incites 
pupils as to create a clear and present danger of the commission of unlawful acts on 
school premises or the violation of lawful school regulations, or the substantial disruption 
of the orderly operation of the school.”437 
The Struggle for Consensus 
With few state laws like California’s protecting student speech (and little 
guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court), federal and state courts have had to contribute to 
the development of student speech and press rights through a series of decisions that 
attempt to balance the First Amendment with the need for school officials to maintain a 
positive learning environment.  As discussed throughout the dissertation, court rulings 
often reflect the fact that high school students generally do not have significant 
journalism experience and may have limited skills when it comes to researching and 
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writing stories.  Students may also not understand the potential harm that inaccurate 
information or an invasion of privacy might cause.  
One example of the difficulty of granting high school students complete control 
over school newspapers is their handling of April Fools editions.  These editions, many of 
which have been the subject of lawsuits, often print outrageous lies and humiliating jokes 
about innocent people—in a publication that otherwise is supposed to report serious 
news.  Such editions often enrage the community and leave readers wondering whether 
the high school newspaper is a serious journalistic effort or a joke. 
School officials are understandably concerned about the public image of their 
institutions.  It is, therefore, understandable that they would want to prevent the 
publication of stories that are embarrassing or reflect poorly on the school in some other 
way.  The difficulty for courts, legislators, parents, and concerned citizens is knowing 
when a student publication is being censored because school officials want to limit the 
dissemination of negative information as opposed to the more commonly stated reason: 
the article was not journalistically sound.  In Hazelwood, Principal Reynolds claimed that 
the right sources weren’t interviewed for the article (e.g. the parents in the divorce story) 
and that a student’s privacy would have been invaded (revealing her pregnancy).  As 
Justice White noted, “Reynolds was concerned that, although the pregnancy story used 
false names ‘to keep the identity of these girls a secret,’ the pregnant students still might 
be identifiable from the text.”438 
What the Law Should Require 
State laws do not have to go as far as California’s to be effective.  While 
censorship of clearly defamatory and false information or invasion of privacy may be 
necessary, administrators should never use their power to censor accurate reporting.  
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Laws involving speech and press rights at the K-12 level should include procedures to 
determine when a high school principal (or teacher or media advisor) is attempting to 
stop the publication of an article because it is embarrassing rather than because it is 
sloppy and potentially libelous journalism.  With such a law, a principal at a public high 
school who stops the publication of an article should be required to issue a statement 
immediately, explaining the reasons why he or she took such action.  If the reason is that 
the article represented unfair reporting or was poor journalism, the principal needs to 
explain in the statement the reasons for reaching that conclusion.  The law should require 
an outside panel of journalists who would independently determine whether the work 
done by the students failed to meet minimal journalistic standards.  
The law should also provide some penalty for a principal who is caught stopping 
an article for an insufficient reason.  The outside panel of journalists should be appointed 
by the local board of education, and the panel’s meetings should be open to the public.  
Additionally, the school board should be required to submit the principal’s or educator’s 
reasoning for the censorship to the local newspaper of record.  Local newspaper editors 
often feel it is part of their duty to support the journalistic efforts of students in their 
communities.  Once the panel convenes, the story that was censored will probably enter 
public discourse anyway, possibly in a local newspaper or newscast.  Fear of having a 
local news outlet reporting on a “censorship” story, as well as a potentially negative 
ruling from the outside panel, will probably discourage principals in the future from 
silencing a story.   
The Local Option 
None of this is to say that local schools cannot decide on their own that they 
would like their school newspapers to be public forums.  It is possible for a school district 
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to designate a student publication as a public forum, and the Student Press Law Center 
offers a template for school boards to accomplish this goal.439  The decision to identify 
the student newspaper as a limited public forum would send the message that school 
officials recognize the importance of a free press and want the students to have the 
chance, within some limits, to learn the craft of journalism and to inform the community 
about important issues.  
One could also argue that the Supreme Court implicitly recognized in Hazelwood 
that a public forum could be created simply by showing an express intent that the 
newspaper be treated as a forum—meaning the student newspaper is available to the 
public—rather than treated as a classroom teaching vehicle.  Justice White said: 
School facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school 
authorities have by policy or by practice opened the facilities for 
indiscriminate use by the general public, or by some segment of the 
public, such as student organizations.440 
The Court did not provide much of a road map for what criteria would give rise to 
a forum, but in several rulings, judges found that a public forum existed through 
longstanding institutional practice.  For example, in Dean v. Utica , Judge Tarnow said: 
Based on the evidence in the record, the Court finds that the Arrow is a 
limited public forum because it has been opened for use by the public for 
speech and discussion concerning matters that are relevant to the Utica 
High School community and its readership.441  
Thus, the decision to have a public forum can be made by the school district and 
does not require a court to declare such a principle in a lawsuit. 
Hosty Is Unreasonable 
Even if there is agreement that high school students need some supervision when 
it comes to publishing the school newspaper, there is less compelling reason to apply 
such restrictions to university students.  Student editors at public university newspapers 
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are adults and should have complete editorial control.  However, this invites a question: If 
the article or report is created for class credit, should the professor or advisor have the 
power to censor the material?  The answer should be no.  There is a complicated 
relationship among the quality of an article, the right to publish that article, and the grade 
given to the article’s author.  Advisors and professors may give a low grade because of 
the poor quality of the article but still allow it to be published.  One reason for this 
seeming inconsistency is that college students need to learn from their mistakes and see 
the consequences of publicly disseminating poorly researched and poorly written stories.  
Private Schools 
California is so far the only state that has enhanced student speech rights at 
private schools (both high school and college).  To date, there have not been any court 
cases involving the question of whether private schools must use their money and 
resources to publish anything students demand.  If such a case arises, a court is likely to 
hold that no private school is required to publish a newspaper, but if it does so, the 
students who work on the paper are entitled to the protection granted under the California 
law.  The reality is that private schools may choose to forego having a student newspaper 
altogether rather than have a newspaper over which they have limited control, or no 
control at all.  Public universities, funded by taxpayers and subject to the First 
Amendment, should not have the power to censor the student newspaper.  However, 
private universities exist in large part to be “places of refuge,” for lack of a better phrase, 
for people who do not believe in the way public universities are operated.  For example, 
public universities must abide by the separation of church and state.  Private universities, 
by contrast, may choose to be a religious school that requires chapel attendance or group 
prayer.  The government cannot force private universities to eliminate such requirements. 
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The strongest argument for student editorial freedom at a private university is not 
one based on the First Amendment; instead, it is an argument for quality and reputation.  
A private school may want a strong journalism program to attract students and to have 
school media operated by students that provide information about the institution to the 
community.  The most respected student newspapers give editorial control to the 
students.  In fact, the College Media Association—the nation’s largest group of student 
newspaper advisors—has a code of ethics stating that it is unethical for an advisor to do 
anything other than advise: 
Faculty, staff and other non-students who assume advisory roles with 
student media must remain aware of their obligation to defend and teach 
without censoring, editing, directing or producing. It should not be the 
media adviser’s role to modify student writing or broadcasts, for it robs 
student journalists of educational opportunity and could severely damage 
their rights to free expression. 442 
Nationwide Standards 
The First Amendment is part of a national charter, and it can be troublesome 
when it means one thing in one state and something else in another, especially in an era in 
which communication extends beyond state and national borders.  But the courts 
frequently allow states to adopt local standards within the framework of national rules.  
For example, in Gertz v. Welch, the Supreme Court nationalized the standards for public 
officials and public figures, but said states can determine the standard for private persons 
as long as there is negligence: 
So long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define 
for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or 
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood which injures a private individual 
and whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent.443 
As California’s model of student free speech has shown, it is wise to allow states 
some flexibility.  The rest of the country can look to California as an example of student 
151 
 
press freedom and see whether granting such freedom has created serious problems.  
Nevertheless, finding the right balance between allowing state experimentation and 
enforcing uniform national principles is not easy to find.  Courts and legislators will 
continue to deal with questions of how much discretion individual states should have in 
regulating student media.  
The founders of the United States knew that a democracy requires the free flow of 
information for citizens to be well informed about civic affairs.  Freedom of speech, in 
addition to allowing informed participation in self-government, can enrich the lives of 
individuals who participate in various expressive activities, especially in student 
journalism. 
Possibilities for Future Research 
Although this dissertation revealed and interpreted the results of legal research, 
the topic of student free speech is suitable for exploration by historians, anthropologists, 
sociologists, psychologists, and communication scholars, to name just a few other 
disciplines.   
For example, quantitative researchers could survey students, teachers, legislators, 
and members of the general public about their attitudes toward student free speech.  A 
quantitative study could lead to unexpected findings, such as the possibility that most 
students do not worry about their speech or press rights—or that the general public is 
more supportive of student free speech than previously thought.  After quantitative 
researchers uncover the attitudes toward student free speech among different 
demographic groups, qualitative researchers could conduct focus groups, in-depth 
interviews, or even ethnographies to discover why these groups hold such attitudes. 
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The previous five chapters demonstrate that there is a story to be told regarding 
student free speech.  Historians wanting to explore the history and development of 
student free speech in the United States would be writing about an important topic, but 
locating the people involved and persuading them to talk candidly about their experiences 
and decisions might be difficult.  For example, school officials may be hesitant to 
comment about issues that were the subject of litigation or may reflect poorly on the 
decisions they made.  Former students might be hard to find and their memories of the 
events and their thinking about the issues during the relevant time period may have faded.  
Unlike some historical subjects, there might be limited written records of what transpired 
at the time of the controversy.  
Likewise, the future of student speech and press rights will be full of surprises and 
insights.  The role of social media will continue to grow.  Communication scholars 
should examine how Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms are affecting 
what students are allowed to say both on and off campus.  The law—both case law and 
statutes—is not well developed when it comes to how much First Amendment protection 
students should have when using social media to communicate statements and opinions 
about school officials or school issues.  The extent to which school policies should apply 
differently to the publications (such as the school newspaper) and student comments on 
social media needs to be fully considered.  Student speech, including student journalism, 
has different ramifications when published online.   
The First Amendment does not have an age limit.  Students are entitled to 
substantial protection when exercising such rights, whether in a school-sponsored media 
outlet or through social media.  But balancing the free speech rights of students with 
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other societal interests will continue to challenge parents, judges, legislators, school 
officials, and of course, students. 
Copyright © David Richard Wheeler 
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431 Student expression protection laws generally protect the right of students participating in 
school press classes or extracurricular activities to write, edit, and generally run their news operations 
without unreasonable interference from school administrators.  One of the most important areas of 
protection under many state statutes is the official recognition of student journalists as the primary creators 
of student press content.  In California, Iowa, and Oregon, student expressive freedom statutes grant student 
journalists the right to freely assign, write and edit the news, editorial or opinion, and features sections of 
their journalism products. (Cal. Educ. Code, § 48907, subd. (c); Iowa Code Ann., § 280.22.5; and Or. Rev. 
Stats. Ann., §§ 336.477, 351.649.)  In Colorado and Kansas, student press laws grant them the additional 
authority to create and oversee advertising content. (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., §22-1-120.5, subd. (a); Kans. 
Stat. Ann., § 72-1506, subd. (d).) 
The second key area of protection for student press is the ban on prior restraint by school 
administrators.  Several state student press statutes, including California, Colorado, Illinois, and Iowa 
expressly prohibit the exercise of prior restraint by school administrators. (Cal. Educ. Code, § 48907, subd. 
(d); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., §22-1-120.1; Ill. Stat. Ann., 110-13-10; Iowa Code Ann., §280.22.3.)  This 
provision in Illinois state law was upheld and reinforced by subsequent case law. (Moore v. Watson, 838 
F.Supp. 2d 735 (N.D. Ill 2012).) 
Many student press statutes also expressly provide for and define freedom of expression allowed 
in schools or in school publications.  Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Oregon, and Massachusetts expressly 
provide that student journalists have the freedom of expression in school-related press activities. (Ark. 
Code Ann., § 6-18-1203; Cal. Educ. Code, § 48907, subd. (a); Iowa Code Ann., § 280.22.8; Or. Rev. Stat. 
Ann., § 336.477.2; Mass. Gen. Laws, § 71-82, subd. (a).)  Statutes in Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Oregon and Massachusetts provide that this freedom extends to school sponsored speech. (Ark. Code Ann., 
§ 6-18-1203; Cal. Educ. Code, § 48907, subd. (a); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 22-1-120.6; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann., 
§ 336.477.2; Mass. Gen. Laws, § 71-82, subd. (a).)  California, Iowa, and Massachusetts provide for 
students to have freedom of expression in all forms of expressive speech. (Cal. Educ. Code, §§ 48907, 
subd. (a), 48950, 76120; Iowa Code Ann., § 280.22.8; Mass. Gen. Laws, § 71-82, subd. (a).)  And the 
Massachusetts student press freedom statute additionally provides for freedom of assembly. (Mass. Gen. 
Laws, § 71-82, subd. (c).) 
Many of these statutes also expressly define and protect the role of the journalism teacher or 
advisor, mandating that this person oversee and bear some responsibility for the quality of content and style 
of the student press and for compliance with state restrictions on student press. (Cal. Educ. Code, § 4809, 
subd. (c); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., §§ 22-1-120.1, 22-1-120.5, subd. (a); Iowa Code Ann., § 280.22.5; Kans. 
Stat. Ann., § 72-1506, subd. (d); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 336.477.3.) 
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Finally, most statutes provide some level of protection for the schools and school districts when 
statutes prevent them from restricting student speech.  In Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, and Massachusetts, 
student press statutes protect schools, school districts, and school officials from liability for the content of 
student journalism products. (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., §22-1-120.7; Ill. Code, § 110-13-35; Iowa Code Ann., 
§ 280.22.6; Kans. Stat. Ann., § 72-1506, subd. (e);  Mass. Gen. Laws, § 71-82.)  Statutes in Colorado, 
Iowa, Kansas, and Massachusetts expressly state that the content of student journalism products cannot be 
alleged to represent the policies of the sponsoring or host school or district. (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 22-1-
12.7; Ill. Code, § 110-13-25; Iowa Code Ann., § 280.22.6; Kans. Stat. Ann., § 72-1506, subd. (e); Mass. 
Gen. Laws, § 71-82.)  In Kansas, the student press freedom statute shifts liability for student journalism 
products from the district to the student when the students involved are adults. (Kans. Stat. Ann., § 72-
1506, subd. (e).) 
School administrators in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Oregon, and 
Massachusetts are authorized to implement reasonable restrictions on the time, place and manner of student 
expression. (Ark. Code Ann., § 6-18-1202-04; Cal. Educ. Code, §§ 48907, subd. (a), 48950, subd. (f), 
76120; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 22-1-120.4; Iowa Code Ann., § 2802.22.4; Kans. Stat. Ann., § 72-1506, 
subd. (e); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 336.477.6; Mass. Gen. Laws, § 71-82.)  Further, schools in most of these 
states, often through the journalism advisor, may object to student journalism products which meet a 
number of listed exceptions to the freedom of expression, including materials which could incite “material 
and substantial disruption” on campus, (Ark. Code Ann., § 6-18-1204.4, subd. (c); Cal. Educ. Code, §§ 
48907, subd. (a), 76120; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 22-1-120.8; Kans. Stat. Ann., § 72-1506, subd. (c); Iowa 
Code Ann., § 2802.22.2, subd. (c)(3); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann., §§ 336.477.4, subds. (d), (c), 351.649; Mass. 
Gen. Laws, § 71-82); violence, (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 22-1-120.3, subd. (d)), gang activity, (Colo. Rev. 
Stat. Ann., § 22-1-120.8), or law-breaking, (Ark. Code Ann., § 6-18-1204.4, subd. (A); Cal. Educ. Code, § 
48907, subd. (a), 76120; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 22-1-120.3, subd. (d); Iowa Code Ann., § 280.22.2, subd. 
(c)(1); Kans. Stat. Ann., § 72-1506, subd. (c); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann., §§ 336.477.4, subd. (d)(A), 351.649); 
rule breaking, (Ark. Code Ann., § 6-18-1204.4, subd. (B); Cal. Educ. Code, § 48907, subd. (a), 76120; 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 22-1-120.3, subd. (d); Iowa Code Ann., § 280.22.2, subd. (c)(2); Kans. Stat. Ann., 
§ 72-1506, subd. (c); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann., §§ 336.477.4, subd. (d)(B), 351.649); or to prevent the 
distribution of journalism products that are obscene, (Ark. Code Ann., § 6-18-1204.1; Cal. Educ. Code, §§ 
48907, subd. (a), 76120; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 22-1-120.3, subd. (a); Iowa Code Ann., § 280.22.2, subd. 
(a); Kans. Stat. Ann., § 72-1506, subd. (c)), or slanderous or libelous. (Ark. Code Ann., § 6-18-1204.2; Cal. 
Educ. Code, § 48907, subd. (a), 76120; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 22-1-120.3, subds. (b), (c); Iowa Code 
Ann., § 280.22.2, subd. (b); Kans. Stat. Ann., § 72-1506, subd. (c); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann., §§ 336.477.4, subd. 
(a), 357.649.) 
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